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Summary
This publication examines the diasporic living conditions and their effects on 
 Tuareg refugees’ self-understandings, changing socio-political hierarchies, cul-
tural practices and religious identity formations in Niger. It focuses, in particular, 
on male refugees’s responses to the loss in social status and respectability induced 
by adverse conditions of exile. Unlike most others, it is not a study of a Tuareg 
polity with a traditional emphasis on the nobility, whose loss in power, and status, 
and alterations in nomadic and semi-nomadic life style in the course of twentieth 
century due to droughts, and famine induced exile, and the persecution or sim-
ple neglect of northern populations by the Malian central state have been docu-
mented by scholars over the past decades. Instead, this book offers an ethnography 
of two Tuareg groups of inferior social status, and examines arguments and social 
practices by which the two refugees groups in Niger redefine themselves as two 
social collectivities in response to their living conditions in exile. It argues that by 
presenting themselves as collectives, the refugees groups redefine their inferior 
social status in the Tuareg society left back home in northern Mali.
One protagonist group is composed of free-born non-noble, white or red 
 Tuareg, who fled Mali to settle in urban Niamey between 1963 and 2012. The sec-
ond group of refugees comprises the unfree Bellah-Iklan who came from Menaka 
region and live since 2012 with several other non-Bellah-Iklan refugees in Abala, 
southern Niger, in a refugee camp administered by the UNHCR. In spite of sig-
nificant differences between the situation in Niamey and Abala, in both settings, 
a situation of material deprivation and rampant structural or enforced unemploy-
ment, and experiences of being treated with hostility or arrogance, as foreign, 
 dependent and supplicant undermine male refugees’ sense of dignity, male honor 
and respectability, fuel intergenerational struggles over economic and moral re-
sponsabilities and obligations, and intra-marital conflicts.
These conditions prompt the refugees with vassal social status background to 
imagine all white free-born Tuareg as a homogenous social collective, “a Tuareg 
people”, and through this, the informants in urban Niamey seek to become equal 
to the noble groups at the top of the social structure by blurring intra vassal cleav-
ages and variations between free-nobles and the nobility. In their part, the unfree 
born, Bellah-Iklan refer to their living conditions in Abala, common history of 
servitude, and subjection, their racial and also their religious identity as well as 
marginalization within the Malian nation-state, as reasons to renounce member-
ship in the Tuareg ethnic group, and to claim a common identity as “Black people 
of the desert” in the exile situation. Through this claim, the Bellah-Iklan reflex-
ively downplay intra-Bellah-Iklan cleavages and redefine themselves as morally 
superior and the powerful group in relation to the free white Tuareg, implying a 
significant inversion of power vectors between the former Tuareg masters and the 
former slaves.
X Summary
While this book analyses in fine detail these refugees’ arguments in several 
chapters, one chapter examines how both groups of informants define their mem-
bership of the social collective they express attachment through daily practices. 
In Niamey, these daily practices consist of visiting each other, listening to Tuareg 
music by Tinariwen, speaking Tamasheq, their language back home, clothing, 
through endogamy, mutual solidarity, and the desire to return back home in the 
future. In Abala, the Bellah-Iklan express their membership to the social col-
lective through attending male conversations under the hangar in the refugee 
camp, mutual solidarity, endogamy, the desire to return back home to change 
the political imbalance between them and the free-born Tuareg in Menaka, and 
listening to guitar music by the Bellah-Iklan musical group while rejecting free 
Tuareg music. These practices not only express the differences, for example, be-
tween free-born Tuareg refugees and their neighbors, Hausa, and Zarma Niamey, 
or between the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg in Abala, but also they 
differentiate the informants of this study from other free-born Tuareg refugees 
who did not engage in the mentioned bonding practices in Niamey, and from 
other Bellah-Iklan who do not come to the Hangar, creating new lines of in-group 
cleavages that, ultimately, make their project of an all-inclusive community for-
mations unfinished at this stage.
To understand these dynamics of constructing in-group inclusions and exclu-
sions in the Nigerien diaspora, this book centers on the following aspects: exile as 
a transformative social experience; the “interplay of narratives and moral projects”; 
and stereotyping as reflexive social practice. The analysis draws on the literature on 
productive repercussions of the social conditions of exile; the theoretical spheres 
of studies of memory; and, finally, to the body of literature on stereotyping, and 
ethnicity. The results afford a much more dynamic understandings of Tuareg 
 socio-political hierarchies, and highlight refugees’ aspirations and capacities to 
 remake their imaginary and material worlds through moralizing labels and racial 
stereotypes that reformulate their own social and ethnic identity in the face of ad-
verse and often deeply humiliating living conditions. By highlighting the dynamic 
nature of moralizing discourses, and their relevance to collective identity forma-
tions, and how “othering” practices entail the positing not only of social difference, 
but of moral hierarchies, the study contributes to the anthropology of morality, 
anthropological debates on ethnicity, and memory politics.
1. Introduction
1.1 The scope of the study
In recent decades, the Niger Republic1 has become an important destination for 
thousands of refugees fleeing hunger, political persecution, and recurrent ethnic 
conflicts as well as rebellions in northern Mali. By the beginning of 1973, over 
13,000  Malian refugees had already arrived in Niger (Boilley 1999; Bonnecase 
2010a; Bonnecase 2010b; Bonnecase 2011). A more recent census by UNHCR 
suggests that the number of displaced Malians in Niger had increased to around 
50,000 persons by 2013.2 This publication focuses on Tuareg refugees who formed 
a significant part of this number in 2012.3 It examines narrative accounts and so-
cial practices through which two groups of Tuareg refugees redefined themselves 
as two distinct collectivities in response to the predicaments induced by exile. This 
book stresses that the constitutions of the refugees’ collectivities entail redefini-
tions of the (former) social status hierarchy that existed in Tuareg society back 
home in northern Mali (cf. Bourgeot 1990; Bourgeot 1995; Grémont 2010; Hureiki 
2003; Klute 1992a; Lecocq 2010).
1.1.1	 A	study	of	two	Tuareg	groups	of	inferior	social	status
The two protagonist groups of Tuareg at the center of this ethnographic study 
live in two different locations under contrasting conditions in Niger. One group 
of informants is composed of free-born, non-noble, white or red Tuareg.4 They 
historically formed an inferior social status group that stands below the free-born 
nobles and above the unfree Tuareg, the former slaves.5 They live interspersed 
with non-refugee residents in urban Niamey, the capital town of the Niger Repub-
lic. Originally, these white or red Tuareg inhabited the northern regions of Mali 
(Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal). They fled to Niamey between 1963 and 2012. While 
1 The Niger Republic is located northeast of Mali.
2 Point de presse du 10 Novembre 2015 par l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés.
3 It should be noted that this number does not trace refugees’s temporary movements back home 
and to Niger between 1970 and 2012.
4 I use the term “free-born Tuareg” to refer to those conventionally called free–white Tuareg or 
former masters in the literature. The population of free white Tuareg is quite diverse in Niamey. 
They are mainly Idnan, Idiaroussouwane, Chamanamas; Kel Essuk, Tagat Mallat, Ifergoumoussen, 
Ishadenharen, Kel Amdiliste, Immakalkalen, Iradianaten, Dawsahak, Kel Ullili, Ikougandène, Kel 
Talatayt, and Kel Antsar. Despite their diversity, they can be roughly categorized as free-born, 
white, non-noble people, and free-born white, noble Tuareg. My research focused on the non-no-
ble white Tuareg who are inferiror to nobles.
5 I will refer to them as free-born or white/red Tuareg throughout this book.
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some arrived in Niger between 1963 and 1968,6 others left Mali due to the well-
known devastating droughts in 1973–1974 and 1983–1984, and the ethnic conflicts 
in the 1990s and later in 2012. The second group of refugees comprises the unfree, 
Bellah-Iklan7, known as former slaves. This group comes from the area surround-
ing Menaka in the Gao region. Since 2012, they have lived with several other non-
Bellah-Iklan refugees in Abala, southern Niger, in a refugee camp administered by 
the UNHCR.8
When the Bellah-Iklan were asked about what motivated their violent and 
abrupt departure to Niger, they contended that the free white Tuareg have sin-
gled them out and subjected them to collective violence. They also explained that 
in order to understand the roots of the current conflict between themselves and 
the free-born Tuareg in Menaka, it is important to reflect upon the political pro-
cesses that have been at work since the early 1990s. For instance, some informants 
stressed the importance of the formation of a political party (UMADD) in 1992 
and later the creation of a propaganda radio station by Bellah-Iklan in Menaka.9 
The radio station had introduced a weekly public discussion program that centered 
on the history of the desert. More specifically, the radio program, called “Tessayt 
n-Azawagh” (literally, assessing the history of Azawagh: read desert), broadcast 
and called for critical conversations about the historical status of social groups 
in northern Mali. These actions began to undermine the domination of the free 
white Tuareg. For example, according to informants in Abala, the Bellah-Iklan 
organized themselves and succeeded in electing Aghamad Ag Azam-zim as Dep-
uty of Menaka between 1992 and 1997, which marked a victory for the former 
slaves over the former masters as Aghamad Ag Azam-zim had defeated the noble 
free white Tuareg, and Bajan Ag Hamatou, the leader of the Tuareg Ouillimeden 
6 Since most military operations of and subsequent restrictions from the Malian authorities around 
that time took place in the region of Kidal, the informants I met in Niamey who fled this conflict 
were also from this region.
7 The term “unfree-born” or “Bellah-Iklan” refers to former Tuareg slaves at the bottom of the so-
cial structure (Hall 2011b). While they are called Iklan, in the Kidal region they are referred to as 
Bellah, a term originating from the Songhay word, gaa-bibi, meaning Black person in the area sur-
rounding Menaka and the Niger Bend. See also Lecocq (Lecocq 2005, 48). A third name often used 
to refer the former slaves in northern Mali is Haratin, but this is mostly used for former slaves of 
the Arabs, another important social group living in northern Mali who have not  attracted  scholarly 
attention as compared to the Tuareg (see Scheele 2012; Scheele 2013). My dissertation  focuses on 
the Bellah-Iklan who primarily come from the following fractions: Dabakar, Kel  Talatayt, Ishaden-
haren, Kel Abaket, Kel Essuk, Kel Tabonant Bellah, Tagassassante, Elhadji  Moussa, Ikarkawane, 
Tarbanassa, Tamizguida Bellah, Ibhawane, Kel Tabonan Imajorène, Tamizguida Imajorène. 
 Igueressanane-Tabaho, Kel Tessayt, Targuitamant Wan Adrar, Targuitamant wan Agayok, Zamburuten, 
Kel Talamène, and Ikarabassan. 
8 According to the census conducted by UNHCR between 2012 and 2013, an estimated number of 
11,795 persons live in the refugee camp of Abala. The findings stemming from this survey classify 
68% of refugees in the camp as unfree-born Tuareg, referred to as former slaves or Bellah-Iklan, 
followed by 19% of Hausa, 10% Songhay, and 2% Fulani; 1% were free-born Tuareg.
9 The radio station is called radio Adrar.
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in Menaka.10 Others still pointed to the creation of the association, temedt (pla-
centa), as another major event that exacerbated the tension between the free-and 
unfree-born Tuareg in the area around Menaka. This tension stemmed in particu-
lar from the fact that the association took on the role of a human rights activist by 
fighting for the Bellah-Iklan’s freedom from domestic or herding slavery, which 
is still practiced by “free white Tuareg” in twentieth (first) century northern Mali 
(Lecocq 2005, see also Lecocq 2015, 194f.). This tension culminated in the expul-
sion of the former Bellah-Iklan from Menaka and its surrounding area in 2012. I 
divided my fieldwork between these two social locations in Niger, and this divi-
sion is reflected in the book. The first part of each chapter will focus on the free 
white Tuareg in Niamey, while the second concentrates on the Bellah-Iklan in the 
refugee camp at Abala.
In Niamey, the group of free-born white Tuareg I examined during my fieldwork 
interpreted their exile as one episode in a sequence of Tuareg suffering that began 
in Mali and will only end once they return there. They explained this through 
the belief that this long history of suffering had induced their consciousness of 
themselves as a collectivity, tumast tan kel tamasheq (“Kel Tamasheq” people11), 
which can be conceptualized as one homogenous community encompassing all 
free-born Tuareg in northern Mali. They argued that this collectivity will offer 
better living conditions to free-born Tuareg after their return to northern Mali in 
the future.
For them, however, the consciousness of this collectivity involves cancelling out 
historical cleavages and social differences between the free white Tuareg’ constel-
lations in northern Mali that have been emphasized in research on the subject (cf. 
Grémont 2010; Hureiki 2003; Klute 1992a, 2013; Lecocq 2010).12 This constellation 
also implies the homogenization of social status differences that distinguish free 
white nobles from non-noble, free white Tuareg. I argue that by claiming homoge-
neity that blurs the social status variations between free non-noble and free noble 
white Tuareg, the informants I met in Niamey sought to redefine their inferior 
social status and become equal to the free white, noble Tuareg groups.
While the free-born Tuareg informants presented themselves as “the Tuareg 
people” in exile in Niamey, the unfree-born Bellah-Iklan in Abala referred to 
themselves as “le peuple noir du désert” (the black people of the desert).13 They 
10 The same argument has been used to support Mossis Bocoum, the former Mayor of Menaka. How-
ever, unexpectedly (from the unfree’s side), since 1997 the former political dominant clans have 
won the other parliamentary elections.
11 According to Lecocq, the term means either “people” or “nation” (2002, 200).
12 I will present these scholarly accounts in chapter 3. While these accounts focused on specific re-
gional groups, for example, Kel Adagh in Kidal, Ouillimeden in Menaka, I focus on informants 
from all of these regions.
13 The Bellah-Iklan informants used the expression tumast ta kawalet n azawagh (literately, the black 
people of Azawagh) or just called themselves in French “le peuple noir du désert” or “les noirs.” I 
will call them the Bellah-Iklan throughout this book, thus adopting the denomination used by Hall 
(Hall 2011a; Hall 2011b).
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 imagined themselves as a collectivity defined by race, their inferior social status, 
experiences of exile, and a long history of marginality vis-à-vis Tuareg local clans 
as well as the Malian state. For them, the theological development of their suf-
fering would eventually result in freedom and prosperity upon their return from 
exile to Mali. This serves as the basis of their consciousness as a collective, the 
peuple noir, which they believe will allow them to return to Mali and alter the im-
balance of power between the Bellah-Iklan and the free white Tuareg in the area 
surrounding Menaka.
The informants in Abala stressed that being a collective of the peuple noir first 
involves the homogenizing of status between different Tuareg former slave catego-
ries that Hall, for instance, emphasizes in his four social types of the Bellah-Iklan 
(Hall 2011b, 67f.).14 Hall argues, as an example, that under colonial rule, there were 
those Bellah who practiced agriculture for part of the year and owed their free-
born masters a share of the harvest. Hall called these the Iklan n eguef. Until late 
1949, these Bellah-Iklan were officially taxed and administered by their masters 
unless otherwise stipulated by the colonial administration.15 Another category of 
Bellah-Iklan that Hall presents are those who constituted autonomous groups of 
herders (iklan n tenere). Characteristically, these people were usually under the 
control of a larger federation led by non-slaves. The third type in Hall’s classifica-
tion are those who lived with masters in domestic settings (iklan daw ehan). It was 
these domestic slaves who were the most likely to remain the longest with their 
masters. The fourth type of Bellah-Iklan are those who left their masters to settle 
in towns16 (Hall 2011b, 68). The accounts from the refugee informants in Abala 
also indicate that being the collectivity of the peuple noir involves redefining their 
group identity as non-Tuareg people in contrast to their former masters. Exam-
ining these claims, I shall show that by reconstructing themselves as non-Tuareg 
people, the informants in the refugee camp in Abala also redefined the former so-
cial status hierarchy that had existed between the Bellah-Iklan and the free white 
Tuareg in a radical way.
Studying the two groups of refugees of inferior social status from their own 
perspectives will complement scholarly accounts that have focused on Tuareg 
societies from the point of view of free, white, and politically dominant groups 
(e.g. Boilley 1999; Grémont 2010; Hureiki 2003; Lecocq 2010; Lecocq 2004; Lecocq 
14 See also Klute for an overview on similar classifications of the Bellah-Iklan (Klute 1995).
15 However, Hall stresses that in 1949, the French government introduced a policy of taxing the Bel-
lah-Iklan directly, rather than indirectly through their masters.
16 Hall reports that the colonial administration feared that these people acted as advocates for other 
Bellah-Iklan to leave their masters. For example, in a report on the Tuareg Kel Sidi Ali in 1950, 
the French administrator Henri Leroux indicated that “the emancipated and settled elements [of 
the Bellah-Iklan] in Timbuktu rapidly became the champions of Bellah emancipation and the 
counselors for their brothers still in the tribe.” It is they who gave the first asylum and assured the 
subsistence of the new fugitives (Hall 2011b, 67f.).
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2005).17 The results will generate new insights into debates on changes in the rela-
tions between different social status categories in the Tuareg societies in northern 
Mali on two levels. On one level, this study will contribute to scholarly discussions 
about changes in the relations between non-noble, free white and noble white Tu-
areg (Boilley 1999; Klute 2003; Klute 2013). For example, Klute traces how the 
non-noble, free white Tuareg of vassal social origin sought to challenge the social 
status hierarchy between them and the free, white, noble, and politically dominant 
groups, the Ifoghas, by claiming the social status of autochthons in the Kidal re-
gion (Klute 2003). However, while Klute’s account discusses how the non-noble, 
free white Tuareg sought to challenge the domination of the noble free whites 
by emphasizing their differences (2003), I examine how free white Tuareg of in-
ferior status sought to become equal to noble white Tuareg by blurring differ-
ences, (therefore emphasizing commonality) between themselves and the noble 
free white Tuareg groups.18 On the second level, this study will offer insights into 
on how the long-standing conflicted relations between the Bellah-Iklan and their 
former masters since the colonial era informed contemporary social processes of 
the refugees’ constructions of collectivity in both Niamey and Abala (Hall 2011b; 
Lecocq 2005).
1.1.2	 An	ethnography	of	male	social	conditions	and	imaginations	in	exile
This study is based on a dense ethnographic exploration of the biographies of men 
interviewed while I completed my field research in Niamey and Abala. It reflects 
on how these men articulated their group identities with specific aspects of their 
conditions of exile. To quickly introduce these men here using the pseudonyms I 
assigned them, Mossa Ag Attaher, Ibrahim Ag Irgimit, Alhabib Ag Sidi, and Ibra-
him Ag Mohamed were the main informants in Niamey town.19 Mossa Ag Atta-
her, a quiet and relatively tall free white Tuareg man was the first informant I met 
a few days after I arrived in Niamey in 2012. As I remarked on several occasions, 
Mossa only became talkative once the discussions among peers focused on the 
free-born Tuaregs past or culture in Mali and the present conditions in Niamey. 
He was born in 1961 in Gossi (near Gao town). Mossa arrived in Niamey as a ref-
ugee for the first time in 1973 at the age of 12. During that time, he had fled with 
17 What is remarkable is that very few studies that explicitly focused on the Bellah-Iklan approached 
them from the perspective of the former masters (Klute 1995), or the colonial archive itself domi-
nated by local racial discourses as Hall insistently suggested (Hall 2011a; Lecocq 2005).
18 As I argue throughout this book, claiming commonlality between free non-noble Tuareg and noble 
free white Tuareg groups is a response to informants’s longer history of suffering in Mali and Niger. 
At the same time, the refugees’s claims introduce long-standing tense relations between the free 
non-noble Tuareg and noble free white Tuareg groups. Seen in this light, the claims show that there 
is no agreement on the social status hierarchy between them.
19 I have given pseudonyms to all free-born Tuareg informants and their relatives in this book.
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his parents to Niger due to the drought that had devastated their entire livestock 
in northern Mali. On their arrival in Niger, the state first hosted them in the refu-
gee camp of Lazaré in suburban Niamey, and they were later transferred to Ham-
dallaye, about sixty kilometers from Niamey.20 After the closure of Hamdallaye, 
Mossa Ag Attaher returned to Gossi with his parents, who had divorced in the 
meantime, and Mossa stayed with his father. Like many of his generation, he had 
been unable to stay in Gossi because his family’s resources had been devastated 
in the preceding years by the drought. Moreover, before they overcame the con-
sequences of the first drought, a second arrived in 1983–1984, leading to the deci-
mation of what the returnees had managed to build to provide subsistence. Under 
such circumstances, he and several of his peers moved back to Niger in search 
of employment. As Mossa told me, his lack of education made it difficult to find 
formal employment. He then began to work as a guard and currently works for 
the French organization, IRD. His wife, Fadimata, is a free white Tuareg woman 
(from the Ifoghas’ clan) who was born in the Gossi region. She also relocated to 
Niamey under the same circumstances at the time she met Mossa Ag Attaher. 
They got married in 1985 and now have four children: Iba  (27), Ibrahim  (21), 
 Mohamed  (17), and Mariam  (14). With the exception of her daughter Mariam, 
their children all quit their education before finishing elementary school and have 
since been moving between jobs as either waiters or security guards in restau-
rants and private domiciles in Niamey, Lomé Cotonou, and Burkina Faso. During 
my fieldwork, Mossa’s family home was chosen as a gathering place where sev-
eral free-born Tuareg from northern Mali in Niger regularly met and socialized 
around the tea kettle. It was on one of these occasions that I met the second man, 
whom I call Mohamed Ag Irgimit.
Mohamed is also a free-born red or white Tuareg who originally comes from 
the same group as Mossa Ag Attaher and also has a vassal social background. He 
was born in the midst of the 1960s in Bamba near Bourem in the Gao region. He 
also came to the Lazaré refugee camp and later transferred to Hamdallaye in the 
1970s at the age of 6. There, he was adopted by a French couple who were volun-
teering as humanitarian workers in the refugee camp at the time. Thus he went to 
school under the care of this couple until his graduation with a Degree in Law at 
the University Abdou Moumouny in Niamey. Since then, he has been working for 
several transnational structures in Niger. Mohamed is married with two wives and 
he has five children. The oldest of his children, Anna (now 30 years), was about 
to complete her Master’s degree in sociology at the University Abdou Moumouni 
in Niamey in 2012. She was already married but had no kids at the time I met her 
in 2012. Anna’s brother, whom I refer to as Noni, is now 27 years old. He is the 
20 Bonnecase gives further details about the camp in Hamdallaye, established as a replacement for its 
predecessor in Lazaré. The main reason evoked for this was to satisfy the growing demand from 
the urban population of Niamey who viewed the refugees’s presence in Lazaré as a threat to their 
security (Bonnecase 2008).
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son of Mohamed Ag Irgimit’s first wife, Annatou. At the time we met, Noni had 
been working for four years with the French company Areva, in northern Niger. 
Noni’s three younger brothers, respectively 9, 7, and 4 years old, go to school in 
Niamey. Like Mossa, several free-born Tuareg visited Mohamed at his home after 
work. They sat on plastic mats around the tea kettle in the yard, which latter had 
been filled with sand and reminded them of “their past harmonious desert life” in 
Niamey.21
The pseudonym Alhabib Ag Sidi is used for the third man who I frequently 
interviewed. He is from the Tessalit area, in the Kidal region, where he was born 
in the 1950s. Originally, he is from Iradianaten’s fraction.22 Alhabib left the region 
for Algeria in the aftermath of the Tuareg’s first rebellion and the drought in 1973. 
From there, he moved on to Libya and ended up in Niamey where he has lived 
since 1983. Upon his arrival in Niamey, he began to work as a car driver for Belgian 
NGOs. There, he currently leads the Malian refugees’ association in Niamey.23 His 
wife is originally from the Immakalkalen group (near Bourem in the Gao region). 
Alhabib has four children, although his oldest daughter unfortunately passed 
away two years ago. His second oldest, Rabbi, is studying law at the university 
Abdou Moumouni in Niamey. Her brother Youssouf (29 years old) has completed 
his education in Niamey and is currently employed with the custom services in 
Niger. Like the other men introduced above, Alhabib’s retiree status allowed him 
more free time to talk, and to visit and be visited by peers at home, and people 
constantly came to his home starting at breakfast time at 7 am and ending only 
at dinner time, around 8 pm. Moreover, Alhabib played a crucial role in helping 
newly arrived refugees with their registration and had turned his homestead into 
an important socializing space for many free white Tuareg. These visits gave him 
the opportunity to engage in conversations about Tuareg history.
Ibrahim Ag Mohamed, the fourth white Tuareg man, was born in 1978 in the 
area of Gossi. Originally, he comes from the vassal social background. He first 
arrived in Niamey with his parents from the area around Gossi due to the devas-
tating drought of the 1980s. A year after their arrival Ibrahim’s father passed away. 
In the early 1990s, they went back to Mali and returned again to Niamey in 1994 
due to the civil war. Since then, Ibrahim has traveled to Lomé and Cotonou sev-
eral times in search of seasonal employment. During these years, he learned and 
mastered the guitar and founded the group Inor meaning the light. Ibrahim works 
currently as a security guard and lives with his sister, mother, and a close friend 
Alhousseyni, another red Tuareg from around Gossi. Indeed, Alhousseyni and 
Ibrahim first met in Lomé where they have both worked as seasonal employees 
21 Mohamed transported sand from the dunes around Niamey to cover the ground in his courtyard.
22 This fraction has been depicted as being politically allied with the dominant groups, called the 
Ifoghas, in the Adagh, but it is not considered to be a free noble warrior group. A fraction can be 
conceptualized as a socially organized herding unit (see Diallo 2008; elsewhere Bjørklund 1990; 
Bjørklund 2003).
23 There is an association called Comité des Réfugiés that deals with registrations issues in Niamey.
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since the 1990s. After a first failed marriage, Ibrahim remarried in 2013. His new 
wife is also a white or red Tuareg woman originally from the vassal group in the 
Timbuktu region. Ibrahim’s status as a musician along with his constant good 
 humor was manifested in his use of anecdotes throughout conversations, and 
this made him relatively famous among his peers in Niamey. This explains partly 
why no matter the time of the day, there were constantly several young free-born 
 Tuareg coming to pass the time with him at his shop along Tillabery road in south-
ern Niamey.
In Abala, my exploration focused on the accounts and social practices of three 
men and how these men of Bellah-Iklan origin redefined the Bellah-Iklan as “a 
people.” Unlike the free-born Tuareg in Niamey, who requested that I keep their 
names anonymous, I use the real names of the Bellah-Iklan men per their request. 
The first, Inawélène Aklinine, was born in 1956 in Anderboukane near Menaka. 
Originally, his father was a slave in the Kel Agayok fraction of the Dawsahak.24 
Since Inawélène went to school in his early years, he was able to escape domes-
tic work with the Dawsahak. He dropped out of formal education just after ele-
mentary school, and has since then moved from one temporary job to another, 
including working at the community health center in Anderboukane for several 
years and working as a translator for NGOs near Anderboukane and Menaka at 
other times. Inawélène is married with two wives and nine children. He has, since 
its creation in 1992, been one of the leaders of the unfree-born pro-political party 
(UMADD). He moved from Anderboukane together with his family members to a 
refugee camp in Abala as a result of an outbreak of violence in 2012. Between 2012 
and 2014, he worked as an assistant and translator for NGO workers in the camp. 
Besides his working hours, Inawélène spent most of the day between the hangar 
gathering and Ahiyou’s place.
The second man, Assalim Ehatt, was born in the late 1950s near Menaka where 
he lived until his exile to Niger in 2012. He originally comes from the Kel-Tabonant 
Bellah’s fraction from Menaka and its surrounding area. Like Inawélène from An-
derboukane, Assalim fled in 2012 and has been living in the Abala refugee camp 
ever since. There, he lives with his two wives, six children, and two sisters. Before 
their exile, Assalim worked as an independent artist, a musician, and as the host 
of a radio program at the pro-Bellah local radio station in Menaka. He has been 
24 Some controversies exist about whether the Dawsahak belong to the Tuareg or not, and what their 
position is in the Tuareg social structure. In the literature, for example, there seems to be no 
consensus about their genealogy. According to French historian Charles Grémont, some of the 
Dawsahak trace their genealogy back to the ancestor of the Ifoghas, Aiitta, the ruling clans of 
the Kel Adagh in the Kidal region (see Grémont 2010, 117f.). Other references to them, based on 
linguistic characteristics, evoke a possible connection between the Dawsahak and the Songhay 
as their language, tadagsahak, has a similar vocabulary and syntax to the Songhay spoken in the 
Timbuktu region. During some of my own earlier stays in northern Mali between 2007 and 2011, 
I heard some oral accounts saying that the Dawsahak are of Israelite origin. However, Grémont 
presents them as an important social group in the Tuareg social and political constellation known 
as Ouillimeden Kel Ataram in Menaka.
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a leading figure in the Bellah political party UMADD, founded in 1992. Assalim’s 
status as an artist made him popular among the Bellah-Iklan and non-Bellah-
Iklan refugees in Abala. After spending his mornings and afternoons with peer 
male adults at the hangar in the middle of the refugee camp, he spent his evenings 
rehearsing with his dance group comprised of young males and females. At night 
around 8 pm, several friends and neighbors came to his place for conversation 
and tea.
The third man, Ahiyou Intaougat, is the oldest man in the refugee camp in 
 Abala and is the president of the refugee representative committee, which discusses 
concerns with the UNHCR and other NGOs operating in the refugee camp. Born 
in the 1930s near Menaka, he is originally from the Ikarabassan fraction. He began 
his professional career as a laundry man in the colonial administration of Gao, and 
ended up in the accounting department of the Rivoli Hotel in Niamey where he 
lived for several years. Ahiyou went back to Anderboukane to enjoy his retirement 
and has been regularly elected as a counselor at the local municipality office, first 
as a candidate of UMADD and later on, as a member of the UMADD-RPM.25 
He lived in Abala from 2012 to May 2015, until he requested that he be allowed to 
return to Anderboukane for his final days. Altogether, Ahiyou had nine children. 
He lived in Abala together with six of them and the other three lived and worked 
in Bamako in southern Mali. Ahiyou’s old age and historical knowledge about the 
tensions between the Bellah-Iklan and the free white Tuareg in northern Mali gave 
him a peculiar status in Abala. This was evident in the ways he dominated conver-
sations among peers. It was also frequent to hear Inawélène, Assalim, and other 
Bellah-Iklan men referring to him in conversations. For example, they often said 
“like Ahiyou said last time” or “we will ask Ahiyou for clarification or the truth.”
1.2	 Comparative	relevance	of	the	findings	of	the	study
In order to understand contemporary dynamics of constructing collectivity within 
the two groups of refugees in Niger, my research focuses on the following three 
aspects: exile as a transformative social experience; the “interplay of narratives 
and moral projects”;26 and stereotyping as a reflexive social practice. In the follow-
ing, I shall attempt to relate my empirical findings to various scholarly works. The 
results of the study will contribute to the scholarship on productive repercussions 
of the social conditions of exile; the theoretical spheres of studies of memory; and, 
finally, to the body of literature on stereotyping and ethnicity.
25 The Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM) is the political party created by IBK, the current president 
of Mali. Since the early 2000s, UMADD has been affiliated with RPM in the area around Menaka.
26 I am using the notion of “moral projects” after Cole (2003, 99), which she uses to point to what is 
often at stake when people recollect particular past processes in particular ways, arguing that it is 
not for objective reasons separated from some specific goals. Rather, it is the specific goal or social 
order that the storytellers seek to achieve which determine the ways in which they tell stories.
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1.2.1	 Exile	as	a	transformative	social	experience
As this book illustrates, clan structure no longer matters to the two groups of ref-
ugees in Niger in terms of reference points. Three questions guide my exploration 
of these claims: What prompts their claims? What do they mean? How do they 
situate themselves in relation to each other? To answer to these questions, I will 
examine the refugee’s accounts that express their feelings of loss of (former) status 
and respectability. These accounts reveal how the informants understood their 
loss of former social status as a social consequence of their exile in Niamey and 
Abala. Concerning the free white Tuareg, these accounts focus on specific inter-
actions between the informants and their family members. The town informants’ 
narratives regarding the loss of their former status and respectability also included 
evaluations of the attitudes of police and the Hausa and Zarma ethnic residents 
toward the free white Tuareg refugees in Niamey. In Abala, the accounts from the 
Bellah-Iklan informants focused on their interactions with their family members 
and humanitarian workers in the refugee camp.
By showing how this dimension of the loss of former social status and respect-
ability allows the refugees to imagine themselves as a collective in Niamey and 
Abala, I substantiate remarks by scholars who underscore the productive reper-
cussions that could result from the social conditions of exile (Falge 1997; Hammar 
2014; Malkki 1989; Malkki 1990; Malkki 1992; Malkki 1994; Malkki 1995a; Malkki 
1995b; Malkki 1996; Samaddar 1999; Sommers 2001; Willems 2003). These au-
thors depart from studies that strongly emphasize the disruptive effects of forced 
migration (Agier 2008; Agier 2011; Blavo 1999; Cohen/Deng 1998). For example, 
Agier argues that war-induced migration has serious effects on the social and 
 cultural reproduction of entire populations, leading to the severing of social and 
cultural community ties, the dismantling of employment relationships, and the 
loss of formal education opportunities; it also deprives infants and other vulner-
able segments of the population of the basic conditions for mental and physical 
health (Agier 2008; Agier 2011; also Blavo 1999; Cohen/Deng 1998). In a similar 
vein, historical literature on the Tuareg population in Mali details how, in re-
sponse to the Tuareg uprisings in the early 1960s (under President Keita) and 
again in the 1970s (under President Traoré), the free-born Tuareg were repeatedly 
exposed to political repression and persecution along with the systematic destruc-
tion of their livestock (Boilley 1999; Lecocq 2002). Under such circumstances, 
many  Tuareg moved to Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Niger where they led a 
life cut off from their kin and clan affiliations, placed into almost total isolation 
from the host society and severed from their cultural resources ( Bourgeot 1990, 
140f.). The living conditions in the refugee camps, in addition to a long history 
of displacement, also radically transformed gender and intergenerational rela-
tions, a development that resembles processes of forced displacement as a conse-
quence of civil war in East Africa (e.g. Allen 2006; Dolan 2009; Hutchinson 1996; 
 Lubkemann 2008).
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In contrast to these authors’ strong emphasis on the disruptive effects of forced 
migration, Malkki, for example, draws attention to the productive ways in which 
the Hutu refugees in the Mishamo refugee camp responded to the spatial isolation 
by creating “mythico-history” (Malkki 1989; Malkki 1995b). Malkki uses the no-
tion of mythico-history to refer to Hutu refugees’ narratives recorded in Mishamo, 
rural Tanzania, and defines the concept of mythico-history in the following way: 
the “Hutu history” that Mishamo refugees reconstituted did not simply record 
events but instead “was a subversive recasting and reinterpretations of Hutu his-
tory in fundamentally moral terms” (Malkki 1995b, 53f.). Malkki argues that the 
result “cannot be accurately described as either history or myth,” and she therefore 
labels it mythico-history (1995b, 54). Characteristically, the Hutu mythico-history 
sheds light on how the refugees drew upon their cultural resources, most notably, 
cultural referents such as proverbs, to substantiate historical accounts that rein-
terpreted their history in a way that incorporated the experiences of exile into the 
group identity. This reveals how the Hutu refugees turned the Mishamo camp into 
a site enabling an elaboration of a self-consciousness of belonging, and is, there-
fore, productive. Malkki states that:
Likewise, lists appeared very prominently in the narratives. There were lists of 
traits, lists of “symptoms”, lists of faults, lists of numbered points to be made, 
lists that were like inventories, lists of many kinds. Proverbs were likewise 
deployed as rhetorical devices for persuasion and “proof.” (Malkki 1995b, 53)
Malkki’s approach to studying refugees draws on Foucault’s influential work Dis-
cipline and Punish in which he discusses the disciplinary techniques of power and 
their productive effects (Foucault 1979). Malkki follows this perspective to ap-
proach the refugee camp as a kind of technology of power device that:
produces its objects and domains of knowledge on two levels. On the one 
hand, it helps to constitute “the refugees” as an object of knowledge and con-
trol. On the other, the camp serves to produce “the refugees” as an historical 
subject empowered to create a mythico-history of a “People”. Its local, particu-
lar pragmatics conspire to produce—independently of intentions—historical 
narratives, which re-order the lived-in world. Thus, as a technology of power, 
the refugee camp ends up being much more than a device of containment and 
enclosure. It becomes a locus of continual creative subversion and transfor-
mation. (Malkki 1989, 415)
According to her, Foucault’s view of the prison in terms of disciplinary techniques 
can be extended to other institutions that have multiple systematic effects (Fou-
cault 1979). For the example, Malkki argues that old-age institutions,
serve to transform old age into a medicalized and therefore specialized “prob-
lem” or object on which documentation accumulates. Old age institutions 
make it possible for those on the outside to believe that suffering refers to 
arthritis, incontinence, or loss of memory, and not to any anguished fear of an 
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old person that in the dark quiet of the night death is eating their body faster 
than it does in daylight. In short, such institutions have the effect of creating 
conditions for the invisibility of aging and death. All of these are transform-
ative technologies of power in which collectivities of persons become fixed 
and objectified as “inmates”, “the elderly”, the “labour force”, and “the refu-
gees”. But more than this, such technologies of power can become generative, 
productive sites for social and political invention and transformation--just 
as the refugee camp has become the privileged locus for the creation of a 
mythico-history. (Malkki 1989, 416f.)
She concludes that the conditions of exile altered the Hutu’s perceptions of them-
selves. For instance, she argues that through the “mythico-history” they created in 
the Mishamo refugee camp, the Hutu refugees silenced their intra-group cleavages 
and presented themselves as a “people” in exile (Malkki 1989, chapter 2).
Ranabir Samaddar’s book, The Marginal Nation: Transborder migration from 
Bangladesh to West Bengal (Samaddar 1999), echoes Malkki’s insistence on the con-
structive implications of social conditions of exile. Focusing on the forced migra-
tions produced by the formation of postcolonial states in South Asia, Samaddar 
argues that the people he studied in West Bengal developed new, stronger ties and a 
sense of community among themselves that did not exist prior to their exile. Sam-
addar maintains that the growing inter-refugee social networks27 and solidarity 
among the refugees in West Bengal offered them an alternative to the state order 
they had fled in Bangladesh. For the refugees, Samaddar suggests, West Bengal has 
become a site that enabled them to articulate alternative memberships to the nation 
state they left behind (Bangladesh). Extending this to broader contexts in the south-
ern Asia region, Samaddar argues that paying attention to the significance the ref-
ugees attached to their relocations allows for an understanding of how the forceful
[m]igration has become the most emphatic question mark on the career of 
political nationhood in South Asia—for the nation which the moving popula-
tion leaves as well as the nation which it enters. (Samaddar 1999, 45)
Both Samaddar and Malkki complement authors such as Connerton and Assmann 
who conclude that collective memories of persecution and genocide might serve as 
resources to imagine the future society (Assmann 1999; Connerton 1989). Malkki 
and Samaddar’s accounts can also be taken as good examples of Marris’ conceptu-
alization of how people cope with loss generated by forced migration (or the death 
of relatives) (Marris 1974). In his book Loss and Change, the British sociologist 
Peter Marris conceptualizes the ways in which people respond to loss in terms of 
three elements: conservatism, bereavement, and innovation. At the center of his 
argument is the assumption that the impulse to defend the predictability of life is a 
fundamental and universal principle of human psychology. According to him, this 
27 See works by Willems and Sommers on urban refugees in Dar Es Salam in Tanzania (Sommers 
2001; Willems 2003).
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predictability is related to control, and even people cannot control their physical 
world without discovering its laws; they can, however, control their social world 
by imposing laws upon it (1974, 16f.). Even when confronted with a situation of a 
loss, people tend to look for a continuity of life as they have known it so far, hence 
the deep-seated impulse to defend the validity of what they have learned; without it 
they would feel lost. For him, meanings are generated in the context of specific re-
lationships and circumstances from early childhood onwards, and, for individuals, 
the continuity of the context represents their identity (1974, 5f.). Therefore, changes 
in people’s relationships and living circumstances, such as how the results of losing 
a relative and exile affect their sense of identity, such that the continuity between 
past and present is threatened, lead, consequently, to life becoming unpredictable.
The second element identified by Marris, bereavement, points to results not 
from the loss of relatives and the socio-cultural environment, but from the loss 
of self, insofar as the relationships fundamental to a person’s identity have been 
abruptly altered. Since the meaning of life is defined by the particular experiences 
of each individual, these experiences need to be treated with respect, whereby 
changes implying loss result in grief. Marris depicts grief as the expression of a 
profound conflict between contradictory impulses to consolidate all that is still 
valuable and important in the past, and to preserve it; at the same time, it also 
serves to re-establish a meaningful pattern of relationships in which loss is ac-
cepted (1974, 31). Accordingly, the contradictory impulses within the process of 
grieving, which seek to reconnect past and future, ask for a predictable set of 
“mourning behavior,” as formulated in mourning customs and rituals, in order to 
protect the mourner from the complexity of the issues involved (1974, 92). Marris 
does not conceive the necessity of a mourning ritual only in situations where peo-
ple have lost close relatives through death, but also when drastic changes occur 
in their lives. The third element, innovation, is not in itself incompatible with the 
first, namely the conservative impulse referred to by Marris. He maintains that 
people can readily adjust to changes, so long as these changes can first be assimi-
lated into their existing structure of thoughts and attachments (1974, 104). What 
makes Malkki, Samaddar, and Marris’ accounts similar is that they all trace how 
people approach the predicaments of exile by assimilating these to their existing 
patterns of thoughts and actions. As the “Hutu mythico-history” can be taken as a 
good example of this assimilation of the new experience into the existing, it might 
also entail modifications of the old structure of thoughts and actions. Following 
these authors, I will explore what alterations were made in the ways in which the 
Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg were conventionally defined.
1.2.2	 “Narrating	(the	past)	as	moral	projects”
Narrating their groups’ past experiences in Mali as reasons to become collectivi-
ties was one core aspect of the informants’ everyday conversations in Niamey and 
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Abala. I argue that their narratives can be best understood by taking into account 
their distinctive aspirations for the future, as their aspirations to see themselves as 
collectivities in the future in northern Mali shaped the particular ways in which 
they recounted their memories of the past. Few studies have attempted to suggest 
systematic definitions of the notion of memory, two of which are Olick and Rob-
bins (Olick/Robbins 1998) and Ricœur (Ricœur 2000). Olick and Robbins take 
“memory as the past we carry, how we are shaped by it and how this past is trans-
mitted” (Olick/Robbins 1998, 129). For them, memory is the lasting traces of the 
past that persist within us in the present. It is the transmission and persistence of 
cultural elements throughout generations. Similarly, Ricoeur proposes that mem-
ory refers to history as it is lived by social agents in the present (Ricœur 2000, 
quoted in Berliner 2005, 199). These authors discuss memory as the way in which 
the history of past processes shapes social agents in present lives. This raises the 
question of how social actors may reshape these past processes according to their 
aspirations as anthropologist Jennifer Cole stresses, arguing that:
In particular, scholars of memory may focus so exclusively on narratives and 
their dynamics that they lose sight of what is at stake in telling a particular 
narrative, of why it matters. In reducing the different generational narratives 
to different performative contexts, or to the specialized moment of visiting a 
museum, we do not gain a sufficient sense of what motivates actors, nor do 
we get a sense of the cultural politics in which these actors and their narra-
tives are embedded. After all, our memories are part of a landscape of action, 
and the broader moral and political projects and historical circumstances in 
which narratives are inevitably situated. (Cole 2003, 98)
She introduces the notion of “moral projects” as a useful way to provide a fuller 
analysis of the complex interrelationships between narratives, agents, and histori-
cal contexts in the production of memory. According to her,
the concept of moral projects, therefore, refers to local visions of what makes 
a good, just community, and the ways in which these conceptions of commu-
nity reciprocally engage people’s notions of what constitutes a good life, and 
their efforts to attain that life. In other words, moral projects link individual 
concerns and desires to wider sociopolitical formations. (Cole 2003, 99)
By using this approach, Cole argues that one gains a much more complex under-
standing of why people reconstruct their past in particular ways (Cole 2003, 122).
Cole’s approach to memory is close to the one proposed by Jean Pierre Olivier 
de Sardan (Olivier de Sardan 1976). In his book Quand nos pères étaient captifs, 
Olivier de Sardan calls for attention to “ideological fields” within which social 
actors situate themselves while recounting the past. To him, the most important 
questions are the following: What past, told by who, and in which context? Are not 
those elders telling stories of the past socially situated actors? Do their social posi-
tions not influence the kind of witnesses they report? (1976, 21). Olivier de Sardan 
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argues that taking such concerns, seriously will prevent us from constructing a 
univocal past that is written from one perspective, mostly that of the dominant 
group. It will also enable us to probe what is at stake when our informants present 
versions of their past.28 Olivier de Sardan’s questions echo Jean Bazin’s calls for a 
critical reflection on the production of narrative accounts of the past (Bazin 1979). 
Examining the oral accounts that reconstruct the Bamanan King Da’s ascension 
to power in the Kingdom of Segu (in central Mali), Bazin discusses the generative 
processes of these oral accounts, memorization, and the circumstances of their 
enunciation. His conclusion suggests that far from being factual and objective re-
ports of actual facts, the narrative accounts of Da’s accession have political and 
ethical implications informed by the interests of those who recounted them and 
the expectations of the audience for which the narrations took place (1979, 450). 
In his historical analysis of oral accounts about the Jaara Kingdom (1440–1862) 
that existed in the Sahelian zone included partly in contemporary Mali, Senegal, 
and Mauritania, Mamadou Diawara follows Olivier de Sardan and Bazin to argue 
that the historical reconstruction of the past is always partial and selective. Moreo-
ver, he insists that the narratives of the past should be scrutinized according to the 
specific perspectives of those recounting it (Diawara 1990, 61). From this standing 
point, Diawara stresses that for a comprehensive account of the Jaara Kingdom’s 
oral history, it is important, as he aptly did, to include the voices and the perspec-
tives of the dominated groups such as women and, more generally, people of ser-
vile conditions. Taken together, Bazin, and Cole, Diawara, and Olivier de Sardan’s 
insights help to draw attention to specific aspirations that are articulated through 
the reconstruction of the past.
In terms of this study of the refugees in Niamey and Abala, the perspective of 
these scholars sheds light on how the refugees’ struggle to become collectivities 
for a better future informed the ways in which they recounted their pasts. My 
discussions will focus on accounts of the refugee groups’ marginalization within 
the Malian nation-state over the past decades. I also examine the Bellah-Iklan and 
the free-born Tuareg’s competing claims to the first comership status, and their 
accounts that reconstruct the historical processes through which Islam came into 
northern Mali.
1.2.3	 Stereotyping	as	reflexive	social	practice
Stereotyping as a signifying practice through which people construct social differ-
ences between categories of persons is one essential characteristic crucial for un-
derstanding the processes of group formation in Niamey and Abala. Each group of 
informants presented social order by referring to long-standing social structures 
28 His book discusses the social history of the social groups living in the area around Ayorou and 
Tillabéry, south Niger, from the perspectives of subordinate groups.
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and conflicts. In their everyday conversations they used derogatory terms for each 
other. One question guides my exploration of the relevance of these stereotyping 
accounts: what role do these derogatory terms play in the refugees’ construction 
of a new social order? To answer this question, I relate the refugee narratives to 
works by scholars such as Brenner (Brenner 1993), Hall (Hall 1997), and Tambiah 
(Tambiah 1985). First, according to Stuart Hall, stereotypes reduce, essentialize, 
naturalize, and fix differences between categories of people (Hall 1997, 258f.). 
They hold fast the simple, vivid, memorable, easily grasped, and widely recog-
nized characteristics about a person or group of people. Stereotypes therefore re-
duce everything about this person or group to these traits, exaggerate and simplify 
them, fixing them without change or development for eternity (1997, 258). Second, 
Hall also maintains that stereotypes always imply dividing the normal and the 
acceptable from the abnormal and unacceptable.
Hall’s account of stereotyping is similar to what Stanley Tambiah has called 
“classification,” by which he refers to a system of categories in the first place that 
describes the world (Tambiah 1985, 3f.). These descriptions usually also imply and 
entail evaluations and moral premises and emotional attitudes, translated into 
taboos, preferences, prescriptions, and proscriptions, which accept these prefer-
ences, prescriptions, and proscriptions as given in “nature,” and as the “natural 
way the world is ordered” (1985, 4). While Hall and Tambiah respectively used 
the notions of stereotyping and classification, Brenner describes similar processes 
of exclusion and inclusion using the term “labeling” (Brenner 1993). Focusing on 
discursive constructions of Muslim identity in south-central Mali, Brenner’s study 
draws on Amselle, who takes identity formation as a process of naming: naming of 
self, naming of others, and naming by others (Amselle 1990; see also Worby 1994). 
Brenner argues: “In its most restricted sense, such naming is associated with the at-
taching of labels such as Muslim/non-Muslim, Wahhabi/traditional […]” (Brenner 
1993, 59). Brenner concludes that both Muslim and non-Muslim identities are for-
mulated through appropriation and reassortment of various elements or build-
ing blocks, which may be religiously significant, but which are also socially and 
politically motivated.29 What these terminologies have in common is that they 
depict social processes of closure and exclusion that symbolically fix bounda-
ries and exclude everything that does not belong. It is precisely this closure and 
exclusion, and the formation of symbolic boundaries, that make Brenner, Hall, 
and Tambiah’s works similar to Barth’s insights into how social actors develop a 
range of options of collective identifications to achieve inclusion and exclusion in 
group membership in specific social situations (Barth 1969; see also Epple 2014; 
Geschiere 2009; Kopytoff 1987; Lentz 2006; Lentz 2013; Schlee 2002; Schlee 2008). 
For example, Barth stresses that ethnic boundaries are socially constructed and 
that ethnic boundaries can be strategically manipulated so that individuals can 
29 Similar arguments about ethnic group formation have been suggested by Worby (Worby 1994) 
(also Lentz 2006; Lentz 2013).
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be included and excluded according to group interests (Barth 1969, 9f.). Since the 
notion of boundary implies what separates one category from the other (Schlee 
2002,  8), I would then argue that it can, perhaps, be seen as a classification in 
Tambiah’s sense (Tambiah 1985). In my view, Brenner’s study of labels among 
 Muslims in southern Mali (Brenner 1993), Hall’s work on stereotyping (Hall 1997), 
and Tambiah’s on classification (Tambiah 1985), complement most of these an-
thropological analyses that conceive of identity formations mainly (or exclusively) 
as a matter of discourses on exclusion and inclusion (e.g. Barth 1969; Epple 2014; 
Geschiere 2009; Kopytoff 1987; Lentz 2006; Lentz 2013; Schlee 2002; Schlee 2008), 
by explicitly examining how people tend to construct themselves as an opposite 
group (morally superior to others) through depicting negatively the others that 
are said to be different.
This implies that “othering” practices entail the positing not only of social dif-
ference, but of moral hierarchies. Such moral hierarchies unveil the relationship 
between stereotyping accounts by Hall (Hall 1997), Tambah’s insight on classifica-
tion (Tambiah 1985), Brenner’s on labelling (Brenner 1993), and the construction 
of power relations in the Foucauldian sense that attributes dynamic, partly con-
tingent positionalities to social actors (Foucault 1980). For example, Hall stresses 
the establishment of normalcy through stereotyping as one aspect of the habit of 
ruling groups to attempt to fashion society as a whole according to their personal 
worldviews, value systems, sensibilities, and ideologies (Hall 1997). These domi-
nants thus tend to make social order appear natural and inevitable (1997, 259). But 
while Hall looks at how dominant groups impose their own worldviews upon the 
subordinate groups through stereotyping, this book examines how the inferior 
social status groups questioned the definitional power of dominant clans by labe-
ling them with derogatory terms. I follow Tambiah’s insight into anthropological 
literature on classification that suggests an understanding of power that not only 
restricts the capacity to classify according to principles, evaluations, and moral 
premises to the ruling class. Drawing on Tambiah’s insight (Tambiah 1985), Malk-
ki’s study points to how Hutu refugees in the Mishamo refugee camp redefined the 
hierarchical relations between them and the Tutsi rivals they had fled in Burundi 
(Malkki 1989). This makes insights from Malkki’s and Tambiah’s studies a good 
illustration of Foucault’s analysis of power (Foucault 1979, 1980). Foucault breaks 
with the perception that power is always radiating in a single direction from top to 
bottom; coming from a specific and unique source such as the state or the ruling 
class (Foucault 1980, 49). For him, power induces pleasure, produces a form of 
knowledge, and is never monopolized by one center. It circulates through the so-
cial body and comes from the ruling class to the subordinate groups and vice versa. 
Following this argument, I will explore how the free white Tuareg stereotyping 
accounts imply the redefinition of power relations between nobles and non-noble 
free white Tuareg in Niamey. As for the Bellah-Iklan in Abala, I will discuss how 
their use of derogatory terms to refer to the free white Tuareg involve redefini-
tions of power relations between the Tuareg former slaves and their masters. My 
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discussions will focus on themes of racial stereotyping narratives through which 
both groups of informants redefined conventional social differences between the 
free-born Tuareg and the Bellah-Iklan in a most radical manner.
Another insight from Foucault’s analysis of power is relevant for understanding 
aspects of stereotyping or labeling accounts in Niamey and Abala. This comes to 
light in the relationship he establishes between discourse and power. For Foucault, 
discourses contain power: “Our speech is ordered through principles of classifica-
tion that are socially formed through a myriad of past practices” (Popkewiz/Bren-
nan 1998, 9). He also submits that it is in discourse in which power and knowledge 
are fused (1998, 86). Therefore, in his view, power relations are not external to the 
field of knowledge but immanent to it. This leads Foucault to what he called the 
“regime of truth.” For him, each society has its regime of truth, its general politics 
of truth; that is, the types of discourse people accept and make function as truth 
(Foucault 1980, 131). Displacing Foucault’s argument about the relationship be-
tween “discourses and power” from its original context into the ones of Tambiah 
and Brenner and Hall is helpful because it enables us to reflect on stereotyping 
or labeling accounts as a “regime of truth” for those who produced them. As we 
will see, both groups of informants drew some common physiological and moral 
characteristics, which, according to them, all members of their respective collec-
tivity share. The informants also argued that these physiological characteristics, 
along with the moral characteristics they entailed, are given in “nature” and are 
the “natural” way in which the difference between the peuple noir and the “Tu-
areg collectivity” is ordered in Tambiah’s sense of classification (Tambiah 1985). 
Thus, Brenner (1993), Hall (1997), and Tambiah (1985) can guide the discussion of 
how the informants reconstructed themselves as two internally homogeneous and 
hierarchical (opposite) moral groups through their use of negative conceptualiza-
tions of each other.
1.3 Structure of the dissertation
This book is organized in seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents the methods I used to 
collect data in Niamey and Abala. It also reflects on how my own southern Malian 
background informed my position in the field. The results of the discussions sug-
gest that my background not only presented disadvantages in Niamey and Abala, 
but also positively affected my fieldwork by enriching the ethnography presented 
in this publication. As a road map for understanding contemporary ways in which 
the refugee informants engaged and subverted the former social status hierarchy 
and history of the Tuareg societies, chapter 3 offers a sketch of Tuareg social or-
ganizations throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It also addresses 
the events that brought the two refugee groups into exile. Finally, the chapter offers 
an overview of the development of free white Tuareg and Bellah-Iklan relation-
ships since the colonial era. Chapter  4 discusses how refugees talk about their 
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conditions of exile in Niamey and Abala. It begins with their narratives about the 
negative effects of exile in Niamey and Abala. The chapter further examines how 
the informants re-interpreted these negative effects of exile upon themselves as 
reasons to become collectives for their future. It also explores how the reconstruc-
tions of the group identities involve undoing the refugees’ memberships of the Tu-
areg local clans and federation structures. Chapter 5 ethnographically focuses on 
the protagonists’ recollections of their distinctive experiences of marginalization 
within the Malian nation-state since 1960. It reflects on how the town-based free-
born Tuareg and Bellah-Iklan in Abala considered these experiences as reasons for 
them to become collectivities for the future. Thus, the chapter discusses how the 
two refugee collectivities stand in relation to Malian state order and to each other. 
Chapter 6 extends chapter 5 in that it traces how the two groups of informants re-
constituted themselves as a group vis-à-vis each other through narrative accounts 
of racial stereotyping. The refugee accounts examined here define the distinctive 
physiological and moral characteristics of the members of “Tuareg collectivity” 
and of the peuple noir. The discussions offer some glimpse into the interplay be-
tween differences in physiological features and ethical differences in morality. The 
chapter argues that the two groups of refugee arguments about their group phys-
iological and moral characteristics entail redefinitions of the former social status 
hierarchy in a new way; through this, the informants questioned the definitional 
power of the dominant free white Tuareg. While chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on the 
narratives that presented the free-born Tuareg and the Bellah-Iklan as internally 
homogenous and distinctive racial groups, chapter  7 examines non-discursive 
practices. It focuses on the relevance of these practices to constructions of the 
Tuareg identity in Niamey and the Bellah-Iklan as noirs in Abala. It also investi-
gates how these practices were expressions of the refugees’ desire to return to their 
homelands in the future. Based on the refugees’ interpretations of these specific 
social practices that kept their Tuareg identity in Niamey and noirs (blacks) in the 
refugee camp, chapter 7 underscores new lines of cleavage within the two groups. 
It discusses the extent to which these cleavages called into question the group ho-
mogeneities presented in the narratives in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

2. Fieldwork conditions and research methodology
This chapter introduces the methods used during my research in Niger between 
2012 and 2014.1 It also discusses how various interlocutors, among them my in-
terlocutors “in the field” in Niamey and Abala, but also European and Malian 
scholars acquainted with Tuareg society in northern Mali, anticipated and judged 
my capacity to conduct research among the Tuareg as a “native” of “black” origin 
from southern Mali.
2.1	 Coming	to	Niger	and	collecting	data
The initial purpose of my research in Niger was to document narratives and mu-
sical performances in which Malian Tuareg refugees reflect on their decades-long 
experiences of displacement, politically induced hunger, persecution, and (tem-
porary) return. The research targeted the refugee camps of Djibo and Gandafadou 
in Burkina Faso and that of Chinegodar in Niger, where major parts of the popu-
lation have been forced to flee because of the recent humanitarian crisis in Mali’s 
northern regions since January 2012. I intended to focus on the Tuareg from the 
region of Kidal. By creating a written and audio-taped record of the narratives and 
musical performances of the Kel Adagh (Tuareg) refugees who relocated to the 
surrounding countries (Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Algeria), I pursued 
two major aims. The first was to lend logistical and scientific support to a local 
archive founded and run by Ehya Ag Sidiyene, a well-known Kel Adagh native 
who had collaborated with several international scholars (e.g. Ag Sidiyene, Bernus 
and Le Floc’h 1996; Ag Sidiyene and Klute 1989; Ag Sidiyene and Bernus 1989) 
and whom I had met during an earlier research stay in Kidal in 2011. Until the re-
cent conflict, the archive had been a center of documentation for local Kel Adagh 
(Tuareg) culture and knowledge and was frequented by members of the local pop-
ulation and by international researchers. The second goal of the research project 
was therefore to document and analyze how long-standing historical experiences 
of violence, displacement, forced resettlement, and political marginalization had 
affected the ways in which the Kel Adagh/Tuareg imagine and articulate national 
(or ethnic) belonging and identity and express their nostalgic longing for a unified 
Tuareg “nation”, known as temust in Tamasheq, the language of the Tuareg (Lecocq 
2002, 200f.).
After only a few conversations with Mossa Ag Attaher and Mohamed Ag 
Ibrahim on my arrival in Niamey, I decided to adjust the focus of my research. 
One reason for my decision was that fewer Kel Adagh Tuareg had gone to Niger, 
1 My stay in Niger was preceded by preliminary research in Kidal in July, August, and September 
2011. Altogether fieldwork lasted 12 months.
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and to Niamey in particular, than I had anticipated. Instead, I learned that most 
Kel Adagh Tuareg I knew back home in Kidal had only transited to Niger from 
 Bamako and continued to Tamanrasset, Djanet, and Bordj El Moctar in southern 
Algeria. A second reason for adjusting my research focus was that I had initially 
expected to meet only the Tuareg recently displaced to Niger. To meet men such as 
Mossa Ag Attaher, Alhabib Ag Sidi, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed, and Mohamed Ag Ir-
gimit, who had lived in Niamey for decades yet still consider themselves refugees, 
surprised me at first. I even thought that these men lived here only because they 
sought to draw material benefits from NGOs that targeted newly arrived refu-
gees. But the consistent and systematic nature of their claims and accounts of their 
shared experiences of suffering, and the persistent references to these experiences 
in their everyday lives (cf. chapter 7), convinced me that this could not be inter-
preted as merely a tactic to receive food donations. Rather, as I gradually realized, 
these narratives reconstructed collective histories that enabled my interlocutors in 
Niamey, and also in Abala, to give a sense and purpose to their actual life situa-
tion. A third reason for adjusting my research was that conversations with Mossa 
Ag Attaher and others made me aware of the fact that downplaying inter-refugee 
cleavages was a central preoccupation of the informants in Niamey. I therefore 
decided to focus on the Bellah-Iklan in Abala and on free-born Tuareg in Niamey.
2.1.1	 Narrative	and	biographic	interviews
Since my research sought to explore how the predicaments of exile reshaped the 
ways in which the refugee informants defined themselves and their histories as 
collectivities I have mainly used narrative interviews. Narrative interviews are a 
qualitative research method for gathering information on the subjective essence of 
one person’s entire life. Atkinson has argued that the role of life history is primarily 
to pull together the central elements, events, and beliefs in a person’s life, integrate 
them into a whole, make sense of them, learn from them, teach the younger gener-
ation, and remind the rest of one’s community what is important in life (Atkinson 
1998, 19). Over recent decades, this method has gained significance in anthropo-
logical studies of post-violence societies (Das 1995) and also in scholarly contri-
butions that approached the wider processes of social and political transformation 
from both historical and personal perspectives (Dausien/Kelle 2009; Rosenthal 
1995; Völter 2006). Speaking about her research in the context of post-violence 
memory in India, Veena Das has argued that collecting individual biographic ma-
terial enabled her to grasp the many ways in which individual histories and the 
community history intersected with each other (Das 1995, chapters 3, 4, 5). Schulz 
has applied the narrative interview methods to understand the changes affecting 
women’s self-understanding as practicing Muslims through their learning activ-
ities in urban Mali (Schulz 2011). Altogether these studies enable us to under-
stand how particular processes have shaped people’s lives in significant ways. With 
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regard to my research, I conducted narrative interviews to collect my informants’ 
personal experiences of the past decades in Mali and in the social contexts of exile. 
Through these interviews, I have attempted to explore specific semantic domains 
that these events generated for individuals and groups. It has been a helpful re-
search approach to gain insights not only into the informants’ perspectives on 
contemporary exile and past events in Mali, but also the political uses to which 
they put their individual biographic histories together to interpret and articulate 
the history of the “Tuareg people” in Niamey and the peuple noir in Abala.
2.1.2 Focus group discussions
Another important research method that I used was focus group discussions. In 
Abala, I followed Inawélène, Assalim Ahiyou, and other Bellah-Iklan men’s group 
conversations during their social gatherings under the hangar located in the mid-
dle of the refugee camp. The offices of staff working for UNHCR, ACTED, OX-
FAM, and Relief Islamic surrounded it. As I observed these men during my stays 
in 2012/2013 and 2014, they woke up around 4.30 am and started their days with 
morning prayers in the mosques built up in their respective quartiers. Before they 
came back from prayers, their wives had cleaned up the tea kettles and prepared 
the fire to make the morning tea. Once back from the mosques, the husbands 
sat next to the tea kettles and fire and started preparing the morning tea. Shortly 
before the first glass of tea was ready their wives brought them breakfast. Interest-
ingly enough, while eating breakfast, followed by the first and second glass of tea, 
they listened to news on the radio in preparation for the social gatherings under 
the hangar.2 Around 8.30 am, they left their tents in small groups of two to five 
neighbors or friends to meet up with the others under the hangar, where they 
stayed till 1.00 pm and returned to after lunch at 3.00, staying till 6.00 pm. Once 
there, their conversations began with greetings that included exchanging news 
about children’s health conditions overnight in the refugee camp.3 After exchang-
ing news about their family members living in the refugee camp, they continued 
to update each other on new developments in the conflicts they fled in Mali. These 
exchanges of news always turned, later, into stories that articulated differences 
between themselves and the free-born Tuareg who, according to this group of men 
in Abala, were accused of having singled them out of the collective, destroyed their 
houses and other property, and having raped their daughters and wives in north-
ern Mali in 2012, ultimately forcing them into exile in Niger.
When I arrived back in the refugee camp in August 2014, I found that the 
hangar had been removed and UNHCR had begun to build a sports hall where 
2 They mostly listened to the Radio France Internationale (RFI).
3 My research took place at a time when children between 1 and 5 years old were in critical situations 
in the refugee camp of Abala due to undernourishment resulting in the deterioration of their health.
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Figure 1:	A group of male Bellah-Iklan under the tent of Ahiyou Intaougat on 14/09/2014 in 
Abala. Photograph S. Diallo.
it had been. Also, Ahiyou was recovering from a long sickness which proved fatal 
in the long run and he died on August 23, 2015. Ahiyou’s sickness had restricted 
his capacity to move around. In this situation, Assalim, Inawélène, and other 
Bellah-Iklan men met at his place in the first quartier. Although the place where 
they met had changed, still the general topic and what impassioned their conver-
sations remained focused on the relationship between the Bellah-Iklan and the 
free-born Tuareg.
While I focused on a formal forum of male group discussions in the refugee 
camp in Niamey, there was no such established and formalized space in Abala. The 
circumstances that brought youths and adults together, except for social events, 
were not common in Niamey. Instead, I focused on conversations during regu-
lar visits Mossa Ag Attaher, Mohamed Ag Irgimit, Alhabib Ag Sidi, Ibrahim Ag 
Mohamed, and several other free-born Tuareg men paid to each other. On these 
occasions, they discussed the news from home but, more prominently, the devel-
opment of the conflict in Mali. The young men met in the guise of mobile fada4 
and engaged in similar discussions with each other. Ibrahim’s place was one focal 
point where youths met during the day and at night for rehearsals. Alongside the 
al-guitara music they performed, the young men embarked on discussions about 
4 Fada is a youth socializing structure in Niger. Fada is called Grin in southern and central Mali (see 
Schulz 2002).
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various topics of common interest. For example, since they had either been born 
or had grown up in Niamey, several of their conversations centered on issues of 
love (tarha). They discussed how their social conditions of being unemployed 
(Ishumar) made it impossible for them to attract female partners and to establish 
a family. Other themes dealt with their frustrations during everyday interactions 
involving Zarma and Hausa ethnic residents in urban Niamey.
2.1.3 Participant observation
Further methods of qualitative data generation on which I relied were participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews, and oral historical accounts. I used par-
ticipant observation during special social events, such as naming and wedding 
ceremonies, which helped me gain insight into the social worlds of the two groups 
under study. Some visits turned into spontaneous focus group discussions that 
involved different perspectives and revealed complex details about past political 
processes in Mali. For example, as we will see in chapter 6 of this book, my in-
formants in Abala and Niamey reconstructed the settlement history in the area 
covering the three northern regions of Mali. These themes allowed them to claim 
shared origins and to relate their life situations in exile to past historical processes 
and events (cf. chapters 4 and 6). Both groups of refugees sought to reconstruct 
themselves as victimized collectivities, and thus represented their past primarily 
in the light of their situation in exile. I collected several of these narratives during 
focus group discussions in the refugee camp in Abala and in Niamey town. To be 
able to place these individual and collective narratives socially, I collected addi-
tional, contextual information through semi-structured interviews with selected 
informants.
2.1.4	 Language	problems:	transcription	and	translation	of	the	narratives
I conducted several of my interviews in French and others in the Tamasheq lan-
guage. As my Tamasheq language skills were insufficient to conduct interviews on 
my own, I worked with the help of two research assistants in both Niamey and 
Abala. The assistants also translated (from Tamasheq into French) the material 
that I had recorded during focus group discussions. I took care that each assistant 
translated the material relating to his group. I personally conducted all interviews 
in French with other relevant ethnic residents and members of NGOs, UNHCR 
working in Niger in the refugee camp, and officials in Niamey. These interviews 
helped me to contextualize particular decisions taken by those in charge of hu-
manitarian aid programs, such as the relocation of the refugee camp from Lazaré 
in the Niamey suburb to Hamdallaye about sixty kilometers away from the capital 
town. Other discussions focused on the regime of Seyni Kountché in the 1970s and 
26 2. Fieldwork conditions and research methodology
1980s and contemporary contexts of war against growing terrorist networks across 
the Sahelian region.
2.2	 Doing	research	as	a	“Bambara”	among	Tuareg	refugees	in	Niger
Prior to and during my field research in Niger 2012/2013 and 2014, I was con-
stantly confronted with the fact that senior colleagues in Germany and France, 
but also my main interlocutors among the free-born Tuareg in Niamey and the 
Bellah-Iklan in Abala, held preconceived ideas about why I, a “Bambara”5 born in 
southern Mali, was doing research on the Tuareg. For the first time I realized the 
restrictive nature of these preconceived notions in Cologne, at a time when I was 
still in the preparatory stage. A funding application I had submitted to a German 
Stiftung funding research among nomadic peoples of the Sahara was rejected on 
the basis that, as a Malian from southern Mali, my attempts to do research among 
the Tuareg stood no chance of success, as argued by one German and one Malian 
reviewer. Even more so, both reviewers maintained that, as a “black southerner”, 
I needed to be protected against resentful free-born Tuareg who considered me 
a representative of the central state. By arguing that it would be impossible for 
me to gain access to free-born Tuareg in northern Mali or in Nigerien exile, both 
reviewers disregarded the three research periods I had already spent in Kidal and 
its adjacent areas (in spring 2007 and 2009 and in summer and fall 2011) and in 
Gao, and that I had also made a documentary from the material collected during 
these stays. Nor did one of the reviewers, during a subsequent conversation with 
my supervisor, believe that the good contacts with host families that I had main-
tained since then could serve me as an entry point for my research among Tuareg 
refugees.6
A few weeks after my application for funding had been declined by the Stiftung, 
I met several prominent scholars of Tuareg society and politics at a conference 
held in Cologne. When I explained my research to one of them, his response was 
to question my plan and to suggest that I do research in southern Mali, rather than 
on the Tuareg of northern Mali. He, too, explained his reservations by expressing 
concern about my safety and success. Only after I had demonstrated my thorough 
acquaintance with the social context of Kidal and with important local figures, 
who had been interacting with many established researchers including himself, 
5 Bambara or Bamanan is one of the largest ethnic groups in southern Mali (see Bazin 1979; Schulz 
2007b). But many Tuareg or northerners use the term uncritically to refer to all southerners in 
Mali. For example, my informants in both Niamey and Abala referred to me as Bambara. Other-
wise, my own ethnic background is Fulani.
6 I initially expected to visit and spend extended periods of time with these former host families in 
refugee camps in Niger, and was likely to employ these contacts as a sound basis for expanding my 
network of male and female informants.
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did the researcher admit that I could continue doing research as I intended to do 
in Niger since I had earlier contacts.
Not only scholars confronted me with this kind of doubt. In 2007, I conducted 
four months field research with a video camera in a Tuareg settlement around 
Djebock situated in the north east of Gao town. Upon completion of my master’s 
degree I became involved in a project team funded by Norwegian Church Aid in 
2009 (NCA). Our task was to make documentaries in Gao and in Kidal to assess 
the impact of 25 years of Norwegian development aid on the living conditions in 
these locations. Whenever I presented these films, I was asked how I, as a Ma-
lian, could do research among the Tuareg in northern Mali given that relations 
between southerners and northerners were fraught with a history of violence and 
repression. I received several similar comments from my family, friends, and rel-
atives in Bamako where people commonly portray the free-born white Tuareg as 
people who do not like or belong to “Mali.” To most “southerners” in Bamako, the 
nation “Mali” is the historical product and continuation of the medieval states of 
Mali,7 Ghana, and Segu. For my interlocutors in the south, the southern residents 
and the racially black segments of northern societies (Fulani, Songhay, and the 
Bellah-Iklan) are descendants of leading figures of these empires. These interloc-
utors among friends and relatives also pointed to the white Tuareg as those who 
constantly have sought to challenge the existence of the Malian nation-state, to 
which they do not belong historically. To illustrate their claim, my interlocutors 
in the south referred to the Tuareg uprisings of the 1960s and 1990s and to the 
on-going conflicts in the north since 2012 as indications of the constant threat 
to the Malian nation-state mounted by the nomads from the north. Some of my 
friends even considered my interest in Tuareg society as a sign of my lack of patri-
otic spirit, and of my siding with the enemies of “Mali.”
These comments set the terms against which I needed to define my position as 
a researcher in Abala and Niamey between 2012 and 2014. The comments conflate 
being Malian with being a southerner, while excluding the Tuareg from the Malian 
political community. Bodies of literature on the “principle of reflexivity” inform 
my analysis of these relationships in the field (e.g. Hammersley/Atkinson 1995; 
Gubrium/Holstein 1997; Holliday 2003). The notion of reflexivity has emerged 
as a powerful analytical framework for reflections on the relationship between 
the researcher and other participants in the research setting over recent decades. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (Hammersley/Atkinson 1995, 16) and Gubrium and 
Holstein have argued that reflexivity responds to the realization that researchers 
and their methods are entangled with the politics of the social world they study 
(Gubrium/Holstein 1997, 9). For Holstein and Gubrium, it relates to both how re-
searchers think and act, and to social phenomena themselves (Holstein/Gubrium 
1994, 265). My thoughts on the issue of reflexivity follow Andrian Holliday who 
7 For an overview on Mali empire, see for example, Niane (1975); also Cisse/Kamissoko (2000).
28 2. Fieldwork conditions and research methodology
argues that researchers need to capitalize on the complexities of their presence in 
the research setting (Holliday 2003, 146).
2.2.1	 	Entering	the	field	and	setting	up	relations	among	the	free-born Tuareg in 
Niamey
I entered the field in Niamey with contacts from families I had become friendly 
with over the past years. Some even visited me there and during their stays they 
tried to introduce me to others. Another point of access to the field has been the 
research institute LASDEL. There I met several doctoral candidates and postdoc-
toral and established international researchers, some of whom introduced me to 
Tuareg acquaintances from Mali. Mossa Ag Attaher has good relations with most 
staff members at this research institute. Many researchers introduced me to him 
as a Malian doctoral student coming from Germany. After my initial contact with 
him, I became a good friend of his first son, Iba. During my stays in 2012/13 and 
2014 this family became essentially my host family. Although I did not stay with 
them overnight, I had my breakfast, lunch, and dinner with them every day. Fa-
miliar with the world of researchers due to their frequent contacts with the staff 
members at the LASDEL, Mossa and Iba took me into their worlds. While Mossa 
brought me into contact with the most adults in transit or living in Niamey, Iba 
made the world of the younger generations accessible to me. Taking me with them 
through the town gave me opportunities to share their everyday social experi-
ences. The following examples will spell out the various ways in which the inform-
ants related to me in Niamey.
2.2.1.1	 “Is	he	a	Malian	soldier	in	Niamey?”
This question emerged from interrogations that surrounded my presence among 
the free-born Tuareg in Niamey. It was on Sunday September 21, 2014, when Tu-
areg refugees in Niamey met at a wedding ceremony in the administrative area 
called plateau. It was the wedding of the former wife of one of my interlocutors be-
tween 2012 and 2013 who had passed away in November 2013.8 She is a free-born 
Tuareg woman from the area of Menaka. She married another free-born Tuareg 
man from the same area on September 21, 2014. On this occasion I sat with several 
adult men playing cards for about seven hours. Although I knew many from my 
earlier stay in 2012/2013, some faces were still new to me as I, myself, was to them. 
Time and again, I heard people asking in a low voice: who is this man? The answer 
the people who knew me gave was:
8 The deceased husband was Badajan Ag Aiti, originally from the vassal group Immakalkalen in the 
area of Bourem.
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His name is Souleymane Diallo. He comes from Mali but he is studying in 
Germany. He is a friend of Mossa Ag Attaher with whom he came here. He is 
doing research on the Tuareg in Niamey.
After lunch, followed by midday prayer, I happened to sit next to someone (Ibra-
him Ag Mossa) whom I had never met before. The man, born into a vassal group 
from Tidarmène (an area of Menaka), initiated a conversation:
Ibrahim: I heard that you come from Mali. Are you a military?
Me: I am not. I am currently a student in Germany.
Ibrahim: You never supported the Ganday koy or Mujao?
Me: No, never.
Ibrahim:  Well, if you as a Malian decided to do research among us that is a good 
thing. Because this is the first time I have seen a Malian enquiring about 
us during my 56 years of life.9 We have only seen Europeans coming and 
asking us, but no Malian has ever done this before. If there were several 
Malians coming to see us and seeking to know who we are like you do, 
we would not be where we are today.10
Ibrahim’s statement above reinforced the widely shared assumption that it is diffi-
cult for a southern Malian to do research in the north, or at least among the white 
Tuareg. His questions in the opening sequence of our conversation above indicate 
some suspicion. He explicitly asked whether or not I was part of the military in 
Mali or affiliated to the Malian army. Since I answered with a “no,” he then moved 
to the next question through which he assessed whether or not I supported the 
MUJAO (Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest)11 or Ganda 
Koy movement. As we will see in chapter 3, when retracing the history of Tuareg 
rebellions in the north of Mali, Ibrahim’s evocation of the MUJAO and Ganda 
Koy was meaningful. He mentioned the term “Ganda Koy” in reference to the 
Songhay political and military structure during the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s. 
Several sources have indicated that the Songhay soldiers in the regular Malian 
army created this structure with the tacit support of the Malian state against the 
white population in the north of Mali (cf. Keita 1999; Lecocq 2010). Ibrahim’s in-
  9 It should be noted that I am not the first Malian to have conducted research among the Tuareg 
in the north. Naffet Keita did his doctoral research in the area of Gao in the 1990s. His research 
resulted in a dissertation entitled: “Contribution à une anthropologie du pouvoir et de l’intégration 
nationale en Afrique: de la ‘rébellion touareg’ à une nouvelle nation au Mali”, Thèse de doctorat en 
Anthropologie: Université Cheick Anta Diop de Dakar 1999 (see also Keita 2005).
10 As one could notice, his use of the notion “Malian” refers exclusively to people from southern Mali, 
excluding himself and the free Tuareg. The full implication of such statements collected in Niger 
will be examined at length in chapter 5.
11 MUJAO is one of the Islamist factions in northern Mali and has existed since 2012. As we will 
see in chapter 3, Olivier de Sardan has suggested that the Arabs, Songhay, and Fulani created this 
military structure in response to abuses committed by the white Tuareg (in the area of Gao) in 2012 
(Olivier de Sardan 2012).
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terrogation about the MUJAO was concerned with assessing whether I belonged 
to one of the Islamist factions created by the Arabs, Songhay, and Fulani. Both 
questions illustrate why it is difficult for a southern Malian like me to do research 
among the white Tuareg. Ibrahim did not trust me in the first place, and he was 
not the only one to do so.
Prior to my encounter with Ibrahim Ag Mossa I had already had similar ex-
periences in 2012. In September 2012, when Mossa Ag Attaher introduced me 
to another old man who fled “the Songhay anti-Tuareg campaigns” in the 1990s, 
he had similar suspicions. It was on an evening after sundown that the slim old 
man appeared with his white beads in his right hand at Mossa’s place. On his 
arrival, Mossa and I had started the ablutions for evening prayer. Therefore, after 
greetings, the three of us prayed together. Since I appeared an unfamiliar visitor 
at Mossa’s place to him, he began to inquire into my presence. He asked Mossa 
where the man sitting with them came from. Mossa introduced me as a friend 
from Mali who was now studying in Germany and wanted to do research on 
the Tuareg. After some time, the old man asked Mossa if he could be sure that 
I was not, to use his own expression, a “secret agent” of the Malian state. Mossa 
Ag Attaher reassured him, maintaining that I was his friend and had nothing to 
do with the police. After this clarification I went with Mossa Ag Attaher’s son to 
his domicile and his work place for several tea sessions. He recounted several 
episodes of his own experiences throughout the years of the conflict before he 
fled to Niger. Since he had been living in Niamey for several years, he became an 
interesting character to talk to about his own experiences in Mali and Niamey. To 
further understand the suspicion of both men about my presence among them, 
we need to pay attention to the longer history of nomadic Tuareg’ persecution by 
the Malian army and to a regional context characterized by the growing influence 
of an international terrorist network and a US-led “war against terrorism” which 
has led to a closer collaboration between intelligence communities across the Sa-
hel region. Both men’s suspicions were reinforced by my use of a voice recorder 
during interviews. For instance, the second old man I met at Mossa’s place once 
reminded me that the recording device made him think of me, at face value, as a 
spy working for the police.12
The reluctance of both men to talk to me as a Malian researcher substanti-
ates observations by historian Mamadou Diawara who argued that, while Af-
rican researchers working in their own national contexts face fewer problems 
with language and living conditions, they might encounter significant difficul-
ties compared to their counterpart western scholars doing fieldwork in Africa 
(Diawara 1985). Speaking about his research (collection of oral history) among 
his own people in southern Mali, he notes that his being a descendent of the 
12 Equally, in the refugee camp, knowing that I am in contact with the free-born Tuareg in Niamey 
and also back home in northern Mali, some of my Bellah-Iklan informants did not even accept that 
I recorded their narratives.
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local nobility and politically dominant clan raised suspicion among the people 
of servile background whose oral accounts and perspectives he sought to inves-
tigate. Below, I will disagree with Diawara’s argument, but for the moment I will 
stay with his account. For example, in Niamey, being a Malian made it difficult 
for some informants, at least at the beginning, to trust me and believe that I was 
doing my research only for academic purposes. The suspicion of both men also 
shows that they, first and foremost, associated me with their experiences of hav-
ing been oppressed by southern Malians in Mali. Ultimately, the suspicion of both 
men substantiate remarks by researchers on the Tuareg, as outlined earlier, that 
as a Malian from southern Mali it would be difficult for me to do research among 
the Tuareg.
Ibrahim’s statement also refutes the conventional assumption that as a Malian 
I cannot do research among the Tuareg. For example, he expressed some posi-
tive evaluation of my presence among them. He argued that I could contribute to 
creating a more mutual understanding between the north and the south. For this 
reason, after our conversation he invited me, together with my contact person 
Mossa Ag Attaher, to come for a tea at his domicile in the quartier of Dar Es Salam. 
As this first invitation went well, I went back to Ibrahim Ag Mossa’s place for con-
versations about his experiences of exile two more times together with Mossa Ag 
Attaher. Both men expressed suspicion about my presence among them, but my 
closeness to Mossa Ag Attaher made them gradually accept me and participate 
in my project. I saw this relationship as a conventional way of gaining access as a 
friend of a friend, which enabled me to dispel the fears some had (Holliday 2003). 
To conclude my discussion of Ibrahim’s statement, being Malian was not as such 
a negative fact in all respects. Since I am not a military but, instead, a student who 
decided to spend time with them and share their everyday life experiences, this 
enabled many free-born white Tuareg to understand that not all southerners are 
enemies of the Tuareg. He perceived my presence among them as evidence that 
some southern Malians could be friends with them too. This came to light espe-
cially when Mossa Ag Attaher highlighted to some of his fellows that I had done 
some research among the Tuareg in the area around Djebock and Kidal before and 
had also gone with him to visit his relatives in some of the refugee settlements in 
northern Burkina Faso.
2.2.1.2 “Amidinin	Diallo	(my	friend	Diallo)	…	Ntada agna	(here	is	the	brother)!”
Mohamed Ag Irgimit followed the above formulation with: “Amidinin Diallo. 
(Souleymane) tu es un de nous maintenant. Tu es devenu Tuareg. Tu vas partout 
où nous sommes” (literally, friend Diallo, Souleymane you are now one of us. 
You became a Tuareg. You go wherever we are). Both the terms amidinin and 
agna were covering terms used by informants in Niamey in order to express 
closeness in social ties. “Amidinin” means friend and “Agna” means brother or 
sibling. Agna expresses more closeness than does the term amidinin (friend). 
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These were taken from songs sung by the Kel Tinariwen al-guitara musical group. 
This group deployed these terms on purpose in order to call for unity and equal-
ity around the idea of the tumast (the people) in exile in the Magrheb (Klute 
2013; Lecocq 2010). It was in these terms that Mohamed Ag Irgimit, one of my 
informants in Niamey introduced earlier, welcomed me into his courtyard in the 
afternoon of December 1, 2012. It was the day that followed my arrival in Nia-
mey from northern Burkina Faso (in the area of Gram-Gram) where I had spent 
a week with Mossa Ag Attaher among his relatives who went into exile there 
in mid-March 2012. His statement shows that my status moved gradually from 
that of a friend to being considered as a sibling. As I said earlier, Mohamed and 
Mossa are originally from the same group called the Immakalkalen that belongs 
to the vassal groups. I also had the chance to meet up with several people he 
knows very well. On my arrival at his place on that afternoon, Mohamed was sit-
ting next to his wife and three children left of the main entrance in his courtyard. 
When I opened the entrance door, he turned right toward me and exclaimed in 
the following terms:
Hello the Tuareg, welcome back from Demsi (where I went to in Burkina 
Faso). Souleymane you are now one of us. You go everywhere to spend time 
with us. You really like the Tuareg. You know our problem with Mali is that 
the state does not consider us as human beings. They [read: the state] just 
think that we are just more than donkeys.
Mohamed’s evaluation of my presence among them resembles that of Ibrahim’s. 
Mohamed took my research as an action that could deepen my understanding of 
the Tuareg. In his interpretation, seeking to know the Tuareg goes hand in hand 
with respecting them and respecting the Tuareg facilitates greater understanding 
of their problems with the Malian state. Since “Mali” as a state, but more precisely 
its southern population, did not seek to know the Tuareg, they cannot be aware 
of the full complexity of nomads’ problems. At the same time, Mohamed moved 
further than Ibrahim when arguing that I became a Tuareg through interacting 
and sharing time and space with them. The expressions such as “hello the Tuareg” 
or “you are now one of us” indicated the extent to which Mohamed accepted me 
as part of them because of my readiness to share time and experiences with the 
Tuareg in different social contexts. By accepting me as a Tuareg or, at least, as part 
of them, Mohamed’s statement also substantiates the argument put forward by 
Crawford and Hastrup that the dichotomy of researcher versus informant may 
lose its relevance during field research as a result of social processes that under-
mine a researcher’s attempt to keep up his/her distinctive status (Crawford 1992, 
48; Hastrup 1995, 143). Hastrup has called this: “The process of becoming the 
other” (1995, 19). For her, “becoming” here is just a metaphor to point to the kind 
of participation that can never be completed and which is no immediate conse-
quence of physical presence. It does not attempt to argue that the anthropologist 
becomes identical with the others among whom he or she is doing research. For 
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example, Hastrup herself recognizes that she did not become an Icelandic shep-
herdess though she participated in sheep farming and experienced the unreality of 
shepherdesses in misty mountains. To her, this implies that one is not completely 
absorbed into the other world, but one is also no longer the same. The relevance of 
Mohamed’s statement to Hastrup and Crawford’s discussion is that the researcher 
does become part of the community among whom he/she is doing research but 
not because he or she changes. Rather, the perceptions of the people among whom 
the researcher is doing research can change during fieldwork in such ways that 
they begin to relate to him/her in familiar terms. I did not become a white Tuareg 
by skin color or through my language skill in speaking Tamasheq in the mean-
while. Instead, Mohamed’s argument drew specifically on the fact that I shared 
time and experiences with them in various contexts. Consequently, they began to 
consider me as one of their own. For example, they no longer hesitated to express 
openly their opinions about the Malian politics in the north since they knew that 
hearing bad stories about the southern Malian population would not have irri-
tated me and turned me against them. Additionally, the ways in which some of my 
informants attempted to prevent me from interacting with other ethnic residents 
in Niamey illustrated their care for “one of them” which is what I had become in 
their own view.
2.2.1.3	 “Souleymane,	be	careful	with	the	Zarma!”
In Niamey, my research did not only involve the free white Tuareg. Instead I navi-
gated between them and several other ethnic residents, the majority of whom were 
Hausa and Zarma people. Most interactions between the town refugee informants 
and their neighbors were not free of suspicion. On several occasions, Mossa Ag 
Attaher warned me to be careful whenever I interacted with the Zarma and Hausa 
because he insisted that one cannot build up a trustful relationship with the Hausa 
and Zarma people. According to him, the Hausa and Zarma people are against 
the free-born Tuareg. While several other aspects of why Mossa prevented me 
from interacting with the Hausa and Zarma people in Niamey will be explored at 
length in chapter 4, it is necessary to mention a few of them here. For Mossa, as 
the Hausa and Zarma are not on good terms with the Tuareg, they would not like 
me because I was friendly with the Tuareg. Through such portrayals of the Hausa 
and Zarma people as bad people for me, Mossa reflexively tried to present the 
free-born Tuareg as good and trustful people for me. One could argue here that 
his warnings appear as instances that express the extent to which his perceptions 
about my person changed over time. Mossa gradually started to consider me as 
part of them as well. Being a friend of his and several other white Tuareg made 
me, at least in Mossa’s view, implicitly part of them, thus consequently subject to 
suspicion for the others.
In the same way in which my free-born Tuareg informants tried to prevent me 
from trusting their Hausa and Zarma neighbors, the latter also warned me to be 
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careful when spending time with “the Tuareg.”13 For example, on our way back 
to Niamey from northern Burkina Faso in late November 2012, where I had been 
together with Mossa Ag Attaher and his oldest son Iba, we reached the bus station 
of Tera, a south-west town in Niger, around 5.00 pm. Many people in our bus 
used the short break we had at the bus station to accomplish their prayers and eat 
some food. Sitting next to Mossa’s son Iba around our tea kettle under the hangar 
at the right corner of the yard of the bus station, we suddenly saw one gendarme14 
in a car entering the station. He got out and asked for our bus driver. Most sur-
prisingly, I saw the bus driver pointing his index finger at me while speaking to 
the gendarme who, in his turn, quickly came toward us. He came to me and asked 
whether I knew Mossa and his sons well. I replied yes. I therefore introduced 
Mossa Ag Attaher to him as a friend of mine and the others as his sons. I also 
made clear to the gendarme that Mossa and his family had been living in Niamey 
for more than two decades. He concluded his series of questions by warning me 
that I should be careful because my travel companions were dangerous people.15 
According to the gendarme, many white Tuareg have had strong connections to 
the international terrorist networks which have been flourishing across the Sahe-
lian region since the early 2000s. Especially several free-born Tuareg had joined 
Islamist militant groups that had taken control of northern Mali. The best known 
of these is Ansar Eddine, led by a free-born Tuareg Iyad Ag Ghali from the region 
of Kidal.
The situation of this conversation at the bus station embarrassed me since all 
this happened in front of my travel companions. Mossa’s son Iba told me that what 
had just happened with the gendarme was one of several mistreatments they are 
used to in Niger. The situation above showed how difficult it was for me to navigate 
between my informants and the other ethnic residents in Niamey. It reminded me 
of Marc Sommers’s depiction of how he developed relationships with his inform-
ants within a politically sensitive environment in urban Tanzania (Sommers 2001). 
He notes that, having learned that refugees who lived and worked together may 
privately consider each other enemies, he had to develop separate relationships 
with each and every Burundi refugee from whom he sought information about 
their hidden society in urban Dar Es Salam (2001, 6). Whereas Marc Sommers 
considered the conflicting situation into which he was plunged as one of the most 
difficult challenges ahead of him in the field, I found mine to be a very productive 
experience that contributed to my understanding of the interconnected aspects of 
social and political dynamics shaping the refugees’ social lives in Niger. Similar 
tensions existed between the Bellah-Iklan and humanitarian workers in the refugee 
camp at Abala too.
13 In this context, when they say Tuareg, they referred to the free-born white Tuareg.
14 The gendarmerie is a major component of the security apparatus in Niger. The members of this 
security force are called gendarmes (see Göpfert 2012).
15 For an overview of the Tuareg issue in Niger (see Salifou 1993).
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2.2.2	 A	southern	Malian	student	among	the	Bellah-Iklan	in	Abala
I accessed the refugee camp of Abala through Mariam Sidibé, a Malian doctoral 
candidate at the LASDEL. She is married to a Nigerien man who worked for some 
time as the human resources manager at the regional office of ACTED. This NGO 
was in charge of the refugee camp management. Mariam’s husband introduced me 
to his colleagues at Abala who, in turn, took me to the UNHCR local office. There 
I was asked to submit a letter from my supervisor that spelled out the institutional 
setting of the research project I was conducting. Once this had been done, I was 
allowed to begin my research in the refugee camp. Inawélène Aklinine was the 
first person I was introduced to by humanitarian workers. He, and several other 
unfree-born Tuareg he introduced me to, also found it compelling that I was doing 
research among them. To use their own term, I was one of the rare Malians inter-
ested in them. Having Inawélène Aklinine as a point of access into the social life of 
Bellah-Iklan in Abala was helpful in many respects. For example, later on I hired 
him as a research assistant and language teacher. Beside the fact that our language 
training always turned into conversations about the political history of northern 
Mali and their present experiences in exile, many other interlocutors told me that 
they took me seriously since they assumed that Inawélène would not get along 
with someone he himself suspected. He accompanied me into the homesteads of 
several people I talked to. His presence definitely enriched the discussions. Fur-
thermore, he is considered to be the nephew of Ahiyou Intagaout, the oldest man 
and president of the refugee central committee. Inawélène and Ahiyou shared the 
view that most people in southern Mali do not know about what is happening in 
the north. According to both of them, that is the reason why southern people in 
Mali give credit to what the free-born Tuareg claim that they are marginalized 
in the north. They viewed my research as a positive undertaking that could con-
tribute to a better understanding of the Bellah-Iklan’s situation in northern Mali. 
At the men’s informal gatherings in the mornings, some discussions started with 
emphasis on “we forgot to tell Souleymane about this event.” I understood my in-
terlocutors’ insistence to be a consequence of their struggles over the control of the 
results of my research. In both Abala and Niamey, my informants manifested their 
explicit expectations of seeing that this project contributes to the information, and 
ultimately to the formation of extra-local opinions, about their situations. When 
seen in a broader context, their struggles illustrated how the informants could 
have their own agendas while participating in the research process as well.
2.2.2.1  “The difference between Souleymane and European researchers in 
Menaka”
The following statement that Assalim Ehatt articulated on the day of my first con-
tact with him reveals the complexity surrounding my own position in the field. He 
put it to me that:
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Before you, we saw Bajan16 and other Tuareg with white people [read: Eu-
ropeans] doing research in Menaka. As the Tuareg are clever and suspicious 
about themselves, they never gave those researchers any chance to talk to 
us. Because they know that many things they are telling them are untrue. 
For this reason, one precaution they took was to follow these Europeans 
closely in order to control everything they were doing. They slaughtered 
goats, sheep even camels for them, all that was done in order to keep their 
research agendas busy and under their close watch. Another thing is that 
the Tuareg followed these whites for the material benefits some of these 
researchers might have offered them. In the end, these researchers did not 
even respect us. But your case is different. You respect us because you came 
to spend time with us although the red Tuareg warned you not to come. 
Also, they see you just like a poor Malian student who cannot offer them 
any material benefit because as an African you need that money for your 
own parents, too. For this very reason, you are not attractive to them like 
Europeans researchers would be.17
Assalim pointed to how my informants in Abala situated themselves vis-à-vis 
other groups through their interactions with me in a way that challenged the 
conventional prestige hierarchy. As will be seen in chapter 3, this conventional 
prestige hierarchy divides the Tuareg society into three main groups. At the top 
of the society stand the free noble warriors and religious clans. These are fol-
lowed by other free born, known as the vassals group. The unfree born, known 
as former slaves who are called the Bellah in the areas of Timbuktu and Gao, 
Iklan, in Kidal, stand at the bottom of the social structure. Assalim reduced the 
whole notion of being Tuareg to free-born Tuareg who, in his view, have been 
controlling the research done by European researchers (however, see Bouman 
2010; Olivier de Sardan 1976). His account assumed that being a Malian and a 
poor African student made it possible for me to move across different social 
segments without encountering major obstacles. His understanding of being 
a poor African student implied that I do not have enough material means to 
distribute resources to the free-born white Tuareg. His argument also illustrates 
how the Bellah-Iklan speakers perceived themselves not only as marginal groups 
in the northern political processes since the colonial era, but also in the gener-
ative dynamics of academic knowledge. Here, his argument allows us to discuss 
Mamadou Diawara’s insight outlined above (Diawara 1985). As mentioned ear-
lier, Diawara has argued that he faced some methodological challenges when 
attempting to talk to people of a servile condition (1985, 12f.). He explained that 
these challenges were due to his noble background in his own society. What 
Assalim tried to show here, which I would argue adds a new aspect to Diawara’s 
discussion, is that non-African scholars can also face the same dilemma that 
16 Bajan is used to refer to Bajan Ag Hamatou, the political leader of the dominant clans in the area 
of Menaka. He is currently the deputy of Menaka at the national parliament of Mali.
17 Conversations with Assalim on 23/12/2012 in Abala.
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their African counterpart, Diawara, experienced during his research. Assalim 
clearly associated the European researchers in the area of Menaka with the po-
litically dominant social segment of the free-born white Tuareg. To him, the 
European researchers could not speak to the Bellah-Iklan because of the free 
white Tuareg who hosted them. Therefore, in Assalim’s eyes, those research-
ers are no longer neutral when it comes to local tensions. This illustrates that 
since European researchers enter African societies through social contacts that 
consequently absorb them, they become part of the local struggles for power 
and legitimacy. This is what Diawara’s account overlooks. It fixes non-African 
researchers and African societies in a rigid and static manner.
Concerning my own position, although I am Malian I am not originally from 
the free white Tuareg group or the Bellah-Iklan. In this regard, my status differs 
from Diawara’s. He was originally part of one of the protagonists on which he 
was doing research. My status becomes closer to non-African researchers who are 
not initially members of given local groups. I would also argue that in the same 
way as that in which Assalim associated European researchers with the politically 
dominant free-born Tuareg groups in Menaka, he tended to associate me with 
their group in Abala. This was evident in how my Bellah-Iklan interlocutors often 
overtly insulted the few free-born families living there when these were passing 
by and interacting with me. As a result, whenever I tried to talk to the free white 
Tuareg, I felt that they did not want to interact beyond the standard exchange of 
greetings, especially when there were Bellah-Iklan men around me. It was because 
of the apparent tension, which informed the free-born Tuareg and Bellah-Iklan 
interactions in the refugee camp, that I could not follow the two groups in Abala. 
As I saw it, attempting to integrate simultaneously the few free-born families as re-
search participants in the refugee camp would have resulted in apparent tensions 
that could bring me problems with NGO representatives. As such, my research 
would contribute further to transforming the social setting of exile into an open 
battleground. This was obviously not the goal that I was pursuing there. The male 
Bellah-Iklan’s attempts to control my interactions with the free-born Tuareg indi-
cate the challenges that I faced in the field. Though these challenges might have 
some limiting implications for the present study, I hope that my focus on a group 
of free-born Tuareg in Niamey enabled me to include the latter’s perspective in 
this research.
2.2.2.2	 The	witness	and	the	compatriot	in	Abala
My project also involved interviews with humanitarian workers in Abala. I 
particularly observed their interactions with my refugee informants under the 
hangar. The everyday relationships between humanitarian workers and refu-
gees in Abala had the following characteristics. The humanitarian workers saw 
the refugees as people who were never satisfied and were ready to do whatever 
came to their minds in order to gain more profit. As a result, this disturbed all 
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the plans the humanitarian workers put into place.18 For their part, the refugees 
viewed the former as disrespectful collaborators who did not consider them as 
“respectable persons.” As will be shown in chapter 4, this tension itself appeared 
to me as a formative process of how my male interlocutors assessed the predica-
ments of exile. What seems to be relevant about this conflicting relationship for 
this chapter is the way in which both protagonists, meaning the NGO workers 
and the Bellah-Iklan refugees, approached me as a witness to this situation. I 
have already explained that I gained access to the camp through different con-
tacts with people working for the NGOs.19 For this reason, I was then offered the 
chance to stay with them at the Guesthouse in Abala village, located about one 
kilometer from the refugee camp. There, after dinner, I often sat with several of 
them around the tea kettle next to the main door. Sometimes our conversations 
lasted for hours. Although we had spoken about several topics of interest to us as 
young men, some aspects of our conversations focused exclusively on the refu-
gees’ behavior. One day Goudel,20 working for the French NGO through which I 
accessed the camp, addressed me in the following manner:
Souleymane, it is really, really difficult to work with your compatriots. They 
do not have any notion of order. Imagine, in the fifth quartier I surprised 
many male adults today who were eating the food we gave them for their 
children in order to diminish the consequences of their undernutrition.
By referring to me as a compatriot of the refugees, Goudel attempted to place me 
in a position to witness the constant efforts of humanitarian workers to satisfy 
them. The next day, he invited me to follow him during the child food checking 
sessions with the families when we returned to the refugee camp. We started from 
the third quartier, where we discovered that in many families the food quantity 
given for distribution to children had already been finished long before the set 
deadline. Goudel complained with an unusual tonal emphasis. He reminded me of 
what he had just been telling me the night before in order to substantiate the claim 
that my compatriots are difficult to deal with. I also had similar experiences with 
other humanitarian workers.
On their part, the refugee men, knowing that I am Malian, always talked about 
the humanitarian workers behind their backs, sometimes discretely and other 
times overtly. I remember that on the same day Goudel went with me to the third 
quartier, some of these men we met with their families told me that “he is really 
18 For example, some refugees were accused of having inserted more people in their lists of food ra-
tions who were not actually their relatives or even living in the refugee camp. When these attempts 
were discovered, the refugees involved have been asked to pay back the extra rations they have 
been given for months back. This situation even culminated in greater pressure until some refugees 
left the camp prematurely.
19 On my arrival in Niger, several researchers I met at the LASDEL advised me to use my own personal 
contacts in order to gain access to the camp rather than going through uncertain bureaucratic pro-
cedures.
20 I use Goudel as a nickname here.
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the unfriendliest NGO worker” at their afternoon informal social gathering. They 
complained that Goudel humiliated the heads of the families under their tents. 
Others went on to state that once something enters their houses, that thing should 
be placed under the control of the head of the family. Yet, at these social gather-
ings, several other stories about humanitarian workers with whom I was spending 
nights at the Guesthouse were explained to me. For one thing, my interlocutors 
stressed that as a Malian I should know about what they are experiencing in the 
refugee camp. In telling their stories, both protagonists expected me to give com-
ments about what I thought of the situation they presented. I found their attempts 
revealing about the dynamics going on in the refugee camp. I formulated ques-
tions from what I heard to ask for further details about what I wanted to know, 
such as how both interpreted these confrontations.
2.3 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have first presented the methods that I used during my research 
in Abala and Niamey. The methods consisted of participant observations, focus 
group discussions, and narrative biographic interviews. The second part of the 
chapter has examined my relationships with the other research participants in the 
field. The body of literature on reflexivity informed the discussions of these in-
teractions with my informants (Altern/Holtedahl 2000; Gubrium/Holstein 1997; 
Hammersley/Atkinson 1995; Holliday 2003). In discussing my situation in the 
field in Niamey and Abala, I engaged in some critical reflections on Diawara’s ar-
gument that African researchers doing research in their social contexts are mostly 
absorbed by local social struggles in ways that make it difficult for them to move 
across different social segments compared to their non-African counterparts 
(Diawara 1985). I stressed that not only Africans are absorbed by local struggles, 
but the non-African scholars can also become gradually part of local struggles 
through the social contacts they access in the field. For example, the Bellah-Iklan 
informants affiliated European researchers with free-born Tuareg in Menaka. 
Their comments posited these researchers as active social actors partaking in lo-
cal tensions between the free-born Tuareg and the unfree-born Tuareg in the 
area of Menaka. Consequently, the Bellah-Iklan’s comments illustrated the loss 
of the researchers’ outsider identities in Hastrup’s and Crawford’s sense of “other-
ing processes” in anthropological fieldwork contexts (Crawford 1992, 48; Hastrup 
1995, 19). I also illustrated my claim about Diawara’s argument by discussing how 
both the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg related to me during my research 
in Niamey and Abala. Each protagonist group of the book tended to absorb me 
into his or her local struggles. In Niamey, the terms “friend” and “brother” were 
used to refer to me. The social closeness these terms imply brought the inform-
ants to protect me, in their own views, from the Hausa and Zarma ethnic urban 
residents who the informants depicted as against the Tuareg. I argued that my 
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interactions with the Bellah-Iklan men limited other possibilities to interact with 
free-born Tuareg in the refugee camp. Seeing that I followed the Bellah-Iklan men 
to the hangar every day made the free-born Tuareg suspicious about my  attempts 
to speak with them. Ultimately, the discussions of these interactions with other 
participants in Niamey and Abala answered the interlocutors who anticipated 
and judged my capacity to conduct research among the Tuareg as a “native” of 
“black” origin from southern Mali.
3. Historical background
This study analyzes how the two groups of Tuareg refugees in Niger redefined 
their former social status hierarchy by reconstructing themselves as collectivities 
in the Nigerien diaspora. As a starting point for this analysis, this chapter offers an 
account of conventional Tuareg social organizations as they existed historically in 
different regions of northern Mali. Yet far from constituting an uncontested social 
order on which the noble free-born “masters,” non-noble free-Tuareg and their 
Bellah-Iklan slaves agreed, I argue that since colonial times, the Bellah-Iklan and 
free-born Tuareg1 were engaged in a very conflicted relationship with each other. 
In a second step, the chapter draws on, yet also critically engages with, works 
such as Boilley 1999; Bourgeot 1995; Grémont 2010; Hureiki 2003; Klute 1992a; 
Klute 2003; Klute 2012; Klute 2013; and Lecocq 2002; Lecocq 2005; Lecocq 2010 
to offer an event history of the political processes that, in recent decades, have led 
to the refugees’ relocation from their home base in northern Mali to neighboring 
countries.
3.1	 Tuareg	social	and	political	organization
Bernus 1981; Boilley 1999; Bourgeot 1995; Grémont 2010; Hureiki 2003; Klute 
1992a; Klute 2003; Klute 2013; and Lecocq 2010 address the social and political or-
ganization and situation of different Tuareg clans exclusively from the perspective 
of the “white,” free-born masters. They show that the Tuareg inhabiting the north 
of the Republic of Mali were politically and socially organized around some rival 
federations that referred to themselves as Kel Adagh, Ouillimeden Kel Ataram, 
and Kel Tinguériguif and Kel Antsar in the regions of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, 
respectively. The term “federation” (in Tamasheq, ettebel) refers to a set of clans 
that form a political unit under the leadership of one dominant clan (Lecocq 2010, 
13). The different clans that make up one ettebel stand in hierarchical relationship 
to each other. The leader of the ettebel is called amenokal, which means “the owner 
of the land” and is also the symbol of power. Several federations rose and fell dur-
ing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.2
Existing scholarship on the Tuareg is not only characterized by a focus on the 
free-born white Tuareg but also by an eclectic concentration on individual clans 
1 As will be shown in this chapter, there was not only tension between the Bellah-Iklan and the white 
free Tuareg since the colonial era, but there existed also a constant conflicted relationship between 
the free-born noble and the non-noble free-born, in particular the imghad Tuareg, as well.
2 For example, Grémont 2010 and Lecocq 2010 argue that both contemporary Ouillimeden Kel At-
aram and Kel Denneg formed one political entity earlier before splitting into two. A most recent 
history indicates that the Kel Adagh emerged as a federation of their own only under French rule 
(see Boilley 1999).
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of free-born white Tuareg that live in different regions of Mali’s north. Klute, Le-
cocq, and Boilley offered detailed studies of the Kel Adagh of the region of Kidal,3 
while Grémont’s and Hureiki’s historical studies concentrate on the Ouillimeden 
Kel Ataram (in the Gao region, notably the area around Menaka) and on the Kel 
Antsar and Tingueriguif in and around Timbuktu. All these authors portray the 
Tuareg social structure within the federations4 as a vertically ordered society. At 
the top of the social structure are the “noble” warriors, who are perceived racially 
as “white” or “red” (Lecocq 2010, 5). According to Lecocq, the nobles distinguish 
themselves from the others by a culture of honor and shame. They referred to 
this culture as temushagha, “the way of the imushagh” (which connotes “the noble 
way of life”). Central to the noble way of life, he argues, was the knowledge of 
honor and shame and that of one’s own lineage, called temet, and ancestry, which 
3 They focused mainly on Kel Adagh but also did research on the Ouillimeden Kel Ataram around 
the area of Menaka. 
4 See Boilley (Boilley 1999, also Grémont 2010; Hureiki 2003; Lecocq 2010), who offered historical 
accounts about the diversity and social stratifications of the Tuareg living in the regions of Gao, 
Timbuktu, and Kidal.
Figure 2:	A map of the Tuareg’s main living areas in the southern Sahara. Source: Boilley (1999, 6).
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form the cornerstone of political organization. As main strategies of social re-
production, these clans (tewsiten in Tamasheq) practised intra-clan5 marriages. 
Another group of nobles was distinguished in early French colonial reports from 
the warrior nobility: the Ineslemen, families of religious experts. This group stood 
directly under the noble warriors in the social structure. The vassal groups, im-
ghad, formed a separate group, politically and physically considered as weaker 
and socially inferior to the other two groups. In the pre-colonial era, the imghad, 
who are considered as the clan of the vassal groups, were in charge of herding 
their own animals as well as these of the nobles (Boilley 1999).6 They paid tribute 
(tiwse) to the politically dominant clans which, in return, offered them protection 
against external attacks.7 Following Ag Litny (Ag Litny 1992), the French historian 
Pierre Boilley has argued that the social life of the imghad in the area around Kidal 
was shaped by material poverty, physical8 weakness, and political inferiority (Boil-
ley 1999, 30). Another social status group, called the Inadan, were craftmen and 
blacksmiths9; they were and are conceived as racially black. Finally, at the bottom 
of the hierarchy stand the Iklan, or slaves, who perform domestic work and cattle 
herding on behalf of their masters; they are of unfree birth and considered racially 
black (Hall 2011a; Hall 2011b).
Klute and Lecocq maintain that this hierarchical structure has undergone signif-
icant changes over recent decades (Klute 2003; Klute 2013; Lecocq 2010).10 Lecocq 
even notes a shift in the terminology used in the self-ascriptions of certain social 
groups when, for example, some imghad began to refer to themselves as nobles, and 
consequently introduced the term Timgheda “the way of the imghad” (Lecocq 2010, 
9). Although Lecocq speaks about these dynamics, his perspective on Tuareg soci-
ety remains somewhat static, for instance, when he frames the differences between 
different social status groups in the Kidal area in terms of oppositions: between 
the free-born and the unfree, strong versus weak, and lineage versus non-lineage. 
According to Lecocq, the first opposition between free–unfree manifests itself in 
norms of social conduct and in a labor ethic that are rooted in collective under-
standings of the mentality and ways of thinking considered to be typical and innate 
to the free born and the unfree (Lecocq 2005, 55f.; Berge 2000, 204f.). The tandem 
  5 I mean here marriage between members within the same clan.
  6 According to Lecocq, this was not necessarily true. He also argues that some imghad, but not all, 
have temet meaning a lineage to which they belong and which also kept them against impurity or 
political encroachments through marriage strategies that formed the basis of a policy to keep the 
social strata in place (Lecocq 2010, 5).
  7 Both Grémont and Boilley recall that there were constant rivalry and conflicting relations between 
different social and political constellations prior to the French occupation of the desert (Boilley 
1999; Grémont 2010).
  8 According to Boilley, the notion of physical weakness was used to refer to the dependence of the 
imghad on noble warriors for protection. But the author also stresses that this issue remains con-
troversial as well (Boilley 1999, 30).
  9 Schmidt compares this group to the Griots in southern Mali. Concerning Griots (see Schulz 2001).
10 See Klute (2003) (also Lecocq 2010, chapters 5 and 6).
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strong–weak similarly arranges the noble warriors and the politically weak imghad 
in a hierarchical relationship. The last opposition, i.e. the lineage−non-lineage, 
points to relations between “those who claim a lineage and know their genealogy, 
and those who do not claim a lineage or do not know their genealogy” (Lecocq 
2010, 9). Having a lineage in the Tuareg society, according to Lecocq, is perceived 
to be the most fitting characteristic of noble origin and blood (2010, 9).
My account departs from this interpretation in the body of literature insofar as, 
firstly, this study examines the points of view of the free white non-noble-Tuareg 
and the Bellah-Iklan, who are both of inferior social status. Secondly, the present 
study also does not focus on the specific regional group of Tuareg called the feder-
ation. In Niamey, my research focused on free white Tuareg from all the regions in 
northern Mali. I sought to understand how the informants negate the regional dif-
ferences between different groups of free white Tuareg. Thirdly, while the authors 
mentioned above depict how the structure of local clans is ordered according to 
social status hierarchy, this study examines how the free white Tuareg informants 
in Niamey and Bellah-Iklan in Abala take apart this local clan hierarchy in the 
exile situation.
3.2  The social dynamics of Tuareg society under French colonial rule 
(1894	to	1960)
The arrival of the French in Timbuktu in 1894 marked the starting point of the co-
lonial conquest of the western part of the Sahara (Boilley 1999, 62f.). From there, 
colonial French troops moved toward other Tuareg settlements. The Kel Intsar and 
Kel Tenguériguif in Timbuktu and the Ouillimeden Kel Ataram living in the Gao 
region resisted the French occupation violently, whereas the Kel Adagh, by con-
trast, opted for an alliance (Boilley 1999, chapter 2). The Tuareg of Timbuktu and 
Gao, who openly resisted colonial domination, were defeated by French troops and 
placed under extreme surveillance. The Kel Adagh of Kidal, in contrast, offered 
their submission in a letter written by Mohammed Illi Ag Khammadin, the chief 
of the Kel Adagh Tuareg, to captain Métois, the French representative of In Salah 
in southern Algeria (1999, 68).11 In his answering letter, captain Métois accepted 
the offer of the Kel Adagh, recognized Illi Ag Khammadin as the single chief of 
the Ifoghas and groups affiliated with them, and offered the Kel Adagh protection 
against their enemies (1999, 69). In exchange, captain Métois requested Illi Ag 
Khammadin to update him on all important events involving the Adagh people. 
The letter exchange sheds light on the different options open to Tuareg clans on 
the eve of colonial occupation, and also on rivalries among Tuareg groups.12
11 The letter was written on October 20, 1903.
12 For instance, in his letter to Captain Métois, the chief of Kel Adagh manifested his desire to obtain 
in written form the French acceptance of their offer in order to dissuade the people around the 
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The rivalry between the Tuareg federations in northern Mali faded away dur-
ing the colonial era through the creation of the short-lived Organisation Com-
mune des Régions Sahariannes (OCRS) in 1957.13 Although the French initiated 
the project of creating the OCRS, it was also positively received by some Tuareg 
groups.14 Thus, on 30 October 1957, the Qadi of Timbuktu wrote a letter of petition 
 addressed to President De Gaulle and signed by notables and merchants of Tim-
buktu. He mentioned in his letter that if there existed a right to self- determination 
for a people, the nomads would like to believe that they were allowed to make 
their aspirations known. The letter manifested the Qadi’s formal opposition to 
the nomads’ integration into Federalist Black or North Africa autonomous enti-
ties (Lecocq 2010, 55f.). Instead, the Qadi demanded their incorporation into the 
French Sahara of which they were part, historically, emotionally, and ethnically. 
Equally, the letter declared without restrictions that nomads already were, and 
wanted to remain, an integral part of the French Republic. The Qadi also traveled 
and campaigned extensively throughout the Sahara in order to promote his idea of 
nomads’ particularism and unity versus the African sedentary people.15 However, 
in spite of his effort, his project remained unsuccessful because not only African 
elites were opposed to the Qadi’s project, but other Tuareg federations as well, in 
particular the Kel Adagh (Boilley 1999).
Under colonial rule, socio-political hierarchies within the federations were 
fundamentally altered, partly as a consequence of the French-led emancipation 
of the vassal groups and former slaves. A colonial measure with momentous con-
sequences was the prohibition of the tribute payments that the vassal groups had 
owed the politically dominant noble warriors in exchange for the protection they 
received from their free-born masters (Lecocq 2010). As a result, the dominant 
clans lost much of their former political and economic power. The position of 
some warrior clans was further undermined as a consequence of the French-
led manumission of slaves who belonged to the defeated federations and their 
subsequent settlement in newly created “liberty villages” (Bouche 1968). These 
Niger river. I would assume he meant those Tuareg from the Timbuktu and Gao regions or just the 
Tuareg in the Niger Bend, as there is historical evidence that the Kel Adagh even stood on the side 
of the French troops against Ouillimeden in 1916. On their part, Boilley and Grémont submit that 
the Kel Adagh, until the colonial occupation, paid tribute to the Ouillimeden for protection. After 
the defeat of the latter by the French, the Kel Adagh tribes were promoted and granted the status 
of an independent federation. In contrast, the Ouillimeden Kel Ataram and Denneg federations 
were subject to severe measures by the French, such as more strict surveillance of the ruling clans.
13 This project consisted of separating the Saharan regions from both French Sudan and the French 
part of North Africa. It included northern regions of current Mali, Niger, and southern Algeria, 
Morocco, and Mauritania.
14 François Mitterrand, Minister of Justice at that time, explained that he would nevertheless like a 
more structured Saharan territory, in conformity with its geographic realities, administratively 
more autonomous from Algeria and the black African Territories bordering to the south (Lecocq 
2010, 52).
15 In this context, the notion of African sedentary population included farmers from both north and 
southern French Sudan.
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measures consisted, first of all, in regrouping dispersed slave families and provid-
ing the household heads with a proper identity card (Lecocq 2005).16 The reunited 
families were often registered then administratively separated from their masters 
and united with Bellah fractions, often taking the name of their masters’ fractions. 
The new fractions were provided with a means of existence of their own (2005, 51).
Lecocq, following Winter (Winter 1984), summarizes the transformation of 
socio-political hierarchies prompted by colonial administrative regulations as 
follows:
With the growth in local markets and the monetization of northern Mali in 
the 1940s and 1950s, these newly liberated communities found an outlet for 
their surplus production, with their former masters forcibly as new custom-
ers. Pastoral slaves were apportioned a minimal part of their former masters 
herds, fixed at three heads of cattle and thirty goats. For those bellah who 
remained with their former masters, labor contracts were drawn up with a 
relatively generous yearly remuneration in livestock: a three-year-old camel 
for herding thirty camels; a heifer for each twenty head of cattle; and ten 
sheep for every hundred herded. (Lecocq 2005, 51f.)
Although most liberty villages were created in the Timbuktu and Gao regions, 
among clans who had mounted resistance to the French colonial powers, the 
Kel Adagh warrior clans in the Kidal region were also affected by these meas-
ures (Boilley 1999). The leaders of imghad vassal groups were placed under the 
direct authority of colonial administrators. This deprived the politically dominant 
Ifoghas clans of any opportunity to assume a role as political brokers between for-
merly dependent clans and the colonial state; these clans of the Tuareg nobility lost 
much of their former political legitimacy. These transformations of established 
social hierarchies and dependencies within individual federations and also of rela-
tions between federations had long-term consequences and informed post-World 
War II Tuareg politics.
The Brazzaville declaration in 1944, followed by the creation of the French un-
ion in 1946, augured a new era of reformulated relations between France and its 
colonial subjects. The first legislative elections where African candidates could 
present themselves were held in 1946, but the Tuareg participated in these political 
processes to a considerably lesser degree than Mali’s sedentary populations. The 
reasons for their limited participation were, firstly, that the Tuareg remained at 
a distance from the political centers of colonial politics, which were essentially 
located in the urban centers of the southern French Sudan. Also, because of logis-
tical and political reasons, schooling opportunities, as the main route to politi-
cal influence for the new African elite, remained severely limited in Mali’s north. 
16 For example, Lecocq emphasizes that the slaves were formerly registered on the identity cards of 
their masters as part of the family, congruent with local discourses and anthropological analysis, 
which stressed the use of family and kinship terminology between slaves and masters.
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Other infrastructures introduced by the colonial state, such as schools and medi-
cal care were almost absent in nomad settlements (Lecocq 2010, 43).
While the overall participation of the nomadic population was low, the partic-
ipation of the social groups within Tuareg society was again shaped by changes, 
even inversions, of the former hierarchies between the different social status 
groups. For many Bellah-Iklan:
voting RDA equaled a vote against the master, it meant filing a freedom pa-
per. On 17 June 1951, 712 bellahs in Gangaber, 59 at In Tillit, 26 at Chunkaye, 
and 203 at Indeliman voted against their master. The results at the ballot box 
at In Tillit are especially interesting: a particularly isolated post, people un-
touched by propaganda, and yet 59 freedom papers. (Lecocq 2005, 49)
The direct effect of the result of this vote, by which the slaves opposed their masters, 
was the exacerbation of tension between them. Many slaves left their masters even 
taking some of the animals along (Lecocq 2005, 49). Lecocq also explains that the 
results of the vote led the colonial administration and the US-RDA to give greater 
consideration to the social and economic emancipation of the unfree Tuareg 
(2005, 49f.). While the colonial administration debated the appropriate reforms 
that should be implemented in the Niger Bend after World War II, a number of 
Bellah-Iklan groups began to take matters into their own hands (Hall 2011b, 73f.). 
For instance, a revolt of some Bellah-Iklan in the area of Menaka in 1946 was de-
cisive in ending the control of free-born Tuareg over their former slaves (cf. Klein 
1998). After the 1916 revolt of the Ouillimeden Kel Ataram, the Iklan n eguef fam-
ilies under their command were separated and regrouped as a fraction under the 
name Zamburuten (Schmitt 1954, see footnote 9 Lecocq 2005, 65). This hastened 
the Bellah-Iklan migration to the south in order to find better pasture lands and to 
avoid their masters (Hall 2011b, 73f.). Throughout this post-World War II era, the 
US-RDA leaders steadily gained influence in local politics, drawing on the support 
of socially and politically subordinate groups. Their opponents from the Parti Sou-
danais Progressiste (PSP), in contrast, were supported by the free-born Tuareg.17 
The party competition and its intertwining with contestations among different Tu-
areg status groups, continued to inform Tuareg politics in postcolonial Mali.
3.3	 The	Tuareg	threat	to	National	Unity	in	Mali:	1960–2016
President Keita’s socialist regime subscribed to the modernist belief in modern 
technologies, rational production schemes, African socialism, and, above all, the 
malleability of the human condition, and was determined to put the Sahara to 
17 Extensive research done by Schulz in southern Mali illustrates similar dynamics around the area of 
Kita (Schulz 2001). While clan chiefs were supportive of PSP, the peoples of social and politically 
marginal positions were attracted to the US-RDA.
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use and civilize its population (Lecocq 2010, chapter 3). As part of the US-RDA 
party’s plan to modernize nomadic economies, in the early 1960s, socioeconomic 
measures were implemented that aimed to transform nomads into sedentary agri-
culturalists, to free the Bellah-Iklan from their master−slave relationships, and to 
tax pastoral economies.
To this end, the state created and distributed garden perimeters to nomads. Es-
sentially, the Keita’s regime had a “notion of work” that could be equated with sed-
entary farming. Thus converting pastoral nomadic peoples who, according to the 
view of the regime, wander around and count the heads of cattle, into sedentary 
farming was then equated with their conversion from a state of laziness into dili-
gent workers. Historical works agree that the gardens created for this conversion 
were in the end held by the Bellah-Iklan because the former masters remained 
reluctant to commit themselves to such manual work. Men whose task had for-
merly been limited to watering the animals and fetching water were now forced 
to do manual work. Free-born Tuareg women, too, who traditionally were not 
expected to do manual work, were forced to make bricks under the new political 
order and were threatened with imprisonment or death in case of non-compliance 
(2010, 159). Keita’s government also sought to put the nomads and their cattle into 
the channels of the national rationalized economy by putting taxes on the pastoral 
activities: the export of the cattle, for example, which until then had been in the 
hands of the nomads themselves. The latter usually sold their animals according 
to needs for consumption, and in the market of their choices. However, from early 
1963 onwards, the nomads had to declare their activities.
The determination of the post-colonial state to emancipate the Bellah-Iklan 
and vassal groups further, processes that had begun gradually under colonial rule, 
was another source of tension between the free-born noble Tuareg and the Malian 
state. The state dissolved some nomadic tribes as administrative entities in 1960 
and replaced them with the new political entities referred to as fractions. Further-
more, the Keita regime implemented a cultural policy that aimed at transforming 
the nomads’ customs and habits. Ag Litny argues that under Modibo Keita’s re-
gime, the Troupe artistique of Kidal18 was forbidden to sing in Tamasheq and had 
to learn, and perform, in Bamanankan19 instead (Ag Litny 1992).
Looking at the state-making as a “cultural process” (Corrigan/Sayer 1985; Stein-
metz 1999), Schulz divides post-colonial Mali into two cultural triangles by re-
flecting on the complex ethnic and cultural compositions on the one hand, and 
the imbalance between different triangles in terms of national cultural politics on 
the other (Schulz 2007b, 190f.). For example, when speaking about Modibo Keita’s 
regime (1960–1968), she states that:
18 For a long period of time, a central axis of Malian state culture was the festival called Biennal held 
each two years. For this event each region sent a Troupe artistique (Schulz 2007b).
19 Bamanankan is the lingua franca in southern Mali.
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State administration of culture […] was effected partly through the creation 
of structures of state patronage that facilitated the incorporation of various 
cultural producers, among them Jeli musicians and oral traditionalists, into 
the nationalist project. Musical and artistic production, closely monitored by 
the Ministry of Culture, became central elements of an officially promoted 
national culture. Considerably less broadcasting time and attention during 
official celebrations were devoted to the oral arts of the peoples from the 
northern triangle. (Schulz 2007b, 190f.)
Before Schulz, Cutter (1968) had already remarked that each night at six, the radio 
broadcast a music program with folk music. More important in this policy was the 
broadcasting of the tales of Baba Sissoko which centered on the Sunjata epic and 
other tales of the Mande Kingdoms performed by “the national griot Banzoumana 
Sissoko” (Cutter 1968, quoted in Lecocq 2010, 73f.).
For Schulz, the consequence of the underrepresentation of northern people in 
the national media and the denial of the existence of differences and inequalities 
within the nation was in line with the persistent exclusion of northern people from 
positions of political influence, an exclusion effected primarily through the struc-
ture of single-party rule that was concentrated in the capital, leaving the north-
ern population very little leverage in accessing the resources of the state through 
patronage relations (Schulz 2007b, 192). Along a similar line, Lecocq, describing 
processes of symbolic cultural formation of nationhood in Mali, points out that:
the name of the new republic reflected the dominance of its core popula-
tions: the Mande and Bambara. Mali was explicitly presented as the rightful 
heir not only of the Mali Empire, but also, more broadly, of a Mande civili-
sation whose glory and dignity, robbed by colonialism, had to be restored. 
Malian schoolbooks presented the history of the new nation almost uniquely 
through the history of the Mali Empire and other Mande kingdoms, leaving 
some space to the Songhay Empire and largely leaving aside the complex his-
tories of the many other communities in the republic. The imaginary glue 
holding the various peoples of the country together consisted of frequent ref-
erence to Sunjata empire-building, thus reflecting an ‘official nationalism’ in 
Anderson’s meaning of the term. […] In this way, Mali national culture was 
Mande culture and Mali’s national character was the Mande national charac-
ter of industriousness and self-sacrifice. (Lecocq 2010, 73)
These various measures targeting Tuareg society resulted in the frustration cul-
minating in a series of interlinked uprisings known as the Tuareg rebellions: 1963, 
1990–1996, 2006, and since 2012 to the present day.
3.3.1 The Tuareg rebellion in 1963 and its aftermath
What is known as the Tuareg’s first rebellion took place in the region of Kidal. One 
captured former rebel, Amouksou Ag Azandeher, explained the revolt against the 
Malian state as follows:
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The reasons are numerous, but the main ones are: 1) we, nomads of the white 
race, can neither conceive nor accept to be commanded by blacks whom we 
always had as servants and slaves. 2) We Ifoghas, do not accept or conceive 
of the equality between races and men Mali wants to impose on us, starting 
with taking our imghad and bellah away from us. 3) We gain nothing from 
Malian independence, but heavy taxes and customs duties to pay. 4) The Ma-
lian Government thinks it is superior to our Chief Zeyd and does not listen to 
him. 5) The Malian gendarmerie mistreats us irrespective of whether they are 
wrong or right. (Lecocq 2010, 188)20
Massacres and summary executions followed altercations between Tuareg “rebels” 
and the Malian army (Boilley 1999; Lecocq 2010). The rebels planned their opera-
tions at the rebel base in southern Algeria Takormiasse and most of their attacks 
consisted of raids on camel herds and fixed Malian army posts (Lecocq 2010). The 
rebel units mostly traveled from there by night, spending the day hidden while 
scouts gathered information. Their general tactic was to attack only small forces 
disadvantaged by the terrain (2010, 198). In order to suppress the rebels, the Malian 
army forces used heavy weapons against them during the first four months of the 
rebellion. For example, in October 1963, the state used an average of 2,200 men, 
35 armored cars, two airplanes, and an assorted number of heavy arms against 
rebel forces numbering about 200 men at most (2010, 199).
The regime also replaced the civil administrator with Captain Dibi Syllas Di-
arra. The entire Adagh zone passed under military control and was divided into 
two: one part declared a “concentration zone” where civilians were advised to re-
locate and a second part declared a “combat zone.” Many nomads resisted this 
arbitrary relocation and moved to Algeria. The Malian army capitalized on close 
diplomatic ties to Algeria and pursued the civil population into Algerian territory, 
considering the Kel Adagh who had fled from the violence as accomplices of the 
rebels. In November 1963, the Malian army forces massacred more than 400 cows 
and 250 camels together with their herdsmen at the wells of In Ouzzel, a few hun-
dred kilometers into the Algerian border zone (2010, 209).
The rebels who were caught by the Malian army were subjected to scenes of 
humiliation before being executed. Amegha Ag Sherif, a former rebel, recalled 
in a conversation with Lecocq how the Malian army forces undressed two men, 
Zeyd and Mohamed Ali, exposing them throughout Goundam, Timbuktu, and 
the whole Tuareg country. Ag Sherif insisted that the soldiers spat on these men, 
who were the most respected men among the Tuareg population. He concluded 
his report by asserting that treating these men like that was equal to “killing some-
one’s soul” (2010, 214f.). By August 15, 1964, the Malian government celebrated the 
end of the rebellion and their victory over the rebels. A great part of Adagh was 
20 However, Klute underlines that the degrees to which these measures were implanted varied from 
one area to another. He argues that they affected the other Western Tuareg federations more than 
the Kel Adagh where the revolt broke out.
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declared a “forbidden zone” and closed to foreigners. The bloody state repression 
of this rebellion produced many nomad refugees across the Magrheb and the West 
African diaspora. Lecocq reminds us that, in spite of the official end of the rebel-
lion, the Malian army continued to commit a significant number of public and 
summary executions, even after the removal of Modibo Keita from power in 1968. 
For example, he explains that the Tuareg chiefs who did not collaborate with the 
army were also shot (2010, 218).21
3.3.2	 	The	fall	of	Modibo	Keita,	the	droughts	of	the	1970s	and	1980s,	and	
continued state repression
In November 1968, a group of young soldiers under the leadership of Lieuten-
ant Moussa Traoré removed the first president Modibo Keita from power. The 
news of the military coup was acclaimed and celebrated, at least among politically 
dominant clans within the Tuareg society. Yet the strong military hold on Tuareg 
regions, especially in Kidal, did not change. In addition, the nomads came to be 
confronted with two droughts that further affected them. During the first period 
of droughts in 1973–1974, the Tuareg lost many of their cattle and also many peo-
ple. Lecocq following Kloth (Kloth 1974) writes:
Survey data from 3,500 children emphasize the fact that undernutrition in 
the four country area is to be found more among nomads than sedentary 
persons, and more in the North than in the South. Children from nomad 
clusters ranged on the average ten to seventeen percent below the threshold 
while those from sedentary or Southern groups were approximately three to 
seven percent below. The existence of pockets of extreme undernutrition is 
supported by data from all countries but particularly from Mali where up to 
80% of the children in one nomad cluster were acutely undernourished. The 
above statements on the nutritional status of children must be considered 
conservative. (Lecocq 2010, 236f.)
According to Ag Litny, as a consequence of malnutrition in this period there were 
days when people did not even leave the cemetery since there were so many bodies 
to be buried. Death became a common occurrence among the Kel Tamasheq (Ag 
Litny 1992, 163).
Before the nomads had been able to recover from the first drought, another one 
began (1983–1984). As before, the only option left to many Kel Tamasheq was to 
go into exile in Niger and in the Magrheb. Among the far-reaching consequences 
of these periods of forced exile was the alteration of norms of conduct regulating 
21 The best known examples of these cases are Ayyouba Ag Mohamed Adargajouj, chief of the Daous-
sahak, and the father of Younes and Ilyas ag Ayyouba. According to Lecocq, Ayyouba’s father, who 
lived in the area around Menaka, was arrested and sent to Kidal, where he was executed on the 
grounds that his sons were rebel leaders and he himself had furnished camels for them (Lecocq 
2010, 218).
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interactions between groups in the Kel Tamasheq society (Boilley 1999; Bourgeot 
1995). The distinct working ethic and codes of behavior guiding interactions be-
tween Tuareg of free birth and the unfree slaves lost much of their validity and 
legitimacy when Tuareg of free birth started to beg for food and to eat in public. 
Also, slaves and masters had to compete for resources, such as when masters  began 
to cultivate the gardens formerly considered the sole occupation of slaves. Accord-
ing to Boilley, among the Kel Adagh these years are still today remembered as “les 
années d’égalité” (literally, the years of equality). The dividing lines between the 
two status categories, the politically dominant free-born Tuareg and their former 
slaves, became blurred. This blurring of former status divisions manifested itself in 
cases where slaves succeeded in marrying the daughters of their former masters. 
The attitude of the Malian government toward the Tuareg confronted with this 
situation is highly indicative. Le Monde reporter Phillipe Decreane stressed that 
the Malian authorities refused to deliver aid to the Tuareg confronted with severe 
situations and that the refusal of humanitarian support severely exacerbated the 
negative consequences of the droughts for nomadic populations (Lecocq 2010, 
237). Recalling antecedents such as pre-colonial relations between nomads and 
sedentary populations; the OCRS; and the rebellion in the Kidal region in 1963, 
Phillipe Decreane even went as far as to argue that the Malian authorities took 
the drought of 1973–1974 as an opportunity to get rid of nomads once and for all 
(2010, 237).22
3.3.3 The Tuareg second rebellion in the 1990s
The bloody repression of the rebellion in 1963–1964 by the Malian army, followed 
by two disastrous droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, fueled the formation of the Tu-
areg diaspora stretching across borders to the neighboring countries of the Magh-
reb and West Africa. This diaspora was largely composed of youths confronted 
with the common experience of exile, unemployment, and rigid security regula-
tions in the Maghreb. These conditions of exile led the Tuareg youths to develop 
a revolutionary vision for the nomad society (Lecocq 2004). Calling themselves 
the Ishumar (meaning unemployees), these young Tuareg sought to promote the 
idea of the “tumast” which, similarly to social processes highlighted in this dis-
sertation, tended to reconstruct the Tuareg society as a homogeneous community 
while downplaying rivalry and differences between and within the federations. In 
this sense, the rebellion was not only an armed uprising (the Tuareg second rebel-
lion) against the Malian state, but also involved attempts to change the hierarchy 
and caste structure of Tuareg society itself. The rebellion started with the attack on 
22 For Lecocq, even if Philippe Decreane’s accusations against the Malian political authority in Bama-
ko were incorrect, they very likely expressed the thoughts of those nomads who lost their children 
due to malnutrition and disease in the aid abandoned camps (Lecocq 2010, 238).
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June 28, 1990, in Menaka, and lasted, at least officially, until March 1996 with the 
ceremony of the peace flame held in Timbuktu.
Lecocq divides the rebellion into four main phases. The first phase went from 
late June 1990 to January 1991 when the Tamanrasset peace agreement was signed. 
According to him, the Tuareg refer to this period as the real rebellion. The rebel-
lion itself was precipitated after members of Gao and Kidal informal Tuareg battal-
ions had been arrested and their arms stocks seized by the Malian army. Only Iyad 
Ag Ghali,23 the leader of the rebellion, luckily managed to escape with a few (30 
in number) men. Additionally, on June 27, 1990, a heavily armed rebel vehicle was 
intercepted by a border Malian army patrol looking for smugglers. After a short 
fight, the army seized the vehicle as well as the arms that it contained. The next day 
the rebels located in the area of Menaka attacked the military camp and adminis-
trative posts in Tidarmène, together with cars and the belongings of NGOs, in the 
area around the Tedjerert.
Between June and October 1990, the rebels constantly attacked military camps 
and administrative posts in various areas of the Adagh and parts of Azawad.24 The 
army’s response and attempt to contain this rebellion resembled that of 1963–1964. 
The army initiated what were known as “concentration zones” in the vicinity of the 
main northern cities and “free circulation zones” next to combat zones. Moreover, 
a state of emergency was declared under which many cases of army led civilian 
executions took place. According to Lecocq, most of these executions formed part 
of a deliberate terror campaign to undermine support for the rebellion and to dis-
courage the fighters (Lecocq 2010).25 Klute reports “around Tamasheq confirmed 
victims 2,374; Tamasheq unconfirmed victims 734; confirmed sedentary victims 
178; sedentary unconfirmed victims 272 between June 1990 and October 1995” 
(Klute 2001, quoted in Lecocq 2010, 306). An important step in the Malian army’s 
“cleansing operation” was taken at I-n-Abalan near Ti-n Essako in July 1990 where 
the soldiers killed an estimated 94 nomads (2010, 306).
The outcome of this first phase was the Tamanrasset peace agreement in  January 
1991 which, roughly speaking, consisted of a ceasefire, a gradual withdrawal of the 
Malian army from the area, and the granting of opportunities to the rebel fight-
ers to join the Malian army. The peace agreement in Tamanrasset initialized the 
second phase of the conflict. It goes from this signing of the peace agreement in 
23 Iyad Ag Ghali is known as the leading figure of the Tuareg second rebellion. He had created an 
Islamist militant group known as Ansar Eddine in northern Mali in 2012.
24 Examples are the attacks on the military post at Ti-n Essako on July 2, which left three soldiers 
and one rebel dead, on the Gendarmerie at Tarkint on 16 July, and on the military post at Abei-
bara on July 28. Throughout August and September 1990, the rebels attacked the military posts at 
Ti-n Zaouatène, Tadjoujemet, Telabit, I-n-Ekker, Abeibara, I-n Tedeyni, and I-n Ghar. Skirmishes 
between rebel and army units occurred also around the beginning of October at Tadjoujemet and 
Tadjinout in the Tighaghar mountains (Lecocq 2010, 300).
25 Lecocq reminds us that spokesmen for the Tamasheq and civil population accused the Malian 
armed forces of having started a campaign of ethnic cleansing in the region of Timbuktu (Lecocq 
2010, 305).
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1991 to early 1994. This period is characterized by what Lecocq termed the “con-
fused rebellion.” The confusion, here was manifested in the fragmentation of the 
Tuareg individual and all-encompassing military and political movements among 
the clans and the federations, in contrast to their commitment to the nation at the 
beginning of the conflict. This confusion illustrated historical rivalries between 
but also fundamental cleavages within different Tuareg clans and federations that 
made the formation of one homogeneous Tuareg society impossible (Bourgeot 
1995; Hureiki 2003). According to Bourgeot, this primarily consists of transcend-
ing once and for all the internal differences rooted in the political organization 
based on lineages. He submits that any national consciousness necessarily trans-
forms two identities, the individual and the social, into a national identity. The 
national sentiment implies the centralization of political power. He concludes that 
the notion of nation is not applicable to the Tuareg who never had a centralized 
state in the Sahara. The rebels did not give any fixed name to their movement due 
to their will to transcend these internal Kel Tamasheq differences highlighted by 
Bourgeot (Bourgeot 1995) and Hureiki (Hureiki 2003). This strategy also enabled 
easier integration of rebels of Moor and Arab ethnic origins into one comprehen-
sive secular-oriented movement referred to as the MPLA (Mouvement Populaire 
pour la Libération de l’Azawad).
Shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion, the FIAA (Front Islamique Arabe 
de l’Azawad) was created to separate Arabs from the Tuareg. By January 1991, the 
FPLA (Front Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad), encompassing clans such 
as the Kel Antsar from the Timbuktu region and the Chamanamas, Ishidenharen, 
Dabakhar from Gao and Dawsahak, was contesting the Kel Adagh leadership 
with Iyad Ag Ghali established at the head of the movement. Consequently, the 
Tamanrasset peace agreement signed by Ag Ghali gave way to open conflict. After 
the creation of the FPLA, the original movement took the name MPA (Mouve-
ment Populaire de l’Azawad). In November 1991, former vassal groups founded 
a new movement called the ARLA (Armée Révolutionnaire pour la Libération 
de l’Azawad) on the grounds that supporting the MPA, led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a 
free man of noble origin, symbolized a legitimation of the former dominant clans 
politically. The founders of the ARLA, pleading for equality in Tuareg society, 
contested the peace agreement signed by Iyad Ag Ghali. These newly established 
Tuareg militant groups expanded the combat zones to all the three regions. They 
engaged in a fight with the central state and also among themselves.
In early 1994, the third phase of the rebellion began, prompted by controver-
sies over the national pact (signed in April 1992) and the arrival of the Song-
hay vigilant brigade, Ganda Koy (created in April 1994), on the scene of violent 
confrontation.26 The vigilant brigade can be seen as an effort on the part of the 
sedentary Songhay to counter what they considered a favoring of nomads to their 
own detriment. Arguing that they, too, had been suffering severely from rebel 
26 MPGK (Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy).
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attacks on sedentary populations, representatives of the Songhay vigilante group 
vowed to protect their own people against the rebels and to contain a situation of 
insecurity in the northern regions. The following pamphlet conveys the rationale 
for the creation of the group:
Fellow citizens of the North, let us sweep away all nomads from our villages 
and cities, even from our barren land! Tomorrow the nomads will install 
themselves there as dominators. Black sedentary peoples, from Nioro to 
Ménaka, let us organise, let us take up arms for the great battle that waits. Let 
us send the nomads back to the sands of the Azawad. The existing social bal-
ance cannot be modified. The social economic problems of the North need to 
be solved for all citizens without discrimination. Why are there development 
projects for the nomads? Why are there army posts for the nomads? Why are 
there seats in parliament for armed rebel-bandits? Because they took up arms 
and killed? That is inadmissible. The Gandakoye movement is born. Signed 
without us, the [National] pact is against us. The realities in the North show 
this. We should create insecurity for the nomads as they have created it for the 
sedentary populations. (Lecocq 2010, 337)
Already in May 1994, Captain Abdoulaye Mahamahada Maiga and Lieutenants 
Lamine Diallo and Abdoulaye “Blo” Cissé, leading figures of the movement, de-
serted from the Malian army.27 Throughout the following months, the group 
mounted several attacks on the Arabs and Tuareg living in the vicinity of the 
Niger River.28
The Bellah-Iklan also created a group of their own to support the Songhay 
against their former masters in the Gao and Timbuktu regions. For example, when 
the Army attacked the free-born Tuareg and Arab community in Léré in 1991, 
many Bellah-Iklan joined in, and even guarded the survivors outside the village 
for more than a year (Lecocq 2010, 350). Fati Wellet Hamomo, one former hostage 
in Léré between May 1991 and 1992, explained that:
The bellah took our possessions, engaged in trade in our place, set up shops 
almost everywhere in the south, killed our cattle. Others lived with our herds 
in the bush. They also killed people in the bush and looted their camps. Dur-
ing the last dry season, we had neither access to the wells, nor to the market 
because of the problems [between the Malian Army Forces and the rebels]. 
The bellah were charged to survey us. Some we knew, others we didn’t. At 
night, military vehicles patrolled to prevent our escape. They threw stones at 
us when we tried to leave. (Lecocq 2010, 350)
27 It was assumed that although these formally deserted from the national army, there was still con-
siderable suspicion. This distrust was especially based on the fact that those who deserted were 
authorized by their superiors in the army, as it seemed that the military and the government did 
not have the same opinion on how to deal with the Tuareg (Lecocq 2010).
28 However, it has often been argued that it was even sometimes difficult to know whether the reg-
ular soldiers or the Ganday Koy or the two together committed the attacks on the Arabs and red 
Tuareg.
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During the fourth and final phase of the rebellion, which lasted from late 1994 
until March 1996, efforts were made to dissolve the army factions through 
 inter-community dialogues. This culminated in the peace agreement (“flamme de 
la Paix”) celebrated in Timbuktu in March 1996 with the symbolic destruction of 
guns. Yet regardless of this declaration of the end of the civil war, major parts of 
the Tuareg population that had fled to neighboring countries were reluctant to 
come back.29
3.3.4	 Rebellion	and	ethnic	conflict	in	the	2000s
On May 23, 2006, Tuareg fighters, under the leadership of Ibrahim Bahanga, 
targeted the Malian army garrison in Kidal, seized arms, and arrested the Gov-
ernor of the region.30 For Lecocq, this was a renewed version of rebellion, this 
time rooted in internal tensions within Tuareg society. One aspect of this tension 
has been explained by the fact that some Tuareg, especially educated cadres, had 
benefited more from the state and NGO resources than their uneducated counter-
parts.  Another aspect of internal tension that led to the rebellion in 2006 was the 
long-standing tension between the vassal groups and the noble warriors’ politically 
dominant groups.31 A peace accord signed in Algeria in July 2006 was merely a 
prelude to further protracted fighting between separatist fighters and the Malian 
army units under the leadership of Tuareg of vassal origins. This conflict came to 
an end in early 2009.
Yet from early 2012 onwards (just about three years later), another violent con-
flict broke out once again. It first started with an attack by the free white Tuareg 
secession movement MNLA (Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad) 
against the Malian state in Menaka and later on turned into confused ethnic con-
flicts. The confusion was made even worse by the emergence of several Salafist 
Jihadist factions obsessed with implementing sharia law. After a short military 
campaign, these factions defeated the Malian army and subsequently occupied the 
northern regions where the Jihadi-Salafist imposed sharia law.32 These conflicts 
were the consequence of the fall of Libyan President Gaddafi,33 of the influence of 
the international terrorist networks, and long-standing ethnic conflicts in north-
ern Mali (Klute 2012; Olivier de Sardan 2012). Thus, the Fulani, Songhay, Arabs, 
and Bellah-Iklan groups created MUJAO in order to contain the growing Tuareg 
29 In the case of Niger, a significant number of free-born Tuareg among the refugees of the civil war 
in the 1990s did not go back to Mali.
30 Alhamoudou Ag Ilyène from Kidal, who is currently ambassador of Mali in Niger, was the gover-
nor at that time.
31 See Klute for the background dynamics of this conflict (Klute 2003).
32 The main Islamist factions were Mujao, Ansar Eddine, and AQMI (Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique).
33 The connection to Libyan conflicts was made through the facts that Gaddafi had been a key player 
in the Tuareg issue in Mali and Niger since the 1980s and also that many Tuareg soldiers fled Libya 
after Gaddafi’s fall to join the battleground in northern Mali.
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control over northern regions after the withdrawal of the Malian army (2012).34 
In addition, existing conflicts between vassals and free-born noble Tuareg clans 
partly informed the groups’ attitudes toward the sharia order in 2012 (Klute 2003; 
Klute 2012; Lecocq/Mann/Whitehouse et al. 2013). Altogether, these conflicts have 
produced over 400,000 refugees and internally displaced people and led to a mili-
tary putsch in March 2012 followed by the near collapse of the state institutions in 
southern Mali (2013, 9).
Drawing on the work of Lecocq, Grémont, Bourgeot, Boilley, Hureiki, Hall, 
and Klute, this chapter sketched out the historical Tuareg social structure and 
political organizations and accounted for transformations in Tuareg society since 
the colonial era, as well as for the political and ecological developments that 
gradually forced many of them into exile. The following chapter takes up this 
account of historical antecedents to present-day tensions between the free-born 
and  unfree Tuareg since the colonial era and explores how male refugees in the 
Nigerien Tuareg diaspora make sense of these tensions in relation to their current 
situation in exile.
34 Olivier de Sardan wrote that during the months that followed the withdrawal of the Malian army 
from the north, the MNLA members were held accountable for several cases of abductions and 
cattle raiding among other sorts of abuses upon the Bellah-Iklan, Songhay, and Fulani. Thus, in 
order to counterbalance the MNLA, many Falani, Songhay, and Arabs joined, or even created, 




To humanitarian workers the refugees have no dignity and do not even deserve 
respect […] But, Aghamad said this will come to an end one day.
—Inawélène Aklinine, Abala, 01/11/2013.
You know for the Hausa and Zarma in Niamey, we Tuareg are just like dogs, we 
are not normal persons […], but all this because we are Tuareg, we have red skin 
color.
—Ibrahim Ag Mohamed, 17/01/2013.
When I arrived in Niamey and Abala in 2012, I was struck by one pervasive fea-
ture of the male refugees’ everyday discourses: their persistent comments on their 
living conditions in exile. They portrayed themselves as those whose living con-
ditions had turned them into “nothing,” aytedim or adinat n bànan,1 or “zéro” in 
French. This term is a commonly used insult indicating someone’s loss or lack of 
status, whether age related or linked to birth. The fact that refugees used this term 
so profusely to characterize their own situation in Niamey and Abala reflects upon 
their sense of crisis, as well as a widespread perception that the exile came with a 
loss in respectability and social status. Many interviewees deplored that their re-
spect (semghar) as husbands and fathers have been undermined as they could no 
longer live up to cultural expectations of “providing” for their families within their 
adopted role as head of a household. However, typically the man of household, the 
father, would expect obedience while the mother as well as their children would 
adhere to his demands in return for his “providing” for the family. Nowadays, 
the respect and honor that derive from a family father’s role as sole provider can 
no longer be achieved under conditions of exile. Accordingly, they feel that they 
have become “useless” people or “nothing.” In Niamey, my informants’ feeling that 
they had become “nothing” stemmed also from the fact that they felt mistreated 
by other urban residents. In Abala, my Bellah-Iklan informants similarly argued 
that humanitarian workers treated refugees poorly, or rather as “nothing.” These 
Bellah-Iklan thus employed the expression adinat n bànan or aytedim to express 
their feelings of being treated without “dignity,” as Assalim put it in the statement 
above. Simultaneously, however, both groups of informants speak in proverbs, 
prophecies, as well as conventional cultural idioms to interpret their predicament 
in Niamey and Abala, and this is a driving force for them to imagine themselves 
as a collective. The informants called their collectivity tumast and the peuple noir 
respectively. The social collectivities they envisioned in this manner were based on 
1 Adinat n bànan can be translated both as “useless persons” or “nothing” in plural, and in awadim n 
bànan in the singular.
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their feelings of “being together and feeling equal,” a sentiment that grew partly in 
response to their predicaments in Niger. They thus maintained that the experience 
of being reduced to “nothing” enabled them to move beyond an identification 
with local clan structures. To them, the social conditions of exile provided alterna-
tive reference points for constructing themselves as a homogenous group. How-
ever, as I realized, my refugee informants reimagining of their collective identity 
in exile implied a construction of group identities that silenced significant internal 
cleavages within the refugee communities, both in Niamey and in Abala.
This chapter examines the ways in which refugees in Niamey and Abala im-
agine and reconstruct their group identities by reflecting on their living condi-
tions in exile. The first part of the chapter focuses on the free-born white Tuareg 
in Niamey, tracing how the town informants interpret their situation of loss and 
thereby reimagine themselves as a “Tuareg people” in exile in Niamey. I begin by 
introducing the multi-ethnic composition of Niamey and its changing dynamics 
of urban economy as a result of changes in global economic processes. I focus on 
socioeconomic and political factors that have affected the self-esteem and paren-
tal patriarchal authority of men over their family members. For Abala, I similarly 
show how the Bellah-Iklan capitalize on their experiences of loss and undignified 
treatment as the basis for claiming a collective identity as the “peuple noir” in ex-
ile. Here, I examine how NGOs’ regulations in the refugee camp undermine male 
respect in their families and throughout society. My key concern is to demonstrate 
how, in each setting, my interlocutors turned their experiences and predicaments 
into an asset that allowed them to deny their membership of former Tuareg clan 
structures. My analysis is informed by Malkki’s argument that the social condi-
tions of exile may reshape refugees’ consciousness of themselves and allow them 
to develop new forms of collective identification (Malkki 1989; Malkki 1996). I also 
apply Marris’ conceptualization of how people cope with loss, which centers on 
the claim that people respond to loss by making the unfamiliar familiar, reducing 
the new to the old (Marris 1974, 9). Marris also suggests that the process of assim-
ilation may lead to modifications to the existing structure of thoughts and actions. 
Accordingly, I account for how the Tuareg in Niamey, as well as the Bellah-Iklan 
in Abala, assimilate their experiences of (losing or having lost) patriarchal control 
over their families with their existing patterns of thoughts and actions. Moreover, I 
also seek to understand what modifications this assimilation entails and how these 
alterations reshape the refugees’ perceptions of their group identities.
4.1	 The	socioeconomic	setting	of	Niamey
Many scholars of Niger depict Niamey as a multi-ethnic setting (Bernus 1962; 
Motcho 2004; Youngstedt 2013). According to Youngstedt, the settlement of Nia-
mey evolved from a collection of small villages in the 1800s to 600 residents in 
1900 (2013, 32f.). In 1926, it was declared the capital of the French colony of Niger 
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and then that of the independent Niger republic in 1960. By 1988, it had mush-
roomed into a city of 400,000 inhabitants (2013, 32). While the Zarma, Songhay, 
Mawri, and Fulani ethnic groups are held to be the founders of the town of Nia-
mey, its demographic growth over time has been made possible by rural–urban 
migration. Gado argues that earlier migrants arrived during the colonial period to 
take up jobs for colonial administrators or as traders (Gado 1997). The successive 
droughts and famines of 1901–1903, 1913–1915, 1931–1932, 1954 provoked a massive 
exodus of rural population toward Niamey (1997, 35), and Niamey became a last 
resort for new rural migrants to begin a new life (Youngstedt 2013, 36). The estab-
lishment of a postcolonial state infrastructure from the 1960s on was also a driving 
force behind Niamey’s spectacular growth, as its population grew from 33,816 in-
habitants in 1960 to 56,997 in 1967 to 137,388 in 1975 and from 242,873 to 399,846 
in 1977 and 1988, respectively (2013, 37).
This intense in-migration has transformed Niamey into a multi-ethnic and 
cosmopolitan setting that manifests itself in the formation of diasporic communi-
ties. Hence, focusing on the Hausa people, Youngstedt argues:
Hausa migrants played a central role in the rapid growth of Niamey from a 
small city of 30,000—of whom only 3,600, or 12 percent, were Hausa in 1960 
[…]—to a bustling West African capital of 400,000 in 1988 where Hausa were 
a slight majority […] and have maintained that position up to the present as 
the city has grown to 1,222066. (Youngstedt 2013, 38f.)
Situating Niamey recently within global economic processes from the late 1980s to 
the present, Youngstedt maintains that the town underwent rapid changes:
[T] he sweeping changes in Niamey over the past 22 years can only be un-
derstood in the context of contemporary globalization, involving the accel-
erating transnational movement of people, money, goods and technologies, 
mass media, and ideas. Specific global trends, policies, and technologies have 
played key roles in the four crucial changes that Niamey has experienced over 
the last two decades, namely, urban growth, deepening poverty, democratiza-
tion, and information and communication revolutions. (Youngstedt 2013, 41)
Alidou further explains:
By the mid-1980s, the collapse of the uranium market, followed by the IMF’s 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and shortly after by the devaluation 
of the currency of francophone Africa, the CFA [by 100% in 1994], plunged 
the country into a devastating economic depression with severe sociopolitical 
and other consequences. (Alidou 2005, quoted in Youngstedt 2013, 43)
In this situation, poverty has become a pervasive threat for the majority of Nia-
mey’s inhabitants over the last two decades (Youngstedt 2013, 8). For example, the 
SAPs launched in the midst of the 1980s had terrible consequences on Nigériens in 
general and on Niamey’s inhabitants in particular: characteristically, skyrocketing 
62	 4.	 Refugee	reflections	on	the	social	conditions	of	exile	in	Niger
prices for Western biomedical pharmaceuticals and hospital admissions and the 
elimination of scholarships and increased school fees (2013, 43). This resulted in 
frequent school closures over the years, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, as well as 
a higher unemployment rate. Moreover, present-day marriage predicaments, typical 
for inhabitants of Niamey, are a result of these broader social developments. Many 
young men, frustrated by their inability to secure the funds necessary to get mar-
ried, are forced to postpone becoming a husband until their late twenties and thir-
ties. This is compounded by the inflated costs of—particularly staple—foods, which 
has caused a decline in the standard of living and in spending power (2013, 43f.). 
Domestic relations for free-born Tuareg have also been reshaped by these changes.
4.1.1 “The adinat n bànan	in	Niamey”
My informants in Niamey refer to themselves as adinat n bànan or aytedim to 
address their areas of concern: first, their limited spending power in Niamey and 
how this has undermined their capacity to respond to expectations placed on 
them as husbands and fathers; and, second, the ways in which urban residents of 
different ethnic origins such as the Hausa and Zarma and political authorities and 
police personnel in Niamey have treated them over the past decades.
4.1.1.1	 “No	money,	no	respect”	(azuruf wartila, wartila semghar)
In trying to understand how Mossa and his cousin Hamza relate their limited 
spending power to their loss in power and control over wives and other family 
members,2 I follow studies that explore how changing economic conditions can 
affect domestic relations (Bouman 2010; Schulz 2012; Youngstedt 2013). For in-
stance, focusing on the self-settled Kel Essuk group from Mali in Niamey, Bouman 
maintains that changes in the political economy resulting from their relocation 
in Niger affected gender relations in two particular ways (Bouman 2010). First, 
women who had always occupied their territory in the form of their tent, the sym-
bol of their lineage and womb, now primarily live in huts and apartments that 
belong to their fathers, brothers, or husbands in Niamey.3 For women, this process 
implies a loss in social respectability that this symbol of their lineage could offer in 
their marital compound. Second, whereas Kel Essuk women had previously had 
access to their own cattle in Mali, which gave them a certain measure of auton-
omy, the new life situation in Niamey has stripped women of these earlier areas of 
relative autonomy. Furthermore, they no longer keep cattle as money is used for 
2 My specific focus on these families is explained by Mossa and Hamza’s stronger emphasis on the 
financial crisis when compared to Mohamed Ag Irgimit and Alhabib Ag Sidi, who have regular and 
relatively high income levels (at least seen in a Nigerien context).
3 It needs to be understood here that families in general give a leather tent to their daughters in the 
event of marriage. This tent is taken as a symbol of her lineage.
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most property transfers. Changes in the nature of bride wealth as well has weak-
ened women’s social status in the family. In Niamey, for example, parents formerly 
provided cupboards, beds, and household utensils to their daughters upon their 
marriage. Although these objects might still be symbols of their lineage and status, 
unlike cattle, these objects cannot be used as capital. Accordingly, women became 
dependent on their husbands, fathers, and brothers, especially in cases of divorce 
in recent decades (Bouman 2010, 109). Moreover, while Bouman’s study focuses 
on men’s loss of respect for women, I explore how men have lost their control over 
family members (Schulz 2012; Youngstedt 2013).
Mossa and Iba’s conflicting relationship within the family
During my stays in 2012/2013 and 2014, in Niamey, I witnessed constant conversa-
tions focused on mutual blame between Mossa and his first son, Iba. For example, 
Mossa blamed Iba for his habits, such as borrowing money from other people 
on his father’s behalf, and constantly accused him of using that money solely to 
purchase alcohol. For Mossa, it was considered shameful that other Tuareg in Nia-
mey could hear and see that his son consumes alcohol, insisting that Iba’s habits 
have affected his noble honor (illulu n ahalis) among his peers. In his defense, 
Iba argued that his father has not done anything to stop him from doing what he 
was doing, going so far as forcing him to leave his education without completing 
elementary school, despite the fact that it is difficult to get a decent job in Niamey 
without a proper education. Iba has resigned himself to his fate, asserting: “I will 
just die like I was born, without achieving anything.”4
While father and son made these mutual allegations behind each other’s 
back, they also complained about each other in their face-to-face interactions. 
One such confrontation took place on October 18, 2012 around 5.00 pm when 
I was chatting with Mossa in his courtyard and Iba arrived smelling strongly of 
 alcohol. After greeting me, his father asked him whether he was drinking again. 
He  replied with pronounced tonal emphasis “iya” (meaning yes). His father went 
on to say that he should know that this does not bring honor to the family. Look-
ing down at the ground for a while, Iba turned his eyes toward his father and 
posed the following question: “What have you done for me to keep me from end-
ing up in this situation?” Mossa looked at Iba, remaining silent for a moment, 
only to later state that his son had become a “useless person” (awadim n bànan). 
As I observed, Mossa did not speak with Iba over the course of the next few days 
after this conversation, and whenever I asked him about Iba, Mossa just replied 
laconically by saying wartisenagh (I do not know). Sometimes he would extend 
his answers by stating:
I have nothing to do with him. I cannot talk to him. You saw yourself the 
other day. When he arrived here with an alcohol smell, I tried to reason with 
him, but you saw that he yelled at me. Iba does not listen to me. He does not 
4 In French: “Je vais mourir comme je suis né sans rien réussir.”
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listen to me! If he listened to me, if he would not even start drinking alcohol 
[…] I never spoke to my parents like Iba does to me.5
I interpret Mossa and Iba’s conflicted relationship as the result of severely al-
tered material conditions and their mutual attempts to rework the predicament 
in which they find themselves. Mossa expressed his dislike of his son’s excessive 
alcohol consumption, which in his eyes rendered Iba “a useless person” (awadim n 
bànan). Iba, in turn, challenged Mossa by arguing that it was his responsibility as a 
father to ensure that his son would be able to move forward, thus blaming him for 
his inability to provide for his son. Iba therefore voiced a common perception that 
fathers should ameliorate their children’s life situation, by, for instance, providing 
them with goats, sheep, and cows. In this narrative, a father’s capacity to protect 
his sons from becoming useless persons (adinat n bànan or aytedim) is placed as a 
central pillar of parental patriarchal authority.
As a case in point, in other conversations Iba explained that his own failure 
was partly caused by two droughts that had devastated his father’s animals in the 
1970s and 1980s, and that his father’s salary in Niamey is not enough to afford an-
imals. His father makes about 80, 000 FCFA,6 which is not enough to even cover 
his family’s basic needs in Niamey.7 As I mentioned in the introduction, Mossa 
and his wife have three sons (aged 27, 24, and 18) and one daughter (aged 13). For 
his family of six, Mossa needed 100 kg of rice per month. This alone costs him 
41,000 FCFA,8 slightly more than half his salary. He used his remaining income to 
purchase tea, sugar, and condiments each month. For him, the high cost of food, 
sugar, and tea in Niamey has made it difficult to save some money for animals 
over the past decades. His economic situation also forced him to remove three 
sons (but not his daughter) from their educations before they had completed el-
ementary school. He lamented that he had to take them out of school because he 
did not have the financial means to cover their school fees despite the fact they 
were good students. In Mossa’s understanding, his inability to cover the costs 
for his children also escalated the situation Iba finds himself in today. For Iba, 
he feels that he cannot be held fully accountable for his own situation, and he 
largely places the blame for his situation on his father. Mossa, conversely, places 
the blame solely on the changes caused by his family’s economic situations since 
they relocated to Niamey.
In terms of social repercussions, the conversations reveal that Mossa feels that 
Iba is challenging the conventional expectation that he is to be respected as a fa-
ther no matter the situation. This is evident in how Mossa’s mood was affected by 
Iba’s behavior and how his relationship with Iba changed in the days that followed 
their altercation on October 18, 2012. Mossa reiterates that while he has pressed 
5 Conversation with Mossa Ag Attaher, 05/10/2012 in Niamey.
6 About €123 in 2016.
7 See Youngstedt’s classification of prices for basic needs in Niamey (Youngstedt 2013, 44).
8 About €62 in 2016.
 4.1 The socioeconomic setting of Niamey 65
Iba multiple times to stop consuming alcohol, Iba has not stopped or limited his 
drinking. For Mossa, this underscores that Iba is not willing to listen or respect 
him as a father figure. More than he expected Iba to stop consuming alcohol, 
Mossa also wanted Iba to listen to his father when he is talking to him. As such, 
Mossa took Iba’s reaction to him as a demonstration that he was no longer re-
spected by his son. This allows us to understand that respect manifests itself in 
how Iba should ideally submit to his father’s advice as another central aspect of a 
father’s authority over his son.
The conversations between Mossa and Iba further underscore that their fam-
ily’s economic situation has also limited Iba’s chance for “socially becoming” an 
adult man (Vigh 2006). Iba once explained that: “If I say I will die like I was born, 
I mean that I will never become someone: a father and grandfather. I was born 
poor, will remain poor.”9 Iba’s statement emphasizes that becoming a father or 
grandfather would imply a change in his situation from the status with which he 
was born. To understand the further implications of his claim, it is important to 
recall Iba’s initial failure to establish a family a few years ago.
In 2010, Mossa went back to home to find a wife for his son Iba. He brought her 
to Niamey. After six months, Iba’s wife went back to her parents in Mali, thereby 
effectively putting an end to the marriage. Iba explained that:
the marriage ended because she did not want to stay with my parents. She 
asked me to rent a place where the two of us could stay. I told her that I did 
not have money to rent a house for us since I had no work. Imagine, if I had 
moved out with her. This meant that I would have to pay for the rent, food, 
and all other things she would like to have. As I was unable to do so, she went 
home and the marriage was over.10
Iba’s statement evokes how material conditions mediate transformations “of social 
temporalities” (Meiu 2009; Meiu 2015; Schulz 2002). Meiu deploys the notion of 
“social temporalities” to describe social aging from the passage from “boyhood” to 
“adulthood” among Samburu men from northern Kenya. His study suggests that 
for the Samburu men involved in sexual economies with European tourists, social 
aging and ideal masculinity are closely connected to, and mediated by, material 
achievement of status related to prestige or wealth Meiu (Meiu 2009, 122f.). Meiu’s 
work also emphasizes that social age is mediated through age-related social prac-
tices (Meiu 2015, 474f.). To conclude, Mossa and Iba’s conflicting relations within 
the family illustrate tensions between two social expectations, tensions which re-
sult from the alteration of family economies in exile: Mossa’s expectation to be 
respected as father and Iba’s expectation of what his father should have done so 
that he could respect him as such.
  9 Conversation with Iba on 18/10/2012 in Niamey.
10 Conversation with Iba on 20/10/2012 in Niamey.
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“A father who is never at home is not a father”
My daughter does not know me because I come at night and go at night.
—Hamza, 49 year-old man, Niamey, 02/10/2012.
I met Hamza through his cousin Mossa Ag Attaher on October 2, 2012 in Niamey 
plateau. That day, Hamza had paid a casual visit to his cousin Mossa and his family. 
Like Mossa, he has a vassal social background. Hamza fled his home near Gossi in 
May 1992 after the Malian army targeted several civilians, including him.11 Before 
fleeing, he was a successful tailor in Gossi. He stressed that he owned over one 
hundred sheep as well as a few cows. He had always milk, tea, and a sufficient food 
supply for his family at home. On his arrival in Niamey in June 1992, however, he 
took up a job as guard of a private house. Like Mossa, he does not pay any rent. 
Instead, he set up a tent in the courtyard of the house he was taking care of, where 
he lives with his two five-year-old daughters and his 18 year-old son. Hamza ex-
plained that since his youngest daughter was born, she has not had the chance 
to get to know him as he has always entered his home at night while she sleeps 
and leaves in the morning before she wakes. He further explained this situation, 
stating that:
[…] How could I stay at home and see my children crying for one meal a day 
or they are ill and I cannot provide them with any medicine? […] I know that 
this situation is not without consequences for me. My children have started to 
speak better Hausa, Zarma than Tamasheq, their own language.12
This reveals some relationship between Hamza’s material and physical absences 
at home. Hamza explained this situation by the fact that his low wage limits him 
from meeting the high expectations that society has placed on him. His job pays 
him a monthly salary of 15,000 FCFA.13 With this amount alone, he argued that 
it is not possible for him to provide his family with food for the whole month. 
For instance, he explained that for him to provide his family with food for an 
entire month, he would need at least 50 kg of rice, which costs 28,000 FCFA14 
in Niamey. Since he cannot afford to buy this amount, he is only able to buy rice 
for ten days at a time,15 after which his wife is forced to rely on support from 
neighbors or other people she asks for help so that she can feed their kids. Hamza 
also expressed concern about the fact that his repeated absences from home had 
undermined his ability to supervise his children’s daily behavior, as evidenced by 
his children’s tendency to talk to each other in Hausa and Zarma, rather than in 
their mother tongue Tamasheq. Hamza deplored the thought that this might lead 
11 This is mostly remembered as, in French, “l’attaque de Gossi.”
12 Interview with Hamza on 02/10/2012 in Niamey.
13 About €30 in 2016.
14 About €43 in 2016.
15 Interview with Hamza on 02/10/2012 in Niamey.
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his children to lose their Tuareg identity in the long run, and he feels responsible 
for this situation.
“I also cannot stay at home without food and tea for visitors”
Azuruf wartila, takaraket dja: There is no money there is (only) shame.
—Hamza, 49 year-old man, Niamey, 02/10/2012.
Hamza and Mossa not only complained about how their current economic situa-
tion had affected their social role and status as fathers in Niamey, they also main-
tained that their situation has also undermined their capacity to reciprocate the 
kindness of their peers. For example, when Hamza arrived at Mossa’s place on 
October 2, 2012 at around 5 pm, he found us in conversation. Mossa was telling 
me a story about how one day when he had no money or food left, three of his 
relatives arrived from Burkina Faso. As he had nothing to cook for them and could 
not offer to buy them food, the only thing that was left for him was, as he put it, 
takaraket (shame). Connecting his own story to our discussion, Hamza stressed 
that he had also been confronted with a similar situation:
[…] when I stay home, visitors might come to visit. For us Tuareg, when 
someone visits you, the first thing to do is to provide him or her with some 
tea followed by food if they are hungry. Since I am not able to provide people 
with these things, I prefer to be away from home. If I stay at home without 
being able to do these, people will laugh at me even if I go to Boughessa. And 
this will bring shame on me.16
As such, Hamza would rather leave his home in order to avoid what had hap-
pened to Mossa. Otherwise, he might receive visitors for whom he will not able 
to provide food or tea, which would affect his reputation. When he mentioned 
Boughessa, a sub-prefecture situated in the north of Kidal region near the Alge-
rian border, he evoked his home region as a metaphor to reflect on the extent 
to which his reputation might be affected for generations. He maintained that 
this situation would not only create takaraket (shame) for him, but also for his 
children and relatives. For Hamza, therefore, shame is conceptualized as being 
closely related to his reputation. For example, when people laugh at him in 
Boughessa, he will be shamed for his poverty. His interpretation of the social 
connectedness of shame and reputation substantiate remarks by scholar who 
closely relate shame and reputation along the spectrum of social evaluations 
(cf. Olivier de Sardan 1984; Ouattara 1999; Peristiany 1966). For example, in his 
discussions of the notion of shame (Haawi) among the Songhay-Zarma groups 
along the Mali− Niger border zone, Olivier de Sardan shows that his inform-
ants with a noble social background refrain from behaving in certain ways be-
cause they fear how others will evaluate and speak uncomfortably about them 
16 Interview with Hamza on 02/10/2012 in Niamey.
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(Olivier de Sardan 1984, 35f.). This attitude of Olivier de Sardan’s informants 
substantiates Peristiany’s interpretations of shame (Peristiany 1966). Peristiany 
considers shame as a form of social evaluation as it reflects the nature of social 
sanctions (1966, 9), as shame can be understood as a standard of measure-
ment for the type of personality considered as representative and exemplary 
of a certain society (1966, 9f.). Similarly, both Hamza and Mossa’s evocation 
of shame (takaraket) reflected their social personalities in the mirror of so-
cial ideals that expect them to provide visitors with tea and food. As I illus-
trate below, their evaluations of their relationships with other urban ethnic 
residents further reinforced their sense of having then become “useless peo-
ple” (adinat n bànan) due to the economic situations examined throughout 
this section.
4.1.1.2	 “We	are	always	insulted	here	in	Niamey”
This section introduces white male free-born Tuareg refugees’ accounts of their 
ill treatment by the Hausa and Zarma ethnic groups and the police personnel in 
Niamey. It also reflects on how this undermines the informants’ sense of being 
“men” and “women” in Niamey. These discussions focus on specific accounts by 
Ibrahim Ag Mohamed, Mohamed Ag Irgimit, and Mossa’s cousin, who I refer to 
here as Alassane.17
“When the nobles are called bellah-izo”
Look Diallo! We are called the nobles in Mali but here, we are […] Bellah Izo.
—Ibrahim Ag Mohamed, Niamey, 07/10/2012.
After only a few weeks in Niamey, one question that I had already derived from 
my causal observations was why I had not yet witnessed the informants visiting 
and being visited by other ethnic residents. In answering my question, Ibrahim Ag 
Mohamed, who grew up in Niamey, stated that:
[…] I do not dare to go and see them. If I go there, they would call me Bellah 
izo. I do not like this term. We are nobles in Mali, but Bellah in Niamey. Also, 
I cannot laugh at them. If I laugh at them, they would tell each other this: 
Look at this guy who came here because of hunger years ago. But now he is 
happy in Niamey. If I talk to a girl, they would say to that girl: Do you not 
know that this Bellah Izo came [here] because of hunger? This would all be 
degrading for me.18
17 Though I focus on accounts from those informants, Mossa and Hamza also made similar argu-
ments and were present and took part in many of these conversations.
18 Conversation with Ibrahim Ag Mohamed on 07/10/2012.
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Ibrahim’s answer above underscores how being called Bellah Izo19 by other ethnic 
residents in Niamey threatens the refugees’ former noble social status and identity. 
For instance, the quoted passage shows that being called Bellah Izo implies a redef-
inition and subversion of Ibrahim’s noble social status as it lowers him to the level 
of Bellah-Iklan (sing: akli). In further conversations, Ibrahim even demonstrated 
that calling the nobles Bellah Izo had more implications for them, explaining that 
referring to the free-born Tuareg with that term is an insult because it simply res-
onates with calling a “noble” a “bastard,”20 which he defines as a term used locally 
for those who have been lost for generations because they cannot trace back their 
origins to their ancestors. For Ibrahim, this constitutes an insult as all free-born 
Tuareg value their lineage. Equally, Ibrahim also found Zarma and Hausa’s referral 
to him as someone who fled Mali because of hunger irritating as this undermines 
his male honor (ashak n ahalis). To Ibrahim, by representing him as someone who 
was “or still is” hungry, the Zarma and Hausa ethnic residents attempt to show that 
he is not “a normal man” and is therefore not equal with other men in Niamey. As 
I explain below, police attitudes toward the free-born Tuareg generated similar 
feelings among the informants I met in Niamey.
The refugees’ narratives about the police in Niger
Beek and Göpfert’s works on the use of violence by police in Niger and Ghana 
influence how I interpret the refugees’ accounts of how they have been affected 
by the police over the course of recent decades (Beek/Göpfert 2012; Göpfert 
2012). Following local perceptions of violence, both scholars interpret this as 
being related to intentionally perpetrated bodily harm, identifying that each 
time the police resort to violence they face a major dilemma. For Beek and 
Göpfert, while legally and morally justified violence can be a source of long-
term legitimacy; the very same action has potentially delegitimizing effects due 
to the possibility that the same situation can result in multiple interpretations 
(according to different, conflicting moral and legal discourses) (Beek/Göpfert 
2012, 17f.).
“The police considered us thieves and terrorists here”
The day that followed my arrival in Niamey in August 2014, Ibrahim picked 
me up on his motorbike so that I could pay a visit to Mossa Ag Attaher in the 
quartier plateau near the presidential palace. On our way from Mossa’s place at 
around 2 pm we took the road passing before the presidential palace. When we 
arrived at the military barracks around the palace, a soldier stood and pointed 
19 This term is used as a nickname by other ethnic residents to refer to the free white Tuareg in Nia-
mey. For further overview on Songhay-Zarma’s terms depicting the Tuareg (see Olivier de Sardan 
1982, 99).
20 Ibrahim’s understanding of the notion of bastard is an adaptation of the meaning of the term in 
French: a child born not in a formalized marital relationship. The Tuareg used it as an insult in 
Niamey and in northern Mali.
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directly at us despite the fact we were surrounded by a group of other people 
passing by. He instructed us to return. However, to our surprise, the soldier para-
doxically allowed others to continue on their way. Ibrahim turned his motorbike 
and we looked for another road to go home. As I remarked, Ibrahim remained 
quiet on the way until we reached his home. Once we reached home and sat for 
tea, he began to smoke a cigarette and asked me about what I understood from 
the scene that had just occurred by the presidential palace. Before I even began 
to speak, he told me:
You see! This is how we have been living here in Niamey. Everybody else pass-
ing by is normal except me. Even you, Souleymane, could have passed by like 
the others. But since you were with a red man, a Tuareg driving a motorbike 
around the presidential palace, one cannot trust you anymore. The reason for 
this is that I am only a Tuareg. They present us as threats to the well-being 
and the security of the people whereas daily the TV shows thieves who are 
Zarma or Hausa.21
Three days later, Ibrahim’s “frustration” about this scene was reinforced by an-
other reaction by the security forces. That day I went with him to withdraw some 
cash from the Bank of Africa near the CG8.22 While he waited for me outside, the 
policeman sitting in the bank’s courtyard saw Ibrahim outside. He stood up and 
moved closer to Ibrahim, and when he got within a few meters of him, he held his 
right hand on his gun. By the time I made it back to him, the police officer had 
already gotten close to him. At the same time, several other people had passed by 
the police officer but had not attracted his attention. Ibrahim therefore concluded 
that the police officer’s reaction was typical of the way the Hausa and Zarma treat 
the “Tuareg.” For him, this was no different than what had happened in front of 
the presidential palace a few days before.23 In further conversations, he also em-
phasized that this was not a new experience for the free-born Tuareg refugees 
in Niamey. Ibrahim recalled that since he was a child, the police personnel have 
targeted the free white Tuareg from Mali whenever something abnormal occurred 
in Niamey.24 For Ibrahim, such practices always revealed that Zarma and Hausa, 
as well as police personnel, only associated the white Tuareg with negative, and 
never positive, behavior.25
21 Conversation with Ibrahim on 06/08/2014 in Niamey.
22 It is the name of primary school. The number of schools are commonly used for indications by 
urban taxi drivers.
23 Conversation with Ibrahim on 23/09/2014. Ibrahim’s insistence on arguing that the policeman 
was a Zarma or Hausa due to the way in which he reacted to his presence at the Bank, demon-
strates how the free-born Tuareg refugees took for granted that all attitudes that stigmatized them 
stemmed from these two ethnic groups.
24 Ibrahim referred specifically to police control in the paracentral quartier, Bobiel, in Niamey where 
he had spent most of his childhood.
25 Conversation with Ibrahim on 02/10/2014 in Niamey.
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Like Ibrahim, many other free white Tuareg who arrived in Niamey in 2012 
complained that the security forces have classified them as not being “normal peo-
ple”26 during their trips to Niger. Some even argued that they were singled out and 
set apart as dangerous persons for meticulous control at the military barracks. For 
instance, a young man of about 35 years of age, who I refer to as Mohamed Ag 
Mohamed, here recollected his personal experiences in the following account. He 
stated that:
We left Demsi27 the day before yesterday. Yesterday we slept at the bus station 
in Dori where we got a bus to Tera early in the morning. But once we crossed 
the border to Niger, we ran into trouble. At the first police checkpoint, the 
police and gendarmerie set us—the Tuareg—apart from the others. We were 
told to sit aside. When they finished checking the others, they allowed the bus 
to continue without us. Then they came to us […]. They recorded our names, 
ages, and marital status. Afterward they took us to the police station where 
they put us in prison. The next day, there was a young police officer who came 
to question us. We explained everything to him that we were in Burkina Faso 
to visit our parents in the refugee settlement at Demsi. After a while, he finally 
released us around 7.00 pm. Then, we had to find another bus to come to 
Niamey in the night. All this showed us that we are only Tuareg.28
What bothered Mohamed and his four other travel companions was not being 
put in prison for nothing per se; instead, they complained about how the police 
personnel presented them as potential terrorists as well as thieves.
Ibrahim and Mohamed’s accounts of police attitudes toward them evoke Goff-
man’s work on “social stigma.” Goffman defines stigma as “the situation of the 
individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance” and any “attribute that 
is deeply discrediting” (Goffman 1963, 57). He distinguishes three typologies of 
stigma: abominations of the body (physical disabilities); blemishes of individual 
character (moral failings); and tribal stigma (race, religion, ethnicity). The inform-
ants’ accounts presented above show us that it is this latter type of “social stigma” 
that corresponds to the ways in which the police personnel act toward free white 
Tuareg from Mali in Niamey. Seen in relation to Beek and Göpfert’s work on the 
police in Niger and Ghana, Ibrahim and Mohamed were not subjected to bod-
ily violence (Beek/Göpfert 2012). Instead, the refugee informants felt harmed by 
the ways in which the police personnel stigmatized them in Goffman’s sense of 
the term. This leads us to consider such stigmatizations as a form of violence as 
well (Hall 1997, 244f.). The informants’ claims that the police personnel associated 
them with not being “normal people” underscores their widespread sense of loss 
in self-esteem as “normal persons” who could be equal to, and respected by, others.
26 In French: “pas normales comme les autres.”
27 Demsi is a locality around Gram-Gram in northern Burkina Faso.
28 Conversation with Mohamed Ag Mohamed at Mossas’s place on 03/10/2012.
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The consequences of the police’s actions on men respectability within families
They ill-treated us until our wives did not even respect us. There was nothing we 
could be proud of anymore. I remembered several times when I quarreled with my 
wife that she always told me this: if you were man, you should have shown that 
at the central police […].
—Alassane, Niamey, 02/11/ 2012.
Several themes of male conversations centered on how the polices’ action directly 
affected their social status and respectability within their families. For example, 
Mossa Ag Attaher’s cousin, Alassane, recalled his decision to divorce his wife some 
ago.29 He explained that before the divorce, whenever he quarreled with his wife, 
she would remind him of a period of time that was particularly difficult for the 
Tuareg men living in Niamey during the presidency of the Nigerien authoritarian, 
Seyny Koutché (1974–1987). During those years, President Koutché instructed the 
police to keep regular patrols in the quartier Plateau in search of Tuareg.30 Accord-
ingly, Tuareg people were arrested by 24-hour patrols that saw them detained at 
Niamey’s central police station (in French commissariat central). There, Alassane 
maintained, the police threw them from the police cars like they were stones. They 
unveiled the men; beat them in the presence of their relatives. For Alassane, the 
most shocking scenes was to witness pregnant women deliver their children in 
public after days of hunger while being exposed to all sorts of insects. Alassane 
further explained his family dispute in the following terms:
If I had reacted against the police at the central police station, my wife would 
not say what she said, but she would have also respected me […]. The respect 
that a man can expect from his wife is nothing else than she listens to him 
and does what he tells her to do. But if I say one word, she says thousands is 
not good. I remember that she did not cook every day. Sometimes, she went 
to the Bobiel to her friends. She stayed the entire day and returned in the 
evening. When I complained about this, she started saying who are you? You 
only know how to yell at me, but we saw you at the commissariat central [cen-
tral police station]. Finally, I divorced before I found the wife I have now.31
Connell’s notion of “hegemonic masculinity” provides a useful interpretative 
framework for understanding Alassane’s dispute with his wife (Connell 1995, 77f.). 
Connell argues that “hegemonic masculinity” can be defined as the configuration 
of gender that embodies the accepted answer to the problem of patriarchy, which 
guarantees the dominant position of men and the subordination of women (1995). 
29 After this divorce, he remarried another free-born woman from northern Mali.
30 Göpfert shows that the police patrols under Kountché were part of a wider mechanism for political 
control that targeted other groups as well (Göpfert 2012). However, according to my informants, 
the failed military coup attempt by some Nigérien Arabs and Tuareg in 1976 against Kountché’s 
regime turned him against the free white Tuareg.
31 Interview with Alassne on 29/11/2012 in Niamey.
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The author stresses that “when the conditions for the defense of patriarchy change, 
the bases for the dominance of a particular masculinity are eroded” (1995, 77). 
Alassane’s insistence that “what a man can expect from his wife is nothing more 
than that she listens to him and does what the man tells her to do” implies a power 
relation that guarantees a man’s “position of dominance” in Connell’s expression. 
However, when Alassane said one word, his wife responded with a thousand more 
showing that his dominant position has been challenged. In order to understand 
Alassane’s status as a man vis-à-vis his wife, it is important to first understand the 
social significance ascribed to a man’s veil (the turban) as well as what it means for 
a man to be unveiled in public.
Alassane explained that the veil (or turban) is the most sacred thing for Tuareg 
men who are more than eighteen years of age, and men must wear the turban 
whenever they are in public in order to signify self-respect as well as respect for 
other people. Alassane also emphasized that the strictest rule is that a man must 
always be veiled when meeting his father-in-law or mother-in-law. Alassane’s ac-
count of the social significance of the veil was reminiscent of remarks by Robert 
Murphy (Murphy 1964) and Susan Rasmussen (Rasmussen 2004). Murphy takes 
the veil as a medium of social distance and shame that regulates social interactions 
in Tuareg societies. He states that:
It is, then all the more interesting to observe that the Tuareg men are most 
strict with their veils when in the presence of the father-in-law or the mother-
in-law, for, in addition to other signs of respect and avoidance, is the son-in-
law is careful to adjust the veil so that only a very narrow aperture is left open, 
and the eyes are hooded and left in shadow. (Murphy 1964, 128)
In a similar vein, Rasmussen argues that “it is Tuareg men who wear a face-veil, 
a sign of modesty, reserve, and respect” (Rasmussen 2004, 325). Thus, it was this 
symbolic function of the veil to preserve social distance and prevent shame that 
police undermined, thus leading to humiliation for the men in front of their family 
members. For example, Mohamed Ag Irgimit further emphasized this, stressing 
that: “The police attitude at the commissariat central was painful for them because 
if one wants to kill a Tuareg man, one just unveils him in public.”32 Mohamed’s 
word choice here evoke a state of being ashamed, which would cause an individual 
to lose self-esteem.
The second aspect, which is also important for our analysis in order to under-
stand why Alassane’s wife reminded him of these events at the commissariat central, 
is what women expect men to do when they are confronted by other people. Ac-
cording to Alassane, Tuareg women expect men to avenge their wives and children 
or themselves when they are accosted by others. In this case, however, the men did 
not react appropriately (egha33) in order to restore their male honor when they 
32 Interview with Mohamed Ag Irgimit on 25/11/2012 in Niamey.
33 Here, I also follow Lecocq’s translation of the term egha (Lecocq 2002, 202).
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were beaten up by the police personnel at the commissariat central. This points to 
the men’s capacity to “riposte” in order to avenge themselves (and their wives) as 
one central pillar of adult masculinity in the Tuareg culture in its Niamey form. A 
pillar of adult masculinity that has been undermined under circumstances of po-
lice ill treatment of men at the central police station. It was thus precisely because 
this pillar has been undermined in Niamey that Alassane lost his social status as a 
man vis-à-vis his wife. As such, Alassane’s situation substantiates Connell’s obser-
vation evoked earlier that when the configuration of social practices that underpin 
male dominance is undermined, this affects the patriarchy (Connell 1995, 77f.).
4.1.2	 “Because	of	all	these,	we	Tuareg	have	to	understand	that	we	are	a	people”
The informants either began or concluded most of their accounts examined in the 
foregoing sections with two particular remarks, which will be examined in this 
section. In what follows, these remarks will be used to shed light on the ways in 
which the informants transformed the negative effects of exile into constructive 
social processes to redefine their identity as a community.
4.1.2.1 “One Tuareg old man said all this before”
One notable remark at the beginning and end of most accounts was the refugees’ 
constant evocation of a prophecy by an old free-born Tuareg man who lived and 
died in Djebock (near Gao town) in northern Mali. According to the informants 
in Niamey, he was able to predict future events. Concerning the future of the free 
white Tuareg in Mali, the informants recalled that the old man had said: “All this 
suffering will come to an end one day. It has been said before that we Tuareg were 
going to go through all these situations.” On several other occasions, the inform-
ants became more explicit when voicing at length that:
Our suffering will continue until the day at which we will have our independ-
ence from Mali. That day will come and our suffering will come to an end. It 
will come when people in southern Mali would be against each other. There will 
be great confusion there, and the Tuareg will then have their independence.34
By referring to this prophecy, the informants related their individual life situations 
in Niamey to the Tuareg’s long experience of suffering as “a group.” The prophecy 
34 This text was excerpted from conversations with Mossa Ag Atther, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed, and Al-
habib Ag Sidi on January 29, 2013 in Niamey. Examined in the context of 2012–2013, this prophecy, 
in the first place, provided the town informants with an interpretative lens for understanding the 
military putsch by a group of young soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo and the subsequent 
events that led to the near collapse of the Malian state. They considered these events in 2012 as 
manifest signs that indicated the coming of Tuareg independence due to the confusion created by 
these in southern Mali (see Lecocq/Mann/Whitehouse et al. 2013).
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has permitted the Tuareg to live their lives situations in exile as a collective and 
temporary phenomenon. For example, during several conversations between the 
young men at Ibrahim’s place, Mossa Ag Attaher’s son Iba often argued:
I live today without love (tarha) because I am Tuareg. If I was not a Tuareg, I 
would not be where I am here today in Niamey. I would be someone else and 
living somewhere else but not in Niamey. We Tuareg are a people that suffer.35
Such interpretations served as a driving force for the creation of the “Tuareg col-
lectivity.” For instance, Iba defined himself as “a character of the Tuareg people” 
by interpreting his personal situation (discussed earlier in this chapter) as a result 
of his membership of the Tuareg group. The “Tuareg people” to which he claimed 
to belong, will, according to the old man’s prophecy, achieve its independence and 
will return to the tenere (bush), the term the informants used to refer to northern 
Mali. They thus took their (future) return back to Mali as the end of suffering for 
them.
4.1.2.2	 “The	Hausa,	Zarma,	Songhay,	and	Bellah-Iklan are the same”
The second remark consisted of locating the attitudes of the Hausa, Zarma, and 
the police toward the free-born Tuareg refugees in the context of conflicts between 
the Bellah-Iklan, Songhay, and the Tuareg in northern Mali (cf. chapter 3). For 
example, the informants insisted that the Hausa, Zarma, and the police are hostile 
toward the Tuareg refugees in Niamey due to the fact that these groups supported 
the Songhay and Bellah-Iklan in their fight against the free-born Tuareg. Thus, 
by relating their specific hostile experiences of long-standing conflicts between 
the Songhay and the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg in northern Mali, the 
informants attempted to present their individual experiences in Niamey as a con-
tinuation of their persecution in Mali. They therefore presented the “Tuareg” as “a 
restless group.” For example, Ibrahim asked the following question several times:
Why does the Hausa and Zarma do this to all of us? They do it because they 
support the Songhay and the Bellah we left behind in Mali. You see that there 
are many Songhay currently living in Niamey as refugees. But did you see them 
complaining about the Hausa and Zarma? Never! Quite the contrary! When you 
meet them in town, they feel at home here that is why they even insult us […].36
Echoing Ibrahim, Alhabib Ag Sidi also explained their fear of the “complicity” 
between the Zarma, Hausa, and police personnel in Niamey and the Songhay and 
Bellah-Iklan in Mali, which prompted most Tuareg refugees to refrain from devel-
oping closer contacts with these other ethnic groups. Alhabib recounted a story 
about a Zarma man he had met when he arrived in Niamey in 1983. According 
35 Conversation with Iba in Niamey, on 29/09/2012.
36 Selected from conversations with Ibrahim Ag Mohamed on 17/01/2013 in Niamey.
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to Alhabib, this man was a “kind enough person,” who expressed his kindness by 
buying meat, milk, and tea for Alhabib Ag Sidi when he visited. One day, however, 
the man asked Alhabib whether he has been to Libya or had friends there.37 Later 
on Alhabib Ag Sidi discovered that his visitor was a police officer. Upon this dis-
covery, Alhabib then asked the policeman to abstain from visiting him again, as, 
in his mind, the ultimate goal of a policeman is to harm him because he is Tuareg.
Mossa Ag Attaher also considered that “all Hausa and Zarma residents” in Niamey 
potentially sought to harm the free-born Tuareg from Mali. He explained that:
I refrained from having Hausa or Zarma friends because they want to know 
about me and tell it to the police. Since I am here, the Zarma that I know are 
many. But I never let them come to see my family. I also do not go to theirs. I 
worked with many of them at IRD but our relationships never moved beyond 
the work place.38
As I have come to understand, representing themselves as such “a restless group 
in exile,” victims of the Hausa, Zarma, Songhay, and Bellah-Iklan, provided the 
informants with a fertile ground to call for change in their mode of self-identifica-
tion and to establish unity among the free-born Tuareg.
4.1.2.3	 	“Nak	utamachek”	(I	am	Tamasheq,	Targi	)—“Nak	in	tumast”	 
(I	am	part	of	the	people)
If the Tuareg do not stop their internal conflicts and stand up together here like 
one, they will disappear from the Earth.
—Mossa’s son Iba, Niamey, 29/01/2013.
When I began my research in Niamey in August 2012, one difficulty that I encoun-
tered was collecting information about the original clans and federations from 
which the informants originated in northern Mali. Whenever I asked them about 
their original clans and federations, many told me: Nak utamachek (I am a Tuareg) 
and Nak in Tumast (I am part of the “people”). Others chose not to reply to my 
questions or politely tended to ignore them. I realized later that not answering 
questions about the details regarding their original clans was a way to express how 
they began to accommodate their society to the ways in which other people, such 
as the Zarma and the Hausa people, perceive them. For instance, after a few weeks, 
Mossa Ag Attaher explained to me that:
It is a mistake for many Tuareg to believe that we are different from each other 
because someone is from the Kel Antsar and the other is from the Immakalkalen. 
37 Indeed, some interlocutors told me that Kountché’s regime strongly suspected and watched the 
Tuareg as the hidden hands of Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi who was against the government of 
the Niger Republic at time.
38 Conversation with Mossa Ag Attaher on 29/01/2013 in Niamey.
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This is a big mistake. Look, the Hausa and Zarma people do not consider us 
to be different. Once one has this skin color (pointing his index finger at his 
body), the person is a Tuareg, a danger, a terrorist and thief. We should now be 
aware of this and stand up together for the Tumast.
Mossa’s call on the promotion of the idea that the Tuareg form one “people” (tu-
mast) is straightforward in this account. He presented the (tumast) “people” as an 
alternative framework of belonging that does not admit any internal differences 
between the free-born Tuareg. A 38-year-old man, whom I call Agissa Ag Attaher, 
told me another story about a noteworthy change in the refugees’ self-perceptions 
of themselves that the informants presented as sine qua non for their “becoming a 
collective.” Agissa explained:
You know, I was born in Niger. When my father arrived here in 1966, he mar-
ried our mother, a Songhay from Tera. I went to school with other Hausa and 
Zarma children near the Merygarage. I did not know that I was different from 
them until one day when we were playing with logs by the river. A man just 
came to us and said to me. Hey! Tuareg leave this wood. It was on that day 
that I became aware of who I am. It is only about the white or red skin color 
and not about the clans.39
Altogether, the refugees’ accounts about the old man’s prophecy, their perceived 
complicity between the police, the Zarma, the Hausa, the Bellah-Iklan, and the 
Songhay correspond to Marris’ conceptualization of how people cope with loss 
(Marris 1974). Initially, the refugee informants assimilated the negative effects of 
exile with their existing experiences of conflicts between the free white Tuareg and 
the Songhay as well as the Bellah-Iklan in Mali. Furthermore, I argue that this has 
led the informants to perceive their contemporary life situations as one episode of 
a longer history of Tuareg persecution. In a second step, their self-definitions as 
Nak utamachek (I am a Tuareg) and Nak in Tumast (I am part of the people), con-
sequently revealed that the assimilation of their predicaments of exile into their 
existing experiences has led to modifications in how they present themselves, their 
history, and, ultimately, the future Tuareg society (tumast). Similar processes of 
changes in collective identifications in response to their predicament also took 
place among the Bellah-Iklan in the refugee camp in Abala.
4.2	 The	Bellah-Iklan	in	Abala	and	their	historical	connection	with	Menaka
Abala, where the Bellah-Iklan refugees have lived since 2012, is situated in the 
northeast in the prefecture of Filingué, around 70 km from the Malian border. It is 
the head village of a rural commune in the Niger Republic. According to Rivières, 
39 Selected from conversation with Agissa, Mossa and Ibrahim Ag Mohamed on 29/01/2013 in 
 Niamey.
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Abala received the status of administrative post for the first time in 1964 (Riv-
ières 1965). Nowadays, the municipality comprises thirty-five villages with a total 
population estimated to be around 60,000 inhabitants. These inhabitants are es-
sentially Hausa, Fulani, Tuareg, and Arab ethnic groups, who are engaged in farm-
ing, small-scale trading, and pastoral activities. Historically, Abala’s inhabitants, 
particularly the Hausa and Fulani, were known as farmers, small-scale traders, 
and pastoral nomadic people who have had long-term exchanges with the Tuareg, 
Songhay, and Fulani inhabiting the area surrounding Menaka. Some interlocutors 
from Abala village related that for a long time, after the rainy season, Hausa men 
crossed the border to Mali to sell veils, tobacco, and related products throughout 
the Gao region. The Fulani from Abala have also had a long history of seasonal 
migration to northern Mali. Conversely, the Tuareg in the village and area sur-
rounding Menaka not only crossed the border into Niger seasonally, but also went 
to the country regularly to purchase tea and tobacco among other related products 
in the weekly market held in Abala.
4.2.1	 The	organization	of	the	refugee	camp
Humanitarian workers in Niamey maintained that the Abala refugee camp was 
the best-structured camp in Niger. They made such claims based on the number 
of NGOs supporting activities, the existing infrastructure, and the ways in which 
they had organized the refugee population in the refugee camp. In terms of infra-
structure, some prominent aspects which attracted my attention between 2012 and 
2014 can be listed here. In the middle of the camp, the offices for the humanitarian 
agencies are located. Behind these offices stand 32 classrooms, a space for sports 
and exercise, and three conference rooms for social and cultural activities and one 
room for children’s recreational activities. There is a consistent number of NGOs 
delivering different services for different sectors of the refugees’ social life.40 The 
camp is divided into five quartiers. Each section is placed under the leadership of a 
chef de quartier. The chef de quartier plays a brokerage role between humanitarian 
agencies and the quartier’s inhabitants. Each quartier comprises several tents, es-
tablished according to household. A household is held to be the lowest social unit 
in the camp and its number of persons varies from one to another. For example, 
in a given household, there might be only a wife, children, and husband, whereas 
in others, unmarried siblings of the husband and wife or a father with his one to 
three wives as well as their children may live there. The social composition of the 
quartier is based on the order of arrival. For example, the Bellah-Iklan who arrived 
first to the refugee camp inhabit the three first established quartiers.41Yet per order 
40 A number estimated to be around thirteen between 2012 and 2013.
41 Before this last quartier was established, the previous ones were extended, and at their arrival they 
were requested to inhabit the already well-structured quartiers aside the Black Tuareg. According to 
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of arrival, the Fulani, Hausa, and Songhay inhabit the fourth quartier as they ar-
rived later. The latecomers, the free-born Tuareg, inhabit the fifth quartier. There 
is one central committee of refugees, which was led by the late Ahiyou Intagaout 
between 2012 and 2015 and acts as the representative of all the refugees in Abala. 
Weekly meetings are held under the UNCHR’s leadership every Wednesday from 
10 am to ca. 3 pm. This also offers opportunities to humanitarian organizations 
to give instructions about expected social conduct. Women and youth commit-
tees help the central committee with this task. The camp’s security is ensured by a 
vigilant committee composed of fifty-one refugees, which works closely with the 
soldiers at the checkpoints and inside the quartier.
As I illustrate below, my Bellah-Iklan informants offer a contradictory view of 
life in the camp to those given by the humanitarian administrators in Niamey. The 
informants often used the sentence: “We are zero here” to express their feelings of 
having become adinat n bànan (useless people or nothing). This interpretation 
echoes arguments by free-born Tuareg residing in Niamey that exile that came 
with a loss in status and respectability. In the first section, I focus on the inform-
ants’ accounts of the registration process as refugees in Abala, and the policies 
pertaining to food ration distributions. In the second section, I will focus on the 
refugees’ accounts of their interactions with NGO workers.
4.2.1.1	 “The	useless	people”	and	the	NGO	regulations
My analysis of the refugees’ accounts of NGO regulations draws on studies that 
examine how the living conditions in the IDPs camps in northern Uganda have 
affected the configuration of social practices underpinning men’s power within the 
domestic realms (Dolan 2002, 2009; Van Soest 2014).42 Dolan argues that:
the northern Uganda civilian men’s ability to achieve key elements in the nor-
mative model of masculinity into which they had been socialized went into 
protracted crisis. With their capacity to create a family and then provide for 
and protect it much reduced, they experienced a loss of domestic and politi-
cal power. (Dolan 2009, 205)
Dolan emphasizes that creating a family, together with the ability to provide for it 
and protect it, are central pillars of men’s power in the domestic realm. This echoes 
the statement that one Acholi man told Van Soest during his research in northern 
Uganda:
the humanitarian workers in charge of the housing and accommodation sections, the latter refused 
to inhabit the same quartiers with the former. Thus the fifth quartier was then established in the 
camp for the newly arrived red Tuareg where they live with a few Hausa and Songhay households.
42 See also Refugee Law Project (2007): “Giving their daughters away for their survival: Self-reliance, 
vulnerability, and the paradox of early marriage” (Refugee Law Project Working paper, 20), Uganda: 
Makerere University.
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You become a man when you’re married and when you can provide for your 
family. A man has to prove to his community that he is respectable, that he is in-
dependent and that he can provide guidance to his family. (Van Soest 2014, 32f.)
“The cavalry of the refugee registration”
Même le simple enregistrement est un calvaire (Even the simple registration is a 
cavalry).
—Assalim, Abala, 29/12/2012.
In the UNHCR camp in Abala, all refugees have to register upon arrival, which 
ensures that UNHCR has a count of the exact number of refugees and is able to 
provide them with food and healthcare. The registration comprises three steps. 
First, registration at the International Office of Immigration requires that refugees 
declare themselves as displaced people fleeing war in Mali. In cases in where those 
declaring their refugee status do not have identity documents, knowledgeable, ed-
ucated refugees such as Inawélène and Assalim act as witnesses. At the end of this 
step, the refugee applicants receive the official documents they need for the second 
step. This takes place at the CNE43, the representative of the Government of Niger 
as the host country. The document issued there bears witness to and acceptance 
of the refugees’ legal status in Niger. At the final step, the refugees are required to 
present the records they receive earlier at the International Office for Migration 
and the CNE to the UNHCR. It is at this final stage that food ration cards are 
delivered to them.
Assalim and several other Bellah-Iklan men I met in Abala explained that this 
registration was in itself a cavalry. For instance, Assalim put his own experience 
with his daughter’s case in the following terms:
[…] my daughter was ill. As we were queuing several days here, I went to 
ask if she could stay in the tent, and that I could provide her details at the 
registration desk; they refused as if I am not her father. I am wondering what 
she could tell them about herself that I, as her father, cannot say. I could not 
register her until she recovered. Four months later, there was a second regis-
tration campaign, and then I succeeded in registering her. But before, we did 
not receive anything from NGOs on her behalf.44
There is evident tension between Assalims’ self-perception as a father and the 
NGOs’ regulations at the camp. Assalim viewed his suggestion to stand at the 
desk instead of his daughter as just a way to allow her to get some rest since she 
was ill. As a father, he perceived doing so as a parental role. The way in which he 
felt his status as a father was threatened echoes the observation by Malkki that 
humanitarian interventions rest on a perception that depersonalizes the refugees 
(Malkki 1996, 378; see also Feldman 1994; Stein 1981). Humanitarian workers 
43 Commission Nationale d’éligibilté au Statut des Réfugiés.
44 Interview with Assalim Ehatt on 22/11/2012 in Abala.
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with whom I engaged in nightly conversations justified their measures regarding 
the registration, maintaining that they operated in the context of international 
law. Accordingly, women and children should be considered refugees in need 
of protection as they have rights that should be promoted independently before 
situating them within a web of affiliation in the family. Assalim called this NGO 
interference “with family affairs.”45 For him, anything between a father, a mother, 
and a child should be primarily considered family affair. It is only the head of the 
family who is responsible for such matters. He stated this more explicitly in the 
following terms:
Since I am no longer able to lead matters concerning my family, this means 
that I am no longer the one leading my family. It is UNHCR that does 
everything concerning our families here. This is our cavalry here.46
The UNHCR’s campaign against domestic violence
Sattopima defines domestic violence as a form of discrimination against women 
that denies them the enjoyment of their basic human rights (Sattopima 2004; 
see also Moore 1994). Dolan (2002, 2009), Foreman (1999), and Zur (1998) have 
sought to understand the relationship between the decline of patriarchal author-
ity and domestic violence in situations of forced exile. Dolan explains the per-
vasiveness of domestic violence in the IPD camps in northern Uganda to men’s 
impoverishment and experiences of powerlessness and loss in family authority 
(Dolan 2009, 205). Discussing domestic violence in Palestinian context, Kha-
waja et al. maintain that men who beat their wives generally have negative views 
about women’s autonomy (Khawaja/Linos/El-Roueiheb 2007, 215). Between 2012 
and 2013, I witnessed almost daily recurrent reports of cases of domestic violence 
against women and children at the ACTED office. These cases were brought to 
the attention of the camp administration and sometimes even ended up in court. 
Whenever a husband did not comply with the advice given by the humanitarian 
administrators, an independent tent was provided for his wife and children. In 
response to repeated cases of domestic violence in the refugee camp, the UNHCR 
local office launched a week-long sensitization campaign on December 16, 2012. In 
his opening speech, the UNHCR representative, Algassymou Bah, addressed men 
as a primary object of concern:
[…] I am concerned with the camp men. We heard about several cases of 
domestic violence. That, you, men beat up your wives in your families. This 
should stop. That is why we organized this week to be, of course, full of joy, 
but also to sensitize you […]. You should know that women deserve respect. 
We urge you to cease violence toward them. We want to reason with you to 
45 In French: “les affaires de famille”.
46 Interview with Assalim Ehatt on 22/11/2012 in Abala.
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give up such practices, at least in this camp. We will not let you violate your 
wives in this camp here.47
The speech was followed by a series of activities that were to inform refugees about 
new regulations aiming to contain domestic violence and related forms of male 
aggression (see below).
Whereas humanitarian aid workers presented their mission in the refugee 
camp as a matter of protecting all refugees, that is children, women, and men, 
my male adult informants viewed these measures as being directed against them 
as men. They took this as an indication of the propensity of NGOs to interfere in 
domestic politics and for threatening men’s authority over women, their offspring, 
and other dependents. For instance, in reaction to Algassymou Bah, Inawélène 
found the statement, “you should know that women deserve respect,” very provoc-
ative. To Inawélène, the suggestion by NGOs that men should stop beating their 
wives and children was all the more upsetting because he felt that the aid workers 
themselves had few skills in terms of dealing with their women and keeping them 
under control. He, as well as other interlocutors, did not consider beating up their 
47 Recorded speech on 16/12/2012 in Abala.
Figure 3:	As part of the sensitization campaign launched in December 2012, the UNHCR had 
put this picture in every quartier to remind men that domestic violence is forbidden in the camp. 
Photograph by S. Diallo on 13/09/2014 in Abala.
 4.2 The Bellah-Iklan in Abala and their historical connection with Menaka 83
children or wives as genuinely bad behavior. Rather, they portrayed the infliction 
of corporal punishment as a core pillar of parental patriarchal authority and re-
spect within the family. As Inawélène maintained:
[…] I really do not understand the laws in Niger, you cannot even move 
within your own household. Even your wife does not obey; you can no longer 
do anything. Your children disobey what you tell them, same, you cannot 
touch them. Since we have been here, our daughters have escaped our con-
trol. They go out with young men before they are married. If you touch them, 
the UNHCR and the Gendarmes take you to court. They have done this many 
times now […].48
Inawélène contrasts the UNHCR regulations and their social repercussions to the 
refugees’ pre-exile situation in Mali. He explains his loss in patriarchal authority 
and control over his daughters and wives as a consequence of UNHCR’s and the 
security forces’ interference. Inawélène thus perceives domestic violence as a form 
of control capable of countering the libertarian lifestyle adopted by women and 
children under the conditions of exile in Abala.
“Our wives have become men”: Male discourses about the distribution of rations
Simon Turner explores how the relief operations’ policy of equality driven by the 
UNHCR challenges older hierarchies of authority among Burundian refugees of 
Lukole in Tanzania (Turner 1999). Turner argues that:
A recurring subject would be the men lamenting that the women no longer 
respect them. The reason allegedly being that the men no longer can provide 
for their wives and children. It is the UNHCR-or merely […] that provides 
food, medicine and plastic sheeting for building blindés (huts). And UNHCR 
provides the same amount to men, women and children alike. “The UNHCR 
is a better husband” the women say, according to the men at least. (Turner 
1999, 1)
Turner’s account offers a useful interpretative framework for understanding the 
conflicted relations between Inawélène and his second wife in Abala. When I ar-
rived in the refugee camp in Abala in August 2014, Inawélène had ceased to stay 
overnight with his second wife living in the second quartier. For him, this was the 
only option because it had become difficult to speak to her. Inawélène complained 
that whenever he attempted to make conversation with her, she vehemently re-
acted to him. He disliked this:
Whenever I speak to her since we arrived in this camp, she always reminds 
me that I am not the one who feeds her. She said that it is rather Sarmaji49 
48 Conversation with Inawélène on 25/12/2012 in Abala.
49 Sarmaji is the camp manager in Abala. Thus, by saying that it is Sarmaji who feeds them, the wom-
en want to mention that they are fed by NGOs and not by their husbands.
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who feeds her who could to talk to her but not me […]. In reality we men 
just became “nothings” in this camp. Look for example, you cannot even raise 
your voice to your family anymore.50
Similar to the experience of those men in Turner’s account (Turner 1999), In-
awélène interpreted his wife’s reaction as a result of the food distribution reg-
ulations introduced by UNHCR in Abala. He explained that the UNHCR set 
the individual food ration to 12 kg of rice per person per month and also held 
women responsible for their children’s food ration. In Inawélène’s family, every 
wife cooked for herself and her children. As a result, whenever he went to see his 
second wife, he has to purchase extra food provisions and bring this over to her. 
The days he did not have money to purchase extra food, she did not cook for him. 
Alternatively, she suggested sometimes that he cook using the food that she had 
received from the UNHCR but Inawélène would have to pay it back whenever 
he gets some money. Moreover, she insisted that it is Inawélène’s duty to feed his 
family at all costs.
For Inawélène, the UNHCR’s policies contradicted the Bellah-Iklan conven-
tional gender relations within families:
our […] women are made for home where they cook, take care of children 
and old parents. […] in contrast, we, men, go and search for food, money, 
and cultivate and take care of animals. In the case of danger, we stood for 
our wives, fought for them; and they respected us. This gave sense to our 
existence as men.51
This quoted passage enables us to understand that it was precisely their submis-
sion to Inawélène’s demands prior to exile that explained their changing attitudes 
toward him in Abala. Inawélène therefore interpreted the change in his wives’ at-
titudes as evidence of their loss of respect for him. To conclude, Inawélène’s ac-
count reveals that men felt like nothing because they lost their status, identity, and 
respectability as heads of families in Abala partly due to the NGOs’ inversion of 
domestic roles. As the account shows, initially men controlled family resources; in 
Niger, however, women were in control.
4.2.1.2 “The nothings versus the arrogant humanitarian workers”
The male Bellah-Iklan refugees not only complained about the changes in their 
domestic power relations after the NGOs imposed regulations upon them, they 
also felt belittled by the treatment they received from humanitarian aid workers. 
In what follows I focus on three kinds of interactions between male adult refu-
gees and humanitarian aid workers to illustrate how the refugees felt their pride 
50 Selected from conversation with Inawélène on 10/09/2014 in Abala.
51 Selected from conversation with Inawélène and Assalim on 12/12/2012 in Abala.
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had been hurt, as well as their sense of respectability and dignity as seniors and 
family fathers.
“ACTED made me a digger in Abala”
Assalim is a renowned musician from Menaka. He depicted himself as someone 
respected by women and everybody else among the Bellah-Iklan in northern Mali 
partly due to his successful musical career. To him, his “identity” as a successful, 
proud, and respected man among his peers and by women was undermined in the 
refugee camp in Abala. He explained this by pointing out the fact that humanitar-
ian workers had no respect for refugees:
To many humanitarian workers, the refugees have no dignity and do not need 
to be respected as persons. Imagine, once the ACTED said that they needed 
people for some days. We were supposed to help them running a cultural 
awareness program targeting women about sanitation […]. To do this, they 
needed some teams. I had applied on behalf of my music group because we 
are used to taking such jobs in Menaka too. They said to me that my group 
was selected to do the job. But unexpectedly, they asked me to do a digging 
job in the fifth quartier […]. I did this digging job for one to two days. Then I 
went to their office to say that I could not do this job again. I explained them 
that they did not respect me. Since, they first told me that I had been selected 
to do something totally different from this digging job. You see I am a musi-
cian, highly respected by women in Menaka. But as I am a refugee here, they 
want to damage this image by turning me into a manual worker wearing dirty 
clothes in front of women because they only think that the refugees are only 
after food but not dignity.52
Assalim reflected on his combined loss of former social identity, status, and 
respectability, depicting Menaka as a place where the older correct order of 
things, as well as people, still prevailed and found respect. While the women 
with whom he dealt in daily life were still the same as those who had surrounded 
him “back home” in Menaka, he presented them as belonging to a distinct 
moral universe.
“Waiting for the UNHCR before doing anything”
They consider us children whom they can tell what to do.
—Inawélène, Abala, 18/10/2012.
My male refugee informants also complained about NGOs’ restrictions pertaining 
to travelling to and from the refugee settlement in Abala. For example, they argued 
that when a refugee wants to visit relatives in Niamey or Bamako, or just attend a 
workshop or any similar event, they were not allowed to go if they did not receive 
52 Interview with Assalim on 11/01/2013 in Abala.
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prior approval from the NGOs. When travelling to a workshop, refugees had to 
submit a letter of invitation from the workshop organizer to the UNCHR and the 
CNE offices for review. They assessed the nature of the organizations involved, and 
paid particular attention to their political orientations before giving the refugee 
permission to attend the event. If the UNHCR and CNE were not convinced of the 
non-political nature of the organization inviting the refugees under their protec-
tion, the answer to the application would be negative. When it came to simple vis-
its with relatives, the applicant was verbally questioned in order to assess whether 
her or his security in the indicated destination is not in danger before a decision 
was made to allow the departure. Another obstructive factor was the length of the 
journey, which should not exceed three weeks in total. To this end, the date of de-
parture and return were identified on an official travel document, “titre de voyage”, 
which was used to as documentation to show security forces at every checkpoint 
throughout Niger.
Inawélène once clashed with security forces, ACTED and UNHCR, when he 
made a short visit back to Mali to vote during the past presidential elections that 
saw the election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in September 2013. His decision to go 
back was informed by the great importance attached to these elections, which the 
non-free-born Tuareg in the camp expected would be a turning point crucial to 
the peace-building process in northern Mali. However, since he left the refugee 
camp without permission, he was asked to explain himself to the UNHCR and 
ACTED staff upon his return to Abala. They gave him serious warnings, forbid-
ding him from doing something similar again. He recalled:
When I arrived at the UNHCR office. There were Bah the chief, Barma, Sar-
maji and Amadou, and another called Bachir. Bah started with the question: 
Who allowed you to go to Mali? I replied no one else than myself. I told them 
that I am responsible person who can decide things for himself. Bah told me 
that if I do the same thing again, I would not be allowed to re-enter the camp 
again. You see Souleymane this is like you are really talking to a child. That 
was all. They told me to go. Where is the respect here?53
This passage reveals what George Paul Meiu has in another context called “queer 
moments”—moments of contradiction and subversion—through which new 
forms of age and time emerge (Meiu 2015, 474f.). Inawélène deplored the way 
in which the local UNHCR representative, Bah, addressed him. To him, Bah’s 
attitude toward him had been disrespectful since it reduced him to a child. For 
Inawélène, telling him that if he takes another trip in the future without first 
receiving permission from the UNHCR would have consequence, such as not 
being permitted to re-enter the camp, came off as being how a person would 
talk to a child. As adults usually use a stronger tonal emphasis with a child who 
is not aware of the complexity of their actions. For this reason, a child has to 
53 Selected from conversation with Inawélène on 19/08/2014 in Abala.
 4.2 The Bellah-Iklan in Abala and their historical connection with Menaka 87
wait for approval before acting, thereby making the child dependent on adults. 
Similarly, he found that waiting for approval lessened the adult’s abilities to de-
cide for themselves, which placed them in a permanent position of dependence 
on NGOs in the refugee camp. These evaluations of the regulations pertaining 
to permission to leave and enter the refugee settlement, in addition to the tonal 
emphasis Bah used when speaking to Inawélène, enables us to reflect on the ref-
ugee camp in Abala as consisting of moments of contradiction and subversion—
through which male adults have come to inhabit the social time of childhood 
they had already lived some decades back (Meiu 2015, 474). To conclude, it was 
precisely this situation that made my Bellah-Iklan informants feel that they had 
lost their former status of respectability and their identity in Abala, as I argue 
further below.
“They insulted me because of a piece of sandwich”
On Friday afternoon January 11, 2013, I joined Inawélène, Assalim, and seven 
other Bellah-Iklan men gathered around their tea kettle under the hangar near 
the UNHCR office in Abala. That day, Inawélène appeared very unfamiliar to me. 
He had expanded his turban to his nose leaving only his eyes visible. His mood 
was unusual and seemingly affected. The anger was manifest through his laconic 
contributions to his discussions with peers; his inspiration to connect desperation 
to hope by evoking different anecdotes during the conversations was gone. When I 
confronted him the next morning at his place during our tea session around 8 am, 
he told that a humanitarian worker had insulted him the previous day:
[…] the reason is that there was a meeting and they [read: the humanitarian 
workers] had ordered some sandwiches. I needed to talk to Assalim. When I 
went to talk to him, there was an ACTED agent who said to another to watch 
me so that I do not profit from talking to Assalim and get a piece of sandwich. 
This person followed me when I went to talk to Assalim and said there are 
people who like to take advantage. I was shocked to hear this about myself. 
In Anderboukane, I am a highly respected man. That day they treated me as 
an undesirable person.54
Like Assalim, this account shows how Inawélène put himself into a retrospective 
mood in order to reflect on his feeling of having lost his social status as a respect-
able man in Abala in contrast to how he had been perceived in Anderboukane. 
In other conversations, he stressed that people respected him in Anderboukane 
as he is not someone who does everything for material gain; he never lied to an-
yone. Also, he argued that people respected him because he respects himself. He 
could measure people’s respect through how they listened to him when he spoke. 
Unfortunately, the humanitarian worker who asked his fellow employee to keep 
an eye on him for a piece of sandwich was degrading him. He degraded him by 
54 Interview with Inawélène on 11/01/2013 in Abala.
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depicting him as a child who would run after food, which stood in stark contrast 
to his former image as an individual who was well respected in Anderboukane. He 
maintained that only a child would chase food in public because the child’s sense 
of self had not yet been developed, while an adult would have enough self-control 
to keep from doing the same.
4.2.2 “What we live here is the suffering of the peuple noir”
In what follows, I shall present and discuss the refugees’ accounts that interpret 
their predicaments in Abala as one reason to become a homogenous collectivity 
called the peuple noir.
4.2.2.1	 “ACTED	wants	to	exterminate	us	for	the	sake	of	the	Tuareg”
Inawélène, Assalim, and Ahiyou interpreted their lives in exile in Abala by situ-
ating them in the context of a long-standing struggle between them and the free-
born Tuareg in northern Mali. They attributed a significance to their life situations 
that extended beyond their individual experiences, presenting their current expe-
riences as only one episode in a longer history of oppression and marginalization. 
In this fashion, my informants not only recollected the history of the Bellah-Iklan 
to me, but also actively (re)created this history. Ahiyou, who was born in the mid-
dle of the 1930s, presented himself as the reliable source for reconstructing histori-
cal connections between their past and present day situations in Abala. According 
to him, the French NGO ACTED treated Bellah-Iklan in the refugee camp in ways 
reminiscent of French colonial administration, which had empowered the free-
born Tuareg to the detriment of the unfree Bellah-Iklan.55 This prompted him 
to establish an alliance between ACTED in Abala and the free-born white Tu-
areg. For Ahiyou the extermination of the Bellah-Iklan is the ultimate goal. As 
the account below illustrates, ACTED had only employed free-born Tuareg in the 
refugee camp:
When we arrived here in Abala, ACTED only employed the Tuareg. Some of 
them were from Mauritania and the others were from Niger. I remembered 
one day when one of them came to my place here, under this tent. He started 
to ask me about the conflict in Mali. I told him to leave this tent immediately. 
He left. I asked Inawélène, Assalim to gather people for a meeting. When 
they gathered people I told them about the story with the Tuareg working for 
ACTED. I clearly told people that if we do not take action, ACTED is working 
for the Tuareg. We protested and they were all transferred to Niamey.56
55 This thought will be further elaborated on in chapter 5.
56 Selected from conversation at Ahiyou’s hangar on 13/09/2014 in Abala.
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Based on this assessment of the parallels between the situation of Bellah-Iklan, 
past and present, Ahiyou called for action to withdraw Tuareg employees. Ahi-
you’s account echoes Sommers’s argument that Hutu refugees in urban Tanzania 
depicted the Tutsi as fundamentally evil, claiming that the Tutsi or their accom-
plices were observing them from everywhere and plotting their destruction (Som-
mers 2001, 30).
As I realized during my research, life in the refugee camp changed radically 
between 2012 and 2014. In 2012, camp life was characterized by the dynamic in-
vestment of several transnational agencies. School infrastructure, public toilets, a 
healthcare center, new tents were built everywhere in the refugee camp. In 2014, 
some of this infrastructure was still not finished, while others had been completed 
but had never been put into use. Women who had earned a modest income from 
cooking for others in the childcare nutrition program now had nothing to pass 
the time or to even make a living. Similarly, men who formerly had made some 
additional cash from manual work, such as brick making for the construction of 
the toilets and classrooms, were no longer employed. Employees of NGOs and the 
UNHCR explained to me that most of these programs had been terminated due 
to a lack of funding.57 For Ahiyou, in contrast, the lost employment opportuni-
ties were proof of the hostile attitude of the international community toward the 
peuple noir. To him, even the intervention by the French and UN coalition forces 
were an attempt to support the free-born white Tuareg against their former serfs.
Look before French troop’s intervention, MUJAO had neutralized MNLA 
several months ago. One could spend days and weeks without hearing from 
MNLA leaders on radios. They had lost the ground and hide themselves at 
the Algerian and Mauritanian borders. But French came to fight against MU-
JAO and let MNLA occupied the ground as those speaking on behalf of the 
northern population. Thus the French did not care about what MNLA did, 
the crime they perpetrated in the area of Menaka. Or this is the clear message 
from the French: the red have souls, are humans whose rights need protec-
tion. However, when it comes to us they [the French] do not consider us 
humans who have rights and need protection. The Minusma [the United Na-
tions military forces in the northern regions] is also following the footsteps of 
French troops. They are in Kidal and Menaka where they see MNLA people 
daily but don’t question what they are doing. Instead, they only target MU-
JAO people who punish MNLA for the crimes they perpetrated. It is clear to 
us that the French people and the international troops are not neutral forces. 
They supported the red against us.58
57 Algassymou Bah, the representative of the UNHCR office in the refugee camp at Abala, stressed 
that UNHCR only got 20% of the money for which they had applied for the Malian refugees in 
Niger. This was due to the growing number of the refugees resulting from the conflicts in the Cen-
tral African Republic and ongoing peace talks in Algeria. The ongoing peace talks for the peace 
agreement in Algeria brought several donor organizations to prioritize the recent refugees from 
the Central African Republic.
58 Selected from conversation at Ahiyou’s hangar on 13/09/2014 in Abala. Elsewhere I have argued 
in chapter 2 that my unfree Tuareg informants in Abala viewed French intervention as a divine 
90	 4.	 Refugee	reflections	on	the	social	conditions	of	exile	in	Niger
Ahiyou also questioned the alleged neutrality of the international coalition forces, 
during, for instance, the peace negotiation processes in Algeria.
Now when they neutralized MUJAO and brought the MNLA to the fore, 
France and the USA asked for people negotiations in Algeria. But at the time 
MNLA was defeated, they did not say anything, no peace negotiation was 
proposed by them. The thing is that they have no interest in knowing about 
MNLA’s role in the conflicts in northern Mali. If it was not for MNLA, MU-
JAO would not have been created. They are interrelated. Why do they not 
want to question the role of MNLA in the conflict? As long as they do not 
want to do this, it is clear that they are supporting the red [read free-born 
Tuareg] to the detriment of the others.59
Ahiyou developed these arguments about ACTED and the international commu-
nity in order to make the Bellah-Iklan aware of the common danger they face as 
a group. Thus, during his narrations of what ACTED, the French, and the inter-
national community have done to the Bellah-Iklan, some of those who listened 
to him in their turn punctuated Ahiyou’s passage from one example to another, 
exclaiming: Ntada (that’s it)! Ntada (that’s it)! Ntada (that’s it)! Ntada (that is it)! 
These exclamations revealed what listeners found adequate explanations of their 
predicament in Abala. The exclamations also expressed how Ahiyou’s explanation 
prompted those who listened to him to see themselves as a single (homogenous) 
group in relation to the free-born Tuareg.
4.2.2.2	 “The	Bellah’s	pathway	to	Exile”
One important figure whose prophecies are widely listened to and commented 
upon is Aghamad Ag Azam Zim.60 For example, according to the informants, 
Aghamad Ag Azam Zim had predicted that the Bellah-Iklan would migrate to 
 Abala. He stated that:
There will an unprecedented war in Azawagh in the course of which the true 
inhabitants will be expelled, and they will cross the border toward the East 
[…]. The enemies will control the whole region. But their mistake will be to 
cross the Wabaria river and move toward the south. If they do so, they will be 
defeated upon their return. They will flee the region in all directions. When 
they left Azawagh, the true inhabitants will return to their home to live in 
absence of any threat to them […].61
 operation in their favor, especially in connection with Aghamad Ag Zam-Zim’s prediction. Here, 
Ahiyou drew the opposite picture. This is not a contradiction in itself, rather, it displays how the 
meanings they give to events have constantly changed according to situations and needs. The sit-
uation and need here, I argue, is succeeding in creating common feelings of togetherness out of a 
common experience of suffering in exile.
59 Selected from conversations at the male gathering at Ahyiou’s hangar on 14/09/2014 in Abala.
60 He passed away in 2013.
61 Selected from conversations at the male gathering at Ahyiou’s hangar on 14/09/2014 in Abala.
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Inawélène, Assalim, and Ahiyou were positive that Aghamad Ag Azam Zim’s ac-
count matched their own path of migration and experiences because they, too, 
had left (the area of) Menaka and moved eastwards across the Nigerien border. 
The statement from the former deputy also depicts those who migrated toward 
east Niger as the true inhabitants of the desert. Even though there was a consider-
able number of free white Tuareg who migrated to from the area around Menaka, 
Assalim, Inawélène, and Ahiyou’s interpretations of Aghamad’s prophecy did 
not include those free-born Tuareg.62 Quite the contrary; the prophecy points at 
the free white Tuareg as historical rivals of the Bellah-Iklan. After expelling the 
Bellah-Iklan, the free-born Tuareg took total control over northern Mali. They 
also crossed the river via the Wabaria bridge near Gao to move toward central- 
southern Mali in 2012.
According to Inawélène, Assalim, Ahiyou, and several other Bellah-Iklan, 
another of Aghamad Ag Azam Zim’s prophecies had equally come true. When 
French military intervention began in January 2013, the informants, gathering 
under the hangar in Abala, argued that the time has arrived for the defeat of their 
enemies. In the following weeks and months, the free-born Tuareg MNLA po-
litical and military structure, as well as other Islamist militants, lost control over 
major parts of the northern regions. For the Bellah-Iklan in Abala, the retreat of 
free-born Tuareg forces would then allow their return to live in peace in Menaka 
in the following months and years as Aghamad had predicted. The arguments put 
forward here by Inawélène, Assalim, Ahiyou, and several other Bellah-Iklan men 
are important for their conceptualization of the French intervention as a form 
of punishment for free-born Tuareg. This punishment came from God, as the 
“Almighty” punished the free white Tuareg for having expelled and attacked the 
Bellah–Iklan whose suffering would come to an end once the free-born Tuareg 
withdrew from  northern Mali.
Another prophecy from Aghamad, through the lens of which the Bellah-Iklan 
interpreted their contemporary situations in Abala, was the caravan of turtles, in 
which he predicted that a group of turtles would pass through the desert from 
the east toward the northwest as a sign that prosperity would return to the Bel-
lah-Iklan after exile. According to my informants’ interpretations, the turtle is the 
symbol of patience and endurance. They interpreted its hard shell as its natural 
shield, while the turtle’s slow movement metaphorically corresponds to the Bel-
lah-Iklan’s longer experiences of suffering in northern Mali. The interlocutors 
also suggested that God would always protect them from damages that the free 
white Tuareg caused to them. In 2012, many refugees began to regain hope that 
God is still with them as it always protects turtles from threat when news spread 
in the refugee camp that turtles had been seen in the area between Menaka and 
62 As chapter 6 illustrates, the Bellah-Iklan’s referral to themselves as true inhabitants imply their 
claims to the first comership in the desert as opposed to the free-born Tuareg.
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Anderboukane. More importantly, the news about the turtles led the informants 
to believe that Aghamad’s prophecy was coming true.
By referring to these prophecies, my male Bellah-Iklan interlocutors framed 
their life in Abala as a temporary episode in a longer trajectory that would ulti-
mately lead them back home. The prophecies also provided my informants with 
some historical basis for reconstructing themselves as the peuple noir in exile. Thus, 
identifying themselves as the peuple noir implied the Bellah-Iklan men’s call for 
unity among the former slaves. They sought to articulate this unity around Agha-
mad’s prophecies. For example, Inawélène expressed this concern more explicitly:
The noirs’ problem [le problème des noirs] is that they think they are different 
from each other. For example, the black from the Dawsahak think that they 
are more noble and better than the others from the imghad. Even my first 
wife does so. She is from the Zamburuten. In Menaka, the Zamburuten think 
that they are different from other noirs since they constitute one independent 
fraction. Since we are all suffering here, we should admit that we are the same, 
we are the peuple noir.63
This statement recalls an observation by Lotte Pelckmans that the former slaves 
of pastoral Fulbe in the area around Douentza in central Mali tend to reproduce 
the hierarchical structure of their masters (Pelckmans 2011, 61). Moreover, while 
Pelckmans’ observation illustrates how the Fulbe slaves reproduced the hierarchi-
cal order of their masters, Inawélène’s account demonstrates that the Bellah-Iklan 
refugees sought to undermine their inter-Bellah cleavages. For Inawèlène, their 
conditions in Abala should prompt the Bellah-Iklan to admit that there were no 
underlying differences between them, which underscores that the peuple noir’s 
identity formation goes hand in hand with undermining the Bellah-Iklan mem-
bership in the Tuareg local clan structures.
4.3 Concluding remarks
This chapter discusses how refugees in Niamey and Abala have transformed the 
negative effects of exile into processes that were creative insofar as they helped 
reconstitute collective identities under conditions of extreme stress and depriva-
tion (cf. Malkki 1989; Marris 1974). The refugees’ discussions evoke a well-known 
scholarly debate on how structural conditions can lead to a sense of commu-
nity among people of heterogeneous social background (Das 1995; Hansen 1997; 
Malkki 1989; Turner 1998). As this chapter has shown, the socio-political condi-
tions under which the free-born Tuareg and the unfree Bellah-Iklan mobilized 
themselves as groups in response to their life situations in exile are somewhat dif-
ferent. In Niamey, the informants’ narratives focused on changes in the free-born 
63 Selected from conversations with Inawélène, Assalim and other Bellah-men on 11/01/2013 in Abala.
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Tuareg political economy; and changing urban economic processes (Youngstedt 
2013). Additionally, the informants interpreted the attitudes of the police, Zarma, 
and Hausa ethnic groups toward them as insults to their noble social status and 
identity. Since men failed to respond to the expectations put on them, they lost 
legitimacy vis-à-vis women as well as their own self-confidence as men within the 
family and beyond. I also argued that men’s inability to support their children and 
to live up to expectations not only affected their sense of being the head of a family 
but also of being nobles and Tuareg men. This situation caused men to feel that 
they have become “useless persons” among adult men, and reinforced feelings that 
they were mistreated as thieves and terrorists.
In Abala, a myriad of regulations imposed by UNHCR have come to under-
mine Inawélène, Assalim, and several other Bellah-Iklan’s capacity to respond to 
the parental and social expectations that have been put on them. These regula-
tions ranged from the registration to food distribution and permission to leave 
and re-enter the settlement in Abala. While men felt reduced to “useless persons” 
by these regulations, they also felt they had become “nothing” by the insults NGO 
workers’ hurl at them. For the refugees, these insults degrade their social age, re-
ducing them from adult men to children in the name of humanitarian efforts. 
These interpretations translated the refugees’ feelings of having lost their former 
status identity and respectability as husbands and adult men.
Apart from these differences in socio-political conditions in Niamey and Aba-
la, the ways in which the two groups of refugees responded to their life situa-
tions in exile are similar. In Niamey, the informants drew on familiar categories 
for explanations such as the prophecies made by the free-born Tuareg old man 
from Djebock; their antecedents since the creation of Malian nation-state in order 
to reflect on these negative effects of exile as shared experiences that rendered 
them “a people.” Therefore, one common point of reference for this people was the 
shared experiences of having been reduced to lesser persons in (adinat n bànan or 
aytedim) Niamey. This, according to them, was followed by previous experiences 
of suffering since the creation of the Malian nation-state. Similarly, in response 
to their situations, the Bellah-Iklan interlocutors also drew upon prophecies by 
Aghamad and antecedents with the free-born Tuareg as well as colonial forces in 
order to interpret their contemporary situations in Abala as a follow up to a longer 
history of collective suffering. They called it “the suffering of the peuple noir,” a 
formulation that presented them as one homogenous collectivity. However, as I 
argue, for refugees in Niamey and Abala, the reconstitution of collective identities 
and the articulation of a sense of communal belonging was predicated on their 
own undoing of, or detachment from, local Tuareg clan structures and affiliations. 
Implied in the informants’ decisions to detach themselves from local structures in 
Niamey was to silence the existing conflicted relationship between the vassal social 
groups and the noble groups since the colonial era (as discussed in  chapter 3). In 
a similar way, the detachment from local clan structures enabled the Bellah-Iklan 
to silence intra-social status category cleavages in Abala. This shows that the terms 
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“tumast” (the people of the Tuareg) and “peuple noir” became instrumental to the 
ways in which the informants imagined themselves as homogenous communities 
in Niger. The following chapter discusses how refugees’ new community forma-
tions define and position themselves vis-à-vis the state and the Malian national 
community.
5. The refugees in retrospect in Mali
On December 2, 2012, the Malian transitional president Dioncounda Traoré 
arrived in Niamey for a two-day visit. The local press commented on this visit, 
acknowledging the role that the Niger authorities had played by hosting several 
thousand Malian refugees. These articles also described this visit as a thank you 
to Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou for his diplomatic support for the 
Malian government while it sought out solutions to the unprecedented multi- 
dimensional problems that had existed in its country since March 2012. During 
the visit, President Traoré decided to meet the Malian refugees living in Niamey. 
The meeting took place at the Malian embassy at the boulevard des Ambassades on 
December 3, 2012 from 3 to 6 pm. Curiously, none of the four informants I had 
documented in Niamey attended the meeting. They stressed that they were not 
Malians, and that they therefore should refrain from attending the meeting. Some 
explained, “tout ce que le Mali a fait depuis 1960” (after all Mali has done since 
1960) to begin or end their personal accounts of the state’s presence in northern 
Mali and how this had gradually affected their group’s socioeconomic situation, 
culminating with their exile in Niger. According to these informants, the coun-
try of Mali’s treatment of the Tuareg excuses them from attending the meeting. 
Similarly, some Bellah-Iklan men had reacted to a Malian ministerial delegation 
that paid a visit to them in the refugee camp of Abala in November 2012. On this 
occasion, Ahiyou publically addressed the former Commandant of the Menaka 
circle, Colonel Adama Kamissoko, who was part of the delegation in the following 
terms: “Whom did you come to visit here? You did not visit us because we are not 
Malians. We are noirs. If we were Malians, the state would have protected us from 
the Tuareg. It would have given us some rights. These are the reasons why we are 
in this refugee camp nowadays.” The two narratives about the two official visits to 
the refugees in Niger illustrate how both groups of informants reconstructed their 
relationships to the Malian state through the lens of their contemporary situations 
in exile.
In this chapter, I examine these central themes from the refugees’ narratives 
about the Malian state in Niamey and Abala. I approach these accounts as a “moral 
matrix” that assesses the Malian state’s politics toward the Tuareg since independ-
ence. Schatzberg uses the notion of a “moral matrix” to refer to implicit cultural 
biases and dispositions that inform people’s evaluations of political legitimacy 
(Schatzberg 2001). To understand the informants’ criticisms of the Malian state, 
I pay attention to their “political imageries” of ideal state−citizen relations. I have 
two primary goals here. The first is to show how the Malian state as a “third party” 
intervenes in the tensions between the Bellah-Iklan and the free white Tuareg. 
Second, I want to trace how the two groups in Niger see themselves in retrospect 
within the Malian nation-state in order to reconstruct their group identities in 
relation to the state and each other. My interpretations of the refugees’ narratives 
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follow Assmann (Assmann 1999; as well as Cole 2003; Connerton 1989; Samaddar 
1999) who stress that a collective memory of persecution or genocide may serve 
as a resource to imagine and construct an alternative future society. The chapter is 
organized in three parts: The first focuses on the narratives recollected in Niamey, 
while the second details the narratives I heard in Abala. The third and final part 
will relate the two perspectives to each other.
5.1	 The	free-born Tuareg relationships to the Malian State since 1960
Several central themes from the free-born Tuareg’s daily conversations in Niamey 
 focused on the beginning of the state’s presence in the north, its “aggression to the 
 Tuareg culture,” the droughts, the free-born Tuareg migrations toward Algeria, Libya, 
and Niger, state repressions of the rebellions in 1963, 1990, and 2012, and,  finally, how 
these events reshaped the refugees’ notions of themselves as a collectivity.
5.1.1 “The beginning of Mali’s presence”
The reconstruction of the beginning of the state’s presence in northern Mali was 
particularly important to free-born Tuareg in Niamey. First, it allowed them to trace 
the roots of what they called “the Tuareg problems with Mali.” Second, through the 
narratives recounting the beginning of the state’s presence, the informants tended 
to define themselves as a homogenous social group and in opposition to “Mali.” 
For example, an old refugee man in his seventies, Acherif Ag Mossa, argued that:
Before 1960, Mali was new to us. To persuade you that Mali was new to us, 
let me tell you a story. In 1960, I was the headmaster of the primary school in 
Boughessa in the Kidal region. There was an old man called Abelessa. Abe-
lessa was too old [he laughs]. He was about 110 years old at that time. After 
classes in the mornings, I used to sit with him in the afternoons. He did not 
know about Mali. One day when Abelessa learned that Modibo Keita [first 
president of Mali] arrived in Kidal, he asked if Modibo had brought Mali 
with him to the Adagh [laugh]. You see this Abelessa thought that Mali was 
a person or a material object one could eat or purchase but not the name of a 
country of which he himself was part.1
This account allowed Acherif to point to the fact that the nomads were ill prepared 
to be part of Mali in 1960, and, therefore, many nomads, like Abelessa, even had 
little knowledge about the southern counterpart they called the Kel Adjous (the 
people of the south). Substantiating Acherif ’s remarks, his friend Alhabib Ag Sidi 
also stated that:
1 Conversation with Acherif Ag Mossa on 27/09/2012 in Niamey.
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I was a small boy in Tessalit in 1960 when the Malian soldiers began to come 
and the French soldiers left. We stood along the road to applaud the Malian 
soldiers arriving in the Adagh. I still remembered that the Bambara got out 
of their cars to greet people. But our parents were not happy about them. 
You know, in our culture young people do not shake older people’s hands 
first. As a younger person, you wait until the older person shakes your hand, 
otherwise he would think that you had no respect for him or her. This was 
what the Bambara did. Another thing that is important in our culture is that 
younger persons do not look older people straight in their eyes. The Bambara 
did this though. I remembered that when they got out of their cars, the sol-
diers shook our parents’ hands first and looked them in the eye, although they 
were younger. We did not like this. They did not respect our culture and us.2
Alhabib Ag Sidi conceived “Mali” as Bambara, the people from the south and vice 
versa. Like Acherif ’s account, Alhabib Ag Sidi also conceived the Tuareg as not 
belonging to “Mali.” Speaking about the nomads’ resentments in the area around 
Tessalit where he was born and had grown up in the same period, Alhabib Ag Sidi 
emphasized that the Tuareg just felt that Bambara had no respect for them. In 
further conversations, he maintained that:
To show you that Mali did not respect us, I will tell you two things. First, Mali 
imposed new rules upon us. To marry, you have to go to the military. They 
took the place of the Kel Essuk who are our marabouts [Islamic teachers]. 
They did everything. Marriage is a religious affair above all. Second, I was at 
school in Tessalit. Our Bambara teachers forced us to speak only French and 
Bambara and at the same time, they considered speaking Tamasheq a crime to 
be punished: You see this. This was to change us. We the Tuareg!3
According to Alhabib, the Malian authorities introduced laws and “the Tuareg” 
had to adopt the new regulations. Henceforth, to marry a woman the nomads 
needed to go to the administrators before Kel Essuk, otherwise the marriage cel-
ebrated by the marabouts alone had no validity. The account also shows that ac-
cording to nomads, the schoolteachers’ insistence on the Tuareg pupils’ speaking 
Bambara was an offense. Alhabib’s concluding assertion, “this was to change us”, 
reflected on how this offense still affected the free born presented in Niamey. This 
was also evident in Albabib’s recollections of the first Tuareg rebellion against 
“Mali,” as I present below.
5.1.2 “The soldiers’ love affairs and their humiliation of the Tuareg”
The first Tuareg rebellion that took place in 1963 was another central theme that 
the town refugees used to comment on what “Mali,” as an external force, had done 
2 Conversation with Alhabib Ag Sidi on 27/09/2012 in Niamey.
3 Conversation with Alhabib Ag Sidi on 27/09/2012 in Niamey.
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to them. Boilley and Lecocq have argued that the first and bloodiest repressed Tu-
areg rebellion in 1963 resulted from the frustrations that Modibo Keita generated 
among the Tuareg (Boilley 1999; Lecocq 2010). For Acherif and Alhabib it was 
precisely the love affairs (tarha) of Malian soldiers that led to conflict between 
Mali and the Tuareg. For example, Alhabib described that:
At that time, the soldiers replaced God Almighty in the north. When the 
Malian soldiers paid visits to our girls at night, they did not like to meet 
other Tuareg young men there. In cases in which they met some Tuareg youth 
there, stories were made up in the following days that denounced these peo-
ple. Most commonly, it was said that they have done something against Mali, 
and for this reason, they were arrested, unveiled, and forced to do manual 
work in the presence of women, wives, and children.4
The metaphorical use of “God almighty” to refer to the attitudes of Malian soldiers 
reflects the extreme effects their authority had upon the nomads as the soldiers did 
whatever they wanted to the “Tuareg.” For example, in terms of their personal love 
affairs, Malian soldiers arrested, unveiled, and forced men to complete manual la-
bor in the presence of women and children, which was humiliating and degrading 
for the Tuareg.
To understand Alhabib’s claim here, it is important to remember the social 
significance of the veil and the implication of unveiling a Tuareg man in public. 
As chapter 4 illustrates, unveiling a free white Tuareg man and forcing him to do 
manual labor in the presence of women, wives, and children undermines his noble 
honor (illulu n ahalis). For Alhabib, this marked the loss of the young Tuareg’s 
sense honor, and this frustrated them, encouraging them to turn against the Malian 
soldiers, and led to the first rebellion. He recollected the story of this rebellion in 
the following terms:
It was just a small problem that occurred between Elladi Ag Alla and a Ma-
lian administrator that turned into the disaster known as the Tuareg Rebel-
lion. The administrator in question was responsible for a post at Boughessa. 
One day, he paid a visit to a girl at night where he met Elladi and his friends. 
As the nomads’ girls were not used to southerners, she was speaking with El-
ladi and his friends in Tamasheq, and they were laughing. The administrator 
thought they were laughing at him since he did not understand Tamasheq. 
He insulted Elladi and his companions. He said to Elladi that he deserved to 
be killed like his father.5 Elladi and his friends profited from the administra-
tor’s inattention to bring his weapon with him […]. It was reported to Mod-
ibo Keita that the Tuareg had seized the administrator’s weapons whereas 
this man was doing something else. Without investigating the incident, 
4 The passage has been selected from a conversation with Alhabib Ag Sidi on 28/09/2012 in Niamey.
5 The father of Elladi was called Alla Ag Albachar. Alla was killed by French troops in 1957 after a 
series of attacks he undertook against the colonial occupation (cf. Boilley 1999).
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Modibo Keita took this information as a declaration of war and launched 
the massacres of 1963.6
This way of reconstructing the rebellion presents the Tuareg as victims of soldiers’ 
abuse. According to Alhabib Ag Sidi, the precipitation of the Malian authorities to 
start with “killing the Tuareg” showed that “Mali” had had its own plan long before 
the encounter between Elladi Ag Alla and a Malian administrator. This view is 
clearly rendered in his recollection of the events during this conflict. He stated that:
Once the rebellion broke out, all the civil servants, apart from the school-
teachers, were systematically replaced by soldiers. This shows that the plan 
was already set. The entire northern part was declared a forbidden zone. Not 
only for human beings, even the animals met in this area were considered re-
bels and for this reason, were fired on by the soldiers. Between 1963 and 1964, 
it was difficult to breathe natural air in the north because of an omnipresent 
smell of death: of entire herds of cattle and their owners. The wells were poi-
soned, which caused the death of several people and animals. Deaths ceased 
to be exceptional events for the Tuareg, they became part of the daily life. 
It was not even considered extraordinary to see women throwing children 
away while fleeing the army. Colonel Muskanani7 is an example of this; all of 
his family members were killed in Menaka. It was someone else passing by 
who found him alone jumping on the immobile body of his mother already 
killed by the soldiers. This person stopped and took him along to Djanet […] 
and then later to Libya. The soldiers occupied every corner of the Azawad. 
Another tactic of the army was to torture people until they told of things they 
had not seen or heard. And, based on such information, people were arrested, 
tortured, and then executed. For example, one day in Tessalit, Mamadou Cis-
soko8 was informed that some people were rebel supporters. He invited the 
whole village to a meeting. He had a list of these nine people. Among those 
people, there were three old women about whom I am sure that they had 
not done anything against Mali. These nine persons on the list were asked 
to join the soldiers in the car. They drove them to the mountain behind the 
military camp situated seven kilometers from the village. Suddenly, we heard 
gun shots [the narrator repeating the sound] and this was the end of the 
day for these people. In other cases, while executing these persons, the army 
forcefully brought family members and relatives to applaud the event. These 
persons were undressed and shot dead in public.9
Here, Alhabib pointed to the far-reaching social consequences of the state’s reac-
tions to Elladi Ag Alla. The narrative form was punctuated with reference to fine 
details such as the names of the people involved, for example, Colonel Muskanani, 
and the children who died under such conditions, and this rendered his account 
6 Selected from conversation with Alhabib Ag Sidi on 28/09/2012 in Niamey.
7 Colonel Muskanani is a member of MNLA.
8 During the rebellion 1963, Lieutenant Mamadou Cissoko was appointed chef d’arrondissement in 
Tessalit.
9 Taken from a conversation with Alhabib Ag Sidi and Acherif on 28/09/2012 in Niamey.
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much more poignant. That was manifested in exclamations: Bissimilahi! or La il-
ahu Mahamadara suru lahi! These assertions were from other people in the court-
yard. The exclamations expressed how they subscribed to these recollections of 
past suffering, with consequences ranging from loss of property and relatives to 
humiliation resulting from the nomad’s loss of honor. Alhabib began by arguing 
that Malian soldiers killed many Tuareg and animals between 1963 and 1964. Sev-
eral others also fled. More importantly for Alhabib, this illustrated their state of 
tiredness. Mothers had no more strength to carry their children. It also expressed 
the extent of sorrow that the migration implied for women. In Alhabib’s terms, 
these women could never be happy again, forever mourning their children who 
had died under such circumstances.
Alhabib found that unveiling these nine people who, in his view, were in-
nocent represented an unveiling of the “public itself ” because people who wit-
nessed the execution shared the social experience of humiliation their relatives 
went through before their executions. For example, from his personal position, 
Alhabib felt humiliated by how the soldiers degraded these people before execut-
ing them. To understand the humiliation of both those who witnessed and those 
who were executed, it is important to relate their claims to the socio- cultural 
context within which the event took place. As my informants explained it, the 
Tuareg’s conception of humiliation is closely linked to their notion of being 
ashamed; it is a feeling of being in conflict with social expectations or ideals 
closely connected to an individual’s social status. This interpretation makes hu-
miliation appear like shame as an instance of social evaluation, measurement of 
the personalities of the actors according to the ideal standards of their societies 
(cf. Olivier de Sardan 1984; Ouattara 1999; Peristiany 1966). The humiliation that 
both those who witnessed the execution and those who were executed felt is 
due to socio-cultural traditional practices: they did not expect to confront each 
other unveiled. As I mentioned before, the veil is the symbol of social distance; 
it regulates conventional interactions between generations and in-laws (Murphy 
1964; Rasmussen 2004).
In further conversations, Alhabib and his friend Acherif further stressed that 
at the end of the war in 1964, an atmosphere of fear reigned in the Kidal region. 
The country had become poorer because “Mali” had shot both the animals and 
people dead. All this was coupled with intensive surveillance that the Malian state 
had introduced in the region, exacerbated by the continued pollution of water in 
the wells resulting in multiple Tuareg deaths in the years that followed 1964 until 
the military putsch, led by Lieutenant Traoré against Modibo Keita. Alhabib Ag 
Sidi and Acherif also understood Moussa Traoré’s regime as a continuation of his 
predecessor’s northern politics. They explained that on his arrival, Moussa Traoré 
removed some leading figures such as Diby Sillas Diarra from the north, and sus-
pended the activities of the US-RDA, including, for example, the dissolution of 
the militia. However, with these exceptions, no substantial change took place, es-
pecially in the Malian policy toward the Tuareg. The stronghold of the soldiers 
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over regions inhabited by the Tuareg remained intact. According to them, this was 
evident in the way in which Moussa Traoré dealt with the droughts in the 1970s.10
5.1.3	 “Mali’s	strategy	against	the	Tuareg,	1973–1974”
My free white Tuareg interlocutors referred to 1973–1974 as the “year of hunger” 
(awatay n laz11). This year of hunger reminded them of the lack of everything: 
food for people as well as animals and material poverty. Their narratives focused 
on the attitudes of the Malian authorities throughout this particular year, which 
they considered a critical moment in their collective history. As the account below 
reflects, some maintained that “Mali” wanted “to finish the Tuareg.”12 Mohamed 
Ag Irgimit recalled:
In fact, toward the end of the 1960s, Keita’s regime had left a very weakened 
and impoverished Tuareg society. Between 1970 and 1973, the remaining an-
imals died because of a lack of grass and water. People had nothing left to 
eat. They died day after day of hunger and measles. The measles came with 
the drought. Under this situation, Tuareg were left to themselves, did not 
get any help from the state. Worse, since the northern regions were isolated, 
humanitarian aid delivered to the state in order to overcome the disaster was 
blocked in the south. People who were not primarily in need of them used the 
donations. In this situation, the only option left to the nomads was to move to 
other countries; thus, like they had during the rebellion, the survivors formed 
small groups of five people for the journey. They had no financial means left 
to travel in vehicles. Also, since their ancestral travel logistics, camels, and 
donkeys were almost inexistent, they walked to Niamey, Djanet, and Bordji. 
Many did not even reach these places. They simply died along the roads due 
to the fact that they were too tired and weak not only because of the length of 
the journey but also because of hunger and sickness. After months and years 
in these countries, the refugees in Niger and Algeria were expelled to Mali. 
For example, I remember that several people were actually collected from 
Hamdallaye and Niamey and sent back to Mali.13
To understand Mohamed’s criticisms toward the Malian state, it is important to 
note his conceptualization of ideal state−citizen relations. These relations, Mo-
hamed suggested in conversations, are made up of mutual obligations and rights. 
In the same way that the citizens have obligations toward the state they also have 
rights, which they could expect from the state. In Mohamed’s view, however, being 
10 In the months that followed Keita’s removal from power, Schatzberg undertook an analysis to 
determine whether there had been more continuity than change among the Malian elite since 
independence. His conclusions suggest that most of the changes were matters of style rather than 
substance in the political thought of Keita and Traoré (see Schatzberg 1972, 11f).
11 Here, I follow Boilley in translating the term awata n laz (1999, 558).
12 They used the French expression, “finir les Tuareg.”
13 Conversation with Mohamed Ag Irgimit, Mossa Ag attaher on 20/09/2012 in Niamey.
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Tuareg people in Mali just means being someone who does not have any funda-
mental rights such as freedom of movement and property rights to protect. For 
example, he stated:
If the state recognized us as its citizens, the humanitarian aid given for the 
Tuareg during the droughts of 1970s and 1980s would not have been confis-
cated in Bamako where people were not in need of anything. I am telling you 
that in Gao and Timbuktu the aid stores were closed. The government refused 
to give us food when we were starving. It was their strategy to exterminate the 
Tuareg [finir les Touareg].14
Mohamed’s interpretation echoes the view of French reporter Philippe Decreane 
who submitted that the Malian authorities attempted to take the drought as an 
opportunity to settle the nomad question once and for all (Lecocq 2010, 237).
5.1.4 “My brothers died on the road (ayitemanin abaten dah zabo)”
The stories of the people who died on the road to Algeria and Libya were also cen-
tral topics of Mohamed Ag Irgimit, Alhabib, and his friend Acherif ’s discourses. 
They used these stories to substantiate their claims about their past sufferings at 
the hands of “Mali.” Often punctuated by interruptions caused by tears upon the 
narrator’s faces, these stories offered insights into understanding the impact of 
the discourses upon those producing them. For example, Alhabib recounted on 
several occasions that:
I left in a small group of eight brothers. We took the roads from Tessalit to 
Bordji, Djanet in southern Algeria where we stayed with Zeyd and other 
combatants who had fled during the rebellion in 1963−1964. After some days 
with those combatants, we took the road to the Algerian and Libyan bor-
ders. But since some of us did not have ID cards, we asked the bus driver 
to stop and we got off before we reached the border checkpoint. Once we 
crossed the Libyan border, there were intensive police stops and army pa-
trols, we moved from one dune to another at night. We slept during the day 
and walked overnight so that we could arrive safely in Tripoli, the Libyan 
capital. Parts of the trip were difficult at times. We only had some biscuits 
and other minor things for nutrition. The difficulty of getting water and food 
weakened us, culminating in the death of three of us [interruption with tears 
on the narrator’s face]; before these three men passed away we found two or 
three dead bodies of other Tuareg from groups ahead of us. Following the 
death of our three brothers, five of us reached Fezzan, a Libyan town where 
several Tuareg lived.15
14 Conversation with Mohamed Ag Irgimit, Mossa Ag attaher on 20/09/2012 in Niamey.
15 Conversation with Alhabib on 20/09/2012 in Niamey.
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This story was crucial to Alhabib’s assessment of “Mali.” Alhabib argued, “If I think 
of Mali since I have left, I just see my brothers who died on the road to Libya. 
Nothing other than this. Mali killed us. That is all.” The notion of “brothers,” which 
underscores the closeness of the group, served as a catchall phrase for Alhabib to 
point to the extent to which he felt the deaths of those who passed away on the way 
to Libya as personal social experiences.
5.1.5 “Blocking the Tuareg from state institutions”
A Tuareg can never become Malian. This is to tell you that a Tuareg remains 
Tuareg in Mali.
—Mohamed Ag Zeyd, Niamey, 29/09/2012.
After listening to my conversations with Alhabib Ag Sidi and Acherif, their friend, 
who I refer to as Mohamed Ag Zeyd, a fifty-five year old man also argued that for 
the first three decades after independence, a central aspect of Malian politics was 
to prevent the nomads’ access to the national army. He explained that even if a 
few Tuareg were recruited by the army, they were always kept at very low ranks. 
He recollected his own experience as a Tuareg in the national army under Moussa 
Traoré in the following:
I was a soldier in the ground forces from 1979 to 1992. I attended the training 
school of subaltern officers in Banankoro near Segu town. Therefore, I served 
at the center for civic training. Each year, our chief who is the current Defense 
Minister, Yamoussa Camara, sent a list for promotions. But since I am Tuareg, 
he never mentioned my name. Even students I trained were given the chance 
and then became my superiors. Whenever I asked, no explanation was given. 
I knew that the reason behind it was not an issue of discipline. I was docile 
enough and fulfilled all my duties well. At some point I realized that the un-
official explanation was that I am Tuareg. I decided then to quit the army and 
Mali. I went to Senegal, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and the 
Maghreb before I settled in Niger.16
For Mohamed Ag Zeyd, leaving the army was his only option, and this has cata-
lyzed his long-standing resentment against the power structure that the military 
hierarchy of Mali had established. It was also the result of his growing awareness 
that there is no room for the Tuareg in the Malian nation-state, just exclusion. 
When he was transferred to the military Base A of Bamako situated in the center 
of the capital, Mohamed tried to learn Bamanankan, the lingua Franca in central 
and southern Mali. He had established good relationships with several “Bambara” 
families in the Bolibana, Ouolofobugu, and Bamako-Coura quartiers surround-
ing military Bases A and B. Despite his knowledge of Bamanankan and his good 
16 Selected from conversations with Acherif, Alhabib, and Mohamed Ag Zeyd on 29/09/2012 in Niamey.
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relationships with neighboring families, the army nevertheless would not trust 
him as a Malian like the others. Mohamed’s anger resulted from the fact he was not 
promoted to the rank of an officer, although he would have been formally  eligible 
to this rank after completing his training at the école des sous-officiers in Banan-
koro. While other, non-Tuareg soldiers were given the opportunity to become 
officers, Mohamed spent almost a decade without a promotion. This made him re-
alize that the reason for his slow advancement was to prevent his later access to the 
officer training school, École Militaire Interarmes (EMIA) at Koulikoro, because 
once he went to EMIA, he would end up in the closed circle of senior officers. In a 
similar conversation, Mohamed Ag Irgimit put that:
In Mali, the Tuareg are not considered human beings yet. They are considered 
like something very similar to a donkey. They have not yet reached the level of 
citizenship because a citizen is someone who has some obligations but also the 
rights that should be guaranteed by the constitution. However, if I as a Tuareg 
enter an office in Bamako today and evoke the Malian constitution, I am sure 
that I would be asked the following question: who are you to evoke the Malian 
constitution? It is so, simply, because I am not considered as someone who 
could become Malian, therefore, a normal Malian. If I say that I have the right 
to be protected by this constitution. They [read: the Malians] would say why 
should I be protected by the constitutional dispositions of Mali? If I keep on 
saying this, I think my only chance would be to have some relatives around. 
Otherwise I would be severely beaten. As such, I believe that a minimum right 
needs to be given to Tuareg. These basics rights are the right to go and come 
back, I mean the freedom of movement, that of property, and presumption of 
innocence. A Tuareg has to be considered as innocent like everybody else in 
Mali until he commits a crime. But this is not the case; it suffices that Tuareg in 
Mali are refused the status of normal citizenship and all other rights.17
Taken together, the ways in which informants presented their experiences of 
“Mali” show that being Tuareg and at the same time Malian are contradictory 
categories. One cannot be both at the same time. This illustrates that the refugees’ 
self-perceptions as “Tuareg” in Niamey town implied that they questioned their 
membership as citizens of the Malian nation. Other conversations that dealt with 
how the Malian state treated free-born Tuareg, Songhay and the Bellah-Iklan peo-
ple differently further substantiated this argument.
5.1.6	 The	State,	Songhay,	and	Bellah-Iklan relationships
A significant part of the refugees’ conversations reconstructing the relations be-
tween free-born Tuareg and the Malian state focused on the civil war in the 1990s 
17 Selected from a conversation with Mohamed Ag Irgimit, his wife, Mossa Ag attaher and Abdine on 
29/01/2013 in Niamey.
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and since 2012 when several other white Tuareg fled. Their conversations centered 
on the argument that the Malian state had created the Songhay and Bellah militia 
to fight against the free white Tuareg. They maintained that “Mali’s support” to 
the Bellah-Iklan and the Songhay vigilant groups against the Tuareg illustrates the 
fact that “Mali” considers these two groups as its Malian citizens rather than its 
“nomads.”
5.1.6.1	 “The	anti-Tuareg campaign between 1994 and 1996”
For informants in Niamey, the civil war between 1994 and 1996 revealed the “hid-
den face of Mali,”18 that is, its role in mobilizing the Songhay vigilante groups. To 
render the role played by the Malian state, especially its military apparatus, against 
the nomads more intelligible, Mohamed Ag Irgimit explained:
When the second rebellion began in late June 1990, the Malian army tried to 
use the same strategies they had used during previous years. These consisted 
of isolating the Tuareg, cutting them off from the rest of the world, and then 
moving on in a violent manner to exterminate them as had been done over 
the past three decades. But, very quickly the Malian state ran into difficulties 
already at the beginning of the rebellion. This was due to the fact that the 
international community was watching the region closely. Several journal-
ists sought to illustrate and denounce the crimes perpetrated by the Malian 
army. In the face of such pressure, the Malian authorities changed their tac-
tics. The security forces organized vigilante groups composed of the Fulani, 
Songhay, and former Bellah against the Tuareg. In 1994, in the midst of the 
conflict, these groups were armed with heavy weapons from the army to put 
targeted violence against the Tuareg into practice. In between 1994 and 1996, 
several systematic attacks took place against the Tuareg. In Gao, the entire 
quartier inhabited by the marabouts [Islamic teachers] was burned. They lost 
everything they had there. There was no action from the army to protect 
them or to prevent the event. Left to themselves, the Kel Essuk took the road 
to Niger. While some settled in the area of Tillabery at the Niger border, sev-
eral others came to Niamey.19
Similarly, another old man in his late sixties still remembered his experience with 
this military campaign in the 1990s against Tuareg in the following terms:
In Gao, I was employed as a guard by soldiers. In addition to this, I mas-
tered the Qur’an. I even did some consultations for many soldiers. In 1991, 
the Songhay and the soldiers began to kill any Tuareg they found in the 
town and around Gao. One day, I went to the market. On my way back, the 
Ganda Koy people arrested me. They brought me to a place where they used 
to shoot the Tuareg dead. I thought then that my life had come to an end 
because obviously they wanted to kill me in one way or another. Meanwhile, 
18 In French: “la face cachée de l’État Malien.”
19 Selected from a conversation with Mohamed Ag Irgimit on 28/01/2013 in Niamey.
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one of my customers, a soldier for whom I did consultations intervened. He 
spoke with them. They did not kill me. This soldier even drove me outside 
the town to where I could get buses to Niger. That was how I came to Nia-
mey. From this scene, I clearly understood that Songhay collaborated with 
the soldiers.20
The informants also presented similar accounts about their escape in 2012.
5.1.6.2	 “The	anti-Tuareg campaign in 2012”
On February 6, 2012, violent events took place in several southern Malian towns. 
Many young people from other ethnic groups carried out systematic attacks 
on the free white Tuareg residing in these towns. For example, in Bamako and 
the surrounding areas such as Kati, many groups of people launched attacks on 
houses, shops, and all other free white Tuareg properties. These attacks resulted 
in the massive displacement of free white Tuareg students and cadres working 
and living in Bamako and Kati toward Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Mauritania, 
and Senegal. The southerners justified these attacks as a response to assassina-
tions of over ninety soldiers from the regular army in the garrison of Adiel-hoc 
in the Kidal region. Most of those soldiers were from the south. According to 
a widespread assumption in the south, the secessionist movement MNLA and 
Ansar Eddine led by Iyad Ag Ghaly carried out the assassinations. Focusing on 
the violence in the south, the informants called it the “anti-Tuareg campaign” (in 
French, la campagne anti-Touareg).21 Mossa Ag Attaher’s cousin, Alou, stressed 
that the reluctance of the authorities to punish those who had singled out Tuareg 
for collective violence proved to him that the state was supportive of these ac-
tions. As Alou put it:
When the conflict began in January 2012, we were still in our village Ebank 
Malen in the neighborhood of Gao town. On March 7, 2012, a group of heav-
ily armed men came to us. They entered the village and went from house to 
house with their guns. In my house, they forced me and other members of 
my family to sit down on the ground. Three men pointed their guns at us. 
After some minutes, one of them called someone, and I guess that was their 
chief, to ask whether they could shoot us. Thank God the person did not let 
them open fire on us. They did the same in all the houses in our village. Those 
who did this were Songhay and Bellah. It was just something against us. They 
told us to leave this country within a week. The Malian government did not 
say anything about this whereas on March 7, 2012, the Malian army had not 
yet been attacked by the rebels. Additionally, the military coup that later led 
to a near collapse of the state, had not yet happened. If the state wanted to 
20 Selected from a conversation with Mossa Ag Attaher, his son, Iba, and the old man who considered 
me to be a policeman from Mali and was introduced in chapter 2.
21 Mossa Ag Atthaher’s son Iba mentioned the example of the Kel Antsar Tuareg who settled near a 
military garrison in Kati-Bamako.
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intervene and even to arrest those who attacked us, they could have done it. 
Since, the Malian authorities did not take action against those who did this, 
we concluded that the state even supported them.22
For my interlocutors, all these experiences are consequences of how the French 
colonial administration dealt with the Tuareg during colonial time as the follow-
ing section explains.
5.1.7	 “If	we	are	in	this	situation	today,	it	is	the	fault	of	French	people”
For the interlocutors the late introduction of school, the medical service, and the 
army ultimately led to Tuareg’ marginalization in the postcolonial state. Most 
prominently, they evoked the role played by the first-educated African elite in the 
struggle for independence, among whom there was no influential free-born Tu-
areg political figure. For them, the absence of an educated elite among the Tuareg 
over time led to a systematic inequality between the northern and southern re-
gions, and to the socioeconomic predicaments affecting the nomads in particular. 
Mossa Ag Attaher’s cousin Alassane, for instance, described the free-born Tuareg 
contemporary predicaments in Niger in the following terms:
I consider French people responsible for all that is happening to us to-
day. They treated people differently. They gave others the chance to go to 
school but denied us the opportunity. People said that we Tuareg refused 
to go to school. But this was not only us. All the others in the south also 
refused to go to school but the French forced them to go to school. They 
did not force us like the others. If they had given us the chance to go to 
school, we would not be where we are today. We were born and have 
grown up like this. As young people, we were struggling to make ends 
meet. Yet, as adults, we are struggling. Our children have no education; 
this is why there is no chance for them to get decent jobs. Still, it is us who 
have to provide our families with everything: milk, sugar, and food even 
though we have grown sons.23
Alassane’s statement substantiates the argument by Crawford Young that to un-
derstand contemporary crises in the African states, we need to pay attention to 
the complex legacy of colonial rule (Young 1988, 26). It questions the colonial 
schooling policy’s treatment of the Tuareg people and how this led to their mar-
ginalization in the postcolonial Malian nation-state. Speaking about the history 
of western education among Tuareg in northern Mali, Ag Litny notes that, in 
contrast to southern Mali, where a western school system was introduced soon 
after its occupation by French conquerors, it took some time before this reached 
the Tuareg country (Ag Litny 1993, 257f.). He states that the first nomad schools 
22 Selected from a conversation with Alou, Mossa Ag Attaher and his son Iba on 23/11/2012 in Niamey.
23 Conversation with Alassane on 03/12/2012 in Niamey.
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were opened in and around Goundam in 1917 for two main groups: the Kel Intsar 
and Tinguereguifs (1993, 258). According to his account, these schools were soon 
closed due to low enrolment, and again reopened in the middle of 1930s and 
early 1940s, respectively. As for the Kel Adagh, Ag Litny indicates that the first 
school was opened in 1947 (1993, 258), almost half a century after the establish-
ment of the first school in the Kayes region in 1886 (Boilley 1999, 219). Follow-
ing Ag Litny (Ag Litny 1992), Boilley contends that the introduction of western 
education resulted in tensions among the Tuareg (Boilley 1999, chapter 6). He 
referred to the nomads’ reluctance to send their children to school as one of the 
reasons for lower rate of schooling in the north. The nomads perceived west-
ern education as a channel through which impious values of the “infidels” were 
transmitted to their children (1999, 222f.). To avoid this path, Ag Litny maintains 
that all kind of tricks were used to hide the children, such as avoiding leaving 
children alone during the recruitment period, or even going as far as to hide 
children in various places: mountains, wells, trees, and tent corners. Instead of 
sending their children to school, the noble Tuareg preferred to send lower clan 
members or former slaves (Ag Litny 1993, 261). The main discrepancy between 
Alassane and Ag Litny’s accounts consists in the responsibility assigned by Ag 
Litny and by Alassane to the nomads for not attending French colonial schools. 
Alassane puts emphasis on the passivity of the colonial administrators. In a sim-
ilar way, Inawélène, Assalim, and Ahiyou related their contemporary exile in 
Abala to colonial policy.
5.2	 	“We	are	just	those	left	behind	in	Mali”:	the	Bellah-Iklan in  
retrospect in Mali
In their everyday discourse, the Bellah-Iklan informants presented the former 
Tuareg slaves as “a people” left behind within the Malian nation-state. The ex-
pression, “we are just those left behind,” points to their marginal socioeconomic 
conditions within the nation-state over the past decades. It also translates how 
they posited themselves as external social group to and in opposition to Mali. 
Their statements assert that these marginal conditions rendered the Bellah-Iklan 
vulnerable, a situation that culminated in their exile in Abala. The informants il-
lustrated these claims by reconstructing their political trajectory from the colonial 
era to the recent conflicts in 2012 when they fled northern Mali.
5.2.1 “What the French did before independence”
Several of the Bellah-Iklan conversations focused on education. Unlike the town 
refugees, in Abala, the informants maintained that a substantial number of the 
Bellah-Iklan had acquired school qualifications under colonial rule. Nevertheless, 
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they complained that although the free-born Tuareg were not educated at all, they 
still held political power, to the detriment of the educated Bellah-Iklan.24
We were the first and are still the most educated in the north. Despite this, the 
French only offered positions like teachers whereas the others with the same 
level in the south were given more responsibility in the colonial administra-
tion and later in the Government of Mali. Despite their skills, the educated 
noirs [read: Bellah-Iklan] were ignored as inhabitants of northern Mali. Mean-
while the Tuareg, who had no education, remained powerful in the colonial 
administration. We remained dependent on them. It seemed to us that the 
outside world took the Tuareg as those who have crafted the “black people,” 
given us our souls, and in consequence we have to depend on them forever.25
According to this statement, the French colonial authorities only employed the 
Bellah-Iklan as schoolteachers. Yet, this, unlike the situation in the south, did not 
allow Bellah-Iklan to gain political influence in the local administration in ways 
that could lead to a weakening of the former ranking system and the rise of new 
status credentials (cf. Schachter Morgenthau 1964; Schulz 2001, 91). This was due 
to the fact that the French still kept the free-born Tuareg in influential political 
positions; thus, the Bellah-Iklan remained in dependent positions until the early 
decades following post-independence Mali.
5.2.2 “Modibo Keita did not do enough”
The informants used the expression, “Modibo Keita did not do enough,” 26 to point 
to their dissatisfaction with Mali’s first postcolonial president in Mali. They crit-
icized Modibo Keita, who, in their view, had not promoted the western educated 
Bellah-Iklan, such as appointing them to influential political positions (in the 
northern regions), which could have enabled the Bellah-Iklan to invert the vectors 
of power relations in the north. Instead, as is reflected in the following passage, 
Keita preferred sending southern administrators to rule the north. Assalim once 
stated that:
What we just saw with Modibo Keita was that the Bambara were at the heart 
of everything. They were sent to the north whereas these southern civil serv-
ants were no more competent than our black educated. Madeira Keita, Bakara 
Diallo, Diby Syllas Diarra could not properly rule the north because they did 
not know who is who and who does what. Such mistakes led to the rebellion 
in 1963. In reality, the Malian authorities were at fault for the rebellion.27
24 They began their arguments by saying: “Ce que les Français ont fait avant l’indépendance.”
25 This passage has been selected from a joint conversation with Ahiyou, Inawélène, Assalim and 
other men on 12/12/2012 in Abala.
26 “Modibo Keita n’a pas assez fait.”
27 Conversation with Assalim on 18/12/2012 in Abala.
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Assalim’s discussions about Keita’s regime offered some insight into debates about 
the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg relationships during the late colonial 
era. As I explained earlier, exploring the socio-political dynamics of the Tuareg 
society in the late colonial rule (1940–1960), Lecocq notes that party competition 
in the post-colonial era resulted in significant transformations in the relationships 
between the former Bellah-Iklan and their former masters (Lecocq 2005). He 
 recalled that a significant number of Bellah-Iklan, especially those belonging to 
the rebellious federations, were freed and settled in the liberty villages (cf. Bouche 
1968). Consequently, they acquired the right to vote. In 1946, for instance, during 
the first elections during which Africans were allowed to vote, the former Bellah 
supported the US-RDA, which had made the emancipation of the slaves the cor-
nerstone of the nomads’ policy. In this context, voting for US-RDA was accord-
ingly equated with voting against the former masters in the Bellah settlements. As 
I understood Assalim, he was not satisfied with the Modibo Keita regime. He crit-
icized the US-RDA because, in spite of former Bellah-Iklan support of the party, 
its leaders did not seek to promote the educated unfree Tuareg, a situation that 
became more pronounced after Keita’s fall.
5.2.3 “It was worse under Moussa Traoré between 1968 and 1991”
The informants emphasized that the Bellah-Iklan situation in the nation-state 
 deteriorated under Moussa Traoré who came to office after the military putsch in 
1968.28 Their narratives focused on how, under the functioning system of  UDPM,29 
the Bellah-Iklan had to withdraw from school.
5.2.3.1	 UDPM-free Tuareg relationships in Menaka
When Moussa created his UDPM in 1978, he only worked with the Tuareg in 
Menaka. The Tuareg were members of the section. This gave them privilege 
to work with the commandant of the circle who was always the comman-
dant of the garrison. For example, the Tuareg partook in the meetings with 
the circle commandant, schoolteachers, and, in brief, all state representatives. 
Everything that the schools, the commandant of circle and soldiers did was 
approved by Hamatou Ag Firhun and later Bajan.30
Assalim’s depiction of UDPM politics echoes Schatzberg’s argument that the 
UDPM was just one state political party like Modibo Keita’s US-RDA (Schatz-
berg 1972). The young military officers who removed Keita from power in 1968 
28 They stated in French: “Le pire a commencé avec Moussa Traoré en 1968 et 1991.” 
29 L’Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM).
30 Conversation with Assalim on 10/11/2012 in Abala.
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put their local party structures at the heart of the decision making in order to 
gain legitimacy. At the national level, the central executive committee, presided 
over by Moussa Traoré himself, was an integral part of the country’s ruling struc-
tures. Furthermore, the UDPM selectively empowered a specific social group to 
the detriment of others as, according to Assalim, the state representatives needed 
the Bajan’s (already introduced as the current political leader of the Ouillimeden 
federation in Menaka) approval before taking action.
Under Moussa Traoré, the Tuareg did whatever they wanted to do to us in 
Menaka because they were all UDPM members. The Bambara commandant’s 
military in Menaka also became friends and relatives of the Tuareg: they mar-
ried their daughters. In addition to their daughters, the Tuareg also gave an-
imals and money to them. You know the Tuareg knew about the Bambara’s 
problem, which was to find women and money. Once they got these, they did 
not care about the rest at all. So, the Tuareg could do whatever they wanted 
to do to people.31
The collaboration between the free-born Tuareg and the representatives in Menaka 
under Moussa Traoré’s rule is evident here. The free-born white Tuareg also de-
ployed other strategies to co-opt state representatives coming from the south, such 
as offering them animals and money and giving them their daughters in marriage. 
As a result of this alliance between state representatives and free-born white Tu-
areg, the Bellah-Iklan continued to find themselves in a very vulnerable and pre-
carious situation.
5.2.3.2	 “We	were	excluded	from	school”
According to Inawélène and Assalim, the free-born Tuareg influence on the state 
institutions in Menaka manifested itself in “the arbitrary expulsion” of Bellah-Iklan 
children from school. Assalim recalled his own expulsion as follows:
I was one of the best children at school. I never repeated a class from the first 
class up to the DEF. When we were preparing for DEF one day I was sitting 
in the classroom when the headmaster came in to ask me to go home. He 
did not give any explanation but just told me that I should never set foot in 
this schoolyard again. I was afraid to ask him why. I went home […] I did 
not know what to do anymore. We did not know anybody else who could 
intervene to ask the headmaster for an explanation. I just stayed at home like 
this. After weeks, since I was good at drawing and art at school, I started to 
do some painting. I developed the idea of choreography. I created my musical 
group later, and the rest is now attaregh [history].32
31 Conversation with Assalim on 10/11/2012 in Abala.
32 Conversation with Assalim and Inawélène on 29/12/2012 in Abala.
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He further argued that:
[…] It was several years after that I learned that there were some Tuareg who 
came to tell our school headmaster to exclude me from the school. Because I 
was good at school, somebody told them this. You know that the Tuareg do 
not like us.33
While Assalim allegedly performed very well as a pupil at school in Menaka, this 
did not protect him against his headmaster’s arbitrary treatment. The last two sen-
tences of his account explain his expulsion as a result of the convergence of in-
terests between free-born white Tuareg and state officials. Bereft of relatives who 
could help him to continue his education, Assalim stayed at home, and subse-
quently embarked on a career as an artist specializing in drawing as well as com-
posing songs that recollect the suffering of the Bellah-Iklan.
Like Assalim, Inawélène believed that the free white Tuareg had him expelled 
from school in spite of his good performance as a pupil. He claimed that:
From my first to eighth grades, I never repeated a year. I always had the best 
marks at school. But since the Tuareg were against us, the schoolteachers 
threw me out. They did not have any other reason. The only thing they had, 
which they did not dare tell me, was that I am black.34
Perhaps, one might tend to take these statements as easy explanations provided 
by both interlocutors. However, when they are examined in context, Assalim and 
Inawélène did not blame their schoolteachers who expelled them from school. 
Instead, they saw this as evidence of the free-born Tuareg’s broader political strate-
gies to block their personal futures and, accordingly, the future of the Bellah-Iklan 
that the informants now called the peuple noir. For both informants, the free white 
Tuareg were aware of the fact that in the long run, education might become one 
axis through which the unfree Tuareg could invert the vectors of local power rela-
tions in the north. Thus, in order to prevent such a situation, they began to identify 
all good Bellah-Iklan school children and excluded them from school. This em-
phasis reveals that Assalim and Inawélène sought to articulate their group history 
through their particular experiences of school in Menaka.
5.2.3.3 “The Tuareg were highway robbers in Menaka at that time”
Both men explained that another consequence of the alliance between the state 
and the free-born Tuareg was evident in the frequency of highway robbery that 
primarily targeted the Bellah-Iklan. Inawélène recollected his own experiences in 
the following passage:
33 Conversation with Assalim and Inawélène on 29/12/2012 in Abala.
34 Conversation with Inawélène on 01/01/2013 in Abala.
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Once in 1986, I went to a local market. On our way back, we were in a bus, we 
encountered the Tuareg in the forest. They stopped us. They first asked the red 
people like them to sit aside before proceeding to take everything, such as tea 
and sugar, from us. When we returned home, we denounced these persons 
to the authorities in Anderboukane. But no action was taken against them.35
For Inawélène, even though the bandits had covered their faces with turbans, the fact 
that they asked other free white Tuareg to sit aside showed that they were Tuareg them-
selves. Inawélène’s suspicion was further reinforced when they (read: the victims) in-
formed the authorities in Menaka upon their arrival and no action was taken in order 
to identify and arrest the bandits. His explanation for this was that those who were in 
a position to take such action were influenced by the UDPM local section members 
who knew that the bandits were their relatives. Similarly, Anawélène also stated that:
My father had left some animals with a Dawsahak for whom he was working. 
I went to collect these animals from the Dawsahak near Anderboukane. My 
father left three cows and a few goats and sheep with him. I collected them 
from the Dawsahak man. But since I was alone on the way back to Menaka, 
the same Dawsahak came to take the animals from me by force between An-
derboukane and Menaka. I could not do anything otherwise he would have 
killed me. Once I reached Menaka, I went to inform the gendarmerie the same 
day about what had happened. But nothing happened to the Dawsahak man.36
Here again he pointed to the passivity of the gendarmes who did not take action 
against the Dawsahak. Considering these accounts, coupled with those above, 
highlights how both Assalim and Inawélène understood the conditions under 
which they were thrown out of school and experienced highway robbery as being 
indicative of political processes that empowered the free-born Tuareg. They un-
derstood these as results of collaboration between Malian authorities and the free 
white Tuareg, a process that further marginalized the unfree-born Tuareg in the 
area around Menaka. According to this perspective, the free-born Tuareg were not 
marginalized by “Mali” as they claimed, quite the opposite. They were empowered 
to the detriment of the Bellah-Iklan. Both informants argued that the empower-
ment of the free-born Tuareg in the decision-making spheres has even become 
more pronounced under the contemporary processes of multi-party democracy 
launched after the fall of Moussa Traoré in March 1991.
5.2.4	 “Since	1990,	the	State	has	handed	us	over	to	the	Tuareg”
Recent scholarly debates have called into question the master narratives that multi-
party democracy introduced in tandem with decentralization would  improve 
35 Selected conversations with Inawélène and Assalim on 28/12/2012 in Abala.
36 Selected conversations with Inawélène and Assalim on 28/12/2012 in Abala.
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African governance (see Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 1998; Ferguson 2006; Klute/
Trotha 2004). It was expected that the decentralization would result in increasing 
political participation among grassroots people by both facilitating their access to 
national resources and making their voices heard in the decision-making processes. 
However, according to Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, these political reforms 
became characteristic of the expansion of the clientship and corruption to the local 
arenas (Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 1998, 4). Klute and Trotha also submitted 
that these political processes have led to the establishment of the para-sovereignty 
of the former masters among the Tuareg in northern Mali (Klute/Trotha 2004). For 
Assalim, Inawélène, and Ahiyou, the political reforms in the 1990s generated pro-
cesses that further empowered the former masters.Their comments centered spe-
cifically on the “militarization” and the economic reinforcement of the free white 
Tuareg and how these factors led to a situation which Assalim and Inawélène called 
“the total domination of the Tuareg” over the north.37
5.2.4.1	 “The	State	militarization	of	the	Tuareg	in	the	army	since	1996”
In the refugee camp in Abala, the informants used the expression “militarization 
of the Tuareg” to point at the massive integration of the Tuareg ex-combatants 
into the national army after their second rebellion. This integration increased the 
political influence of the free-born Tuareg in the north. Assalim reconstructed this 
process in the Menaka area in the followings terms:
After the fall of Moussa Traoré, around 1993, Mali came to recruit many young 
Tuareg for the army in the Menaka area. I still remember how they did it. 
They went from family to family to write the names of people even if they 
were absent. For example, Papa and his brother were both in Tamanrasset. 
But their names were written down. They wrote the names of several even 
inept people, for example, those who did not know how to write their names. 
This is how they became soldiers officially in the Malian army. They refused 
to include us in this process. Even if you look at the list of the soldiers in the 
Malian army today, there is no one from our side […] whereas we have the 
most robust men who would never go against the Malian state. They are really 
the most suitable men for the army. But these men were and are still refused 
by the government.38
A further problem that Assalim and several other Bellah-Iklan men seemed to 
have with this integration was the following: The state transferred all the new Tu-
areg soldiers to where they originally came from. For example,
Assalat was in Menaka, Bamoussa was in Anefis and Gamou was somewhere 
in the north. All these three figures are Tuareg. Additionally, most of the 
37 In French, they stated: “Depuis 1990, l’État nous a livré aux Touareg.”
38 Selected from conversations with Assalim, Ahiyou, Inawélène and four other men together on 
24/12/2012 in Abala.
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subalterns and soldiers in these garrisons were members of their clans, and 
the rest a few soldiers from the south who did not know anything in the 
north.39
For the Bellah-Iklan, the consequence of the free-born Tuareg integration into 
the army has been the generalization of insecurity in the north. For example, in 
further conversations, Assalim stressed that, in the area around Menaka, these 
free-born Tuareg soldiers did not even go to their military garrisons. Instead, they 
joined their relatives in the bush with their arms and bullets. With these arms in 
the bush, they regularly ambushed buses transporting the Bellah-Iklan merchants. 
Or they even went to villages where the Bellah-Iklan lived to kill “some of them” 
and take their belongings in some other cases. Assalim recollected some acts per-
petrated by the free-born Tuareg below:
One day last year [read: 2011], I was on my way to Essailal. On my arrival near 
Agadaw, I found seven young men—all black people—freshly shot dead by 
the Tuareg. After killing them, they took their animals to Menaka. Everybody 
knows about this event in Menaka and those who did it. In the same manner, 
Mahmoud was killed in Anderboukane. Nothing happened. The Tuareg have 
put a regime of terror in place.40
For Assalim, the Tuareg soldiers were the perpetrators of this attack. However, as 
Assalat was the military chief in Menaka and Bajan the deputy, and both closely 
collaborated with the commandant of the circle from the south, no actions were 
taken against the perpetrators.
5.2.4.2	 “The	NGOs	also	worked	for	the	Tuareg”
Inawélene also argued that the NGOs and other state structures that invaded the 
northern regions in the 1990s only privileged the free-born Tuareg. For example, 
he maintained that in the area surrounding Menaka, whether qualified or not, all 
young free-born Tuareg were given positions in the NGOs. He stated:
Despite the fact that we are 85% of the population in Menaka, we have nothing, 
no position with the NGOs. We have several intellectuals without work, teach-
ers, graduated executives. With all these qualifications, we were left behind. 
It was always the Tuareg who did not reach even the fourth grade at the ele-
mentary school who were appointed by NGOs and the state administration.41
In another conversation he added that, for example,
39 Selected from conversations with Assalim, Ahiyou, Inawélène and four other men together on 
24/12/2012 in Abala.
40 Selected from conversations with Assalim, Ahiyou, Inawélène, and four other men together on 
24/12/2012 in Abala.
41 Conversation with Ahiyou and Inawélène on 08/01/2013 at Abala.
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Whenever there have been food distributions in Menaka, they have always 
targeted the Tuareg. We only saw our neighbors with millet, rice, and some-
times clothes. Even if we go, we won’t get anything and you cannot complain 
about it. Complaining will put your life in danger. Because Mali have armed 
the Tuareg in such a way that they are able to kill people and not face any 
consequences.42
The two accounts together point to how NGOs have contributed to further mar-
ginalize the Bellah-Iklan. They express the Bellah-Iklan informants’ perception of 
the state and NGOs as complementary forces that supported the free-born white 
Tuareg against them. Substantiating this claim, Ahiyou argued:
Mali took our freedom from us and gave it to the Tuareg. To tell you the truth, 
we are not even refugees. Because where we left we did not have a country. 
That is all. We are those left to ourselves. No one cares about us. It is the Ma-
lian government that took our rights from us to give them to the Tuareg. This 
is the result of everything because we did not have any rights. We were not 
Malians because we had no rights in Mali.43
To understand Ahiyou’s claim here requires us to look into his “political imagery” 
of the state. Ahiyou further claimed that a state should treat all citizens equally, as 
once it fails to do so, “it ceases to be what it claims to be, that is, a political appara-
tus for the interest of all.” Through similar statements, the refugees challenged the 
legitimacy of the Malian state below.
5.2.5	 “Our	expulsion	from	Mali	in	2012”
For the informants in Abala, the longer process of the Bellah-Iklan marginaliza-
tion that began following the colonial era culminated in their humiliation and 
expulsion from “Mali” by the free-born Tuareg. Ahyiou emphasized that, in the 
area around Menaka, the Malian soldiers left without shooting one bullet, leaving 
several vehicles and equipping them with everything else. According to him, the 
attitude of the Malian soldiers should be seen in the light of the subsequent de-
velopment of cooperation and collaboration between the Malian government and 
the Tuareg dating from the creation of UDPM. What substantiates this claim, for 
Ahiyou, is the commemoration of the fifty years of independence in 2010 to which 
he referred. He recalled that during this commemoration, the then president of 
Mali, ATT, was sitting next to many other officials at the military parade for more 
than three hours. Since Ahiyou followed this event on TV, he emphasized that that 
day there were all sorts of heavy equipment for the ground forces as well as the 
air forces that were shown to the people in Bamako. But what puzzled him in 2012 
42 Conversation with Ahiyou and Inawélène on 08/01/2013 at Abala.
43 Conversation with Ahiyou and Inawélène on 08/01/2013 at Abala.
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was that the Malian army then made no use of these weapons in the north in order 
to protect the Bellah-Iklan who were attacked by the free-born Tuareg. Ahiyou 
interpreted this—the state being without these weapons—as a conspiracy between 
the Malian army and the Tuareg against the Bellah-Iklan. He took this argument 
further in the following:
The reason why the soldiers left without using one bullet was simple, because 
they were just told to leave us in the hands of the Tuareg. It was the president, 
ATT, himself who left us at the hands of the Tuareg. Everything was ready. 
Once the soldiers left, those who had been given the job to kill us began their 
actions. They were ready in the mountains surrounding Anderboukane. They 
opened fire on us [the narrator repeating the omnipresent gun sound]. Over 
an entire day, bullets rained in Anderboukane. There was great confusion in 
all these things that happened outside of Menaka. It was even difficult for us 
to know exactly whether or not the soldiers had partaken in this violence 
against us. For example, they left their garrisons to join the Tuareg. It was 
very difficult for us to know exactly what was happening. However, one can 
be sure about one thing: someone gave the order to fire at us.44
Accordingly, this statement expresses Ahiyou’s strong conviction that the Malian 
state had made a deal with the Tuareg to kill the Bellah-Iklan. This arrangement 
between the Malian soldiers and the free-born Tuareg, according to Ahiyou, be-
comes more evident to anyone who wants to comprehend the events surrounding 
the way that the former abandoned their garrisons without any resistance.
Supporting Ahiyou’s view, Assalim stressed that if there was nothing concluded 
between the Tuareg and the Malian state as such, rebels could not have taken Menaka 
and the garrison of Gao so easily. For Assalim, in Menaka, the soldiers knew that 
there would be an imminent attack and for this reason they left their garrison in the 
morning before the rebels had arrived. Assalim and Ahiyou’s comments on the vio-
lent events in 2012 denied that there was even a war between the Malian soldiers and 
the Tuareg rebels in the north. They considered that there were only assassinations 
and expulsion of Bellah-Iklan by Tuareg supported by the Malian state. Assalim re-
called the assassinations and expulsion in the area around Menaka as follows:
The Tuareg had intimate knowledge of the houses where we lived and where 
our belongings were. They entered house after house to expel us. Our neigh-
bors were among those who entered our houses. When they entered a house, 
they first targeted the men. They captured the men, beat them up, and tied 
them down in front of their family members. They took the women and 
daughters to Tahabanate where these were raped by several Tuareg for days. 
They also looked for everything else like motorbikes, clothes, and money. 
They took all the valuable objects seen in these houses. They then asked that 
we leave within minutes.45
44 Selected from conversations with Ahiyou, Aghaly and Assalim on 08/01/2013 in Abala.
45 Selected from conversations with Ahiyou, Aghaly and Assalim on 08/01/2013 in Abala.
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Assalim’s cousin Aghaly, about sixty years old, related another scene revealing the 
ways in which the Tuareg treated them as follows:
After the army left, we were degraded in the north, treated like dogs. I saw 
two young boys of around 16 years old passing by in the street in Menaka. In 
front of them there was a group of armed Tuareg on the street corner. Among 
them, there was a young Dawsahak man who claimed to his companions that 
he was the most skillful at shooting […] then he just looked at these two boys 
and opened fire on them. One fell down and died a few minutes later on their 
side, I saw the young Dawsahak man and companions celebrating his success-
ful act in killing the boy. This happened in the town of Menaka. Several cases 
similar to this happened in the bush where no witnesses were around. They 
did the same to Mohamed, a shop owner. The young Dawsahak man entered 
his shop to tie up and strangle him to death. Then they took everything they 
wanted from this shop to their homes.46
According to Assalim, though there are many reasons for these assassinations, 
particularly the following: the demographic number of the Bellah-Iklan. As 
mentioned earlier, the Bellah-Iklan refugees in Abala believed that they were 
numerically the majority in the north. To them, if democracy meant power of 
the majority, they should have been given the legitimacy to govern the north, 
especially in Menaka. Since the free-born Tuareg were aware that a day would 
come when there would be a reliable government in Mali, which would do a 
proper census of the population and implement democracy, the Bellah-Iklan 
would rule these regions. To avoid such situations in the future, it was argued 
in Abala, that the free-born Tuareg had expelled the Bellah-Iklan from their 
homeland.
5.2.6	 “Men	humiliated	during	their	expulsion	from	Mali”
My Bellah-Iklan informants also argued that their expulsion entailed humiliation 
for many men. Here, their notion of humiliation referred to situations in which 
they felt degraded and ashamed vis-à-vis women and children since they failed to 
act as heads of the families. For example, Inawélène said:
When I was leaving Anderboukane with my family, we did not have anything 
but a donkey cart. As you might know, you cannot take all your belongings in 
such a situation. We took what we could from our home. But on the way to 
Chinagodrar I met some Tuareg in a car. The car stopped and they proceeded 
to check what we had in our cart. Thus, they took my chairs, blankets and 
everything that they fancied from us. I knew the persons who did this to me. 
They humiliated me in front of my wives and children.47
46 Selected from conversations with Ahiyou, Aghaly and Assalim on 08/01/2013 in Abala.
47 Conversation with Inawélène on 03/01/2013 in Abala.
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Inawélène established that stopping his cart followed by taking their chairs, blan-
kets, and other belongings in front of his wives and children had humiliated him. 
He further explained:
As the head of the family, my wives and children count on me. When people 
take our belongings, and I am unable to do anything to get these things back, 
they will stop counting on me. And this is what I am not happy about; it has 
degraded me in the family.48
As a result, Inawélène and several other men at the hangar believed that their 
inability to take action against the free-born Tuareg when fleeing Mali partially 
contributed to their loss of respect as the family’ provider. On several occasions, 
the informants in Abala argued that their wives constantly reminded them that if 
they were men, they should have taken action against the MNLA militants. Such 
comments from women further reinforced male Bellah-Iklan resentment toward 
their living situation in the refugee settlement in Abala. The comments also ena-
bled male refugees to interpret their situations in Abala as the result of fallout from 
political processes rooted in Malian state politics around Menaka.
5.3	 How	the	two	perspectives	relate	to	each	other?
The two groups of refugees’ accounts of their respective marginal situation within 
the Malian nation-state correspond to what Schatzberg has called the cultural 
logic of legitimacy in middle Africa (Schatzberg 2001). He argues that:
Political legitimacy in this corner of the globe rests on the tacit normative 
idea that government stands in the same relationship to its citizens that a 
father does to his children. In turn, this normative idea ultimately derives 
from a pervasive, yet largely unarticulated, conceptual understanding of the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities within a highly idealized family. 
(Schatzberg 2001, 1)
Schatzberg’s argument is helpful here because it enables us to grasp how both 
groups of refugees reconstruct their trajectories within the nation-state in contrast 
to each other. The refugees relied on the specific social dynamic of marginaliza-
tion/integration, which is interdependent for them. The informants in Niamey 
deplored the fact that the colonial and postcolonial states did not treat the Bel-
lah-Iklan and the free white equally. They compared their marginal situations 
within the nation-state to the Bellah-Iklan who, as it was argued in Niamey, have 
had privileged positions since the colonial period. The informants for example, 
took the recent Bellah-Iklan and the Songhay attacks on the free white Tuareg as 
evidence that substantiates their claims. In these situations, the free white Tuareg 
48 Conversation with Inawélène on 03/01/2013 in Abala.
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informants found that the Bellah-Iklans’ privileged position readily manifests it-
self through the fact that the state did not punish them for their actions against the 
free white Tuareg around Gossi. The town informants also insisted that there had 
been attacks against the free white Tuareg in southern Mali in 2012. They argued 
that, as had happened in Gossi, the state did not seek to punish the Bellah-Iklan 
for their wrongdoings. For the free-born Tuareg informants in Niamey, this il-
lustrates the imbalance in the state politics between the Bellah-Iklan and the free 
white Tuareg. For the Bellah-Iklan, the proof that they were the ones “left behind” 
in Abala was evidenced by the privileged positions that the colonial and postco-
lonial states gave to the free white Tuareg. They thus measured their social and 
political marginal positions of being left behind to the easy situations faced by the 
free white Tuareg. According to the Bellah-Iklan, the free white Tuareg’s privileged 
position was underscored in the influence the Tuareg had on the state apparatus 
since the Modibo Keita and Moussa Traoré eras. The Bellah-Iklan also argued that 
while the state massively integrated the free white Tuareg into the army, it refused 
to recruit the former Tuareg slaves.
To use Schatzberg’s logic, these comments together suggest an analogy of the 
two refugee groups as two children of one father (the state), who treated his chil-
dren unequally. As a result, each child questioned the father’s legitimacy. Schatz-
berg argues that when the state acts as a political father
care for, nurture, and provide wealth for their children, their political legiti-
macy is enhanced. When, on the other hand, economic conditions deterio-
rate and they are no longer able to nurture the population in this way, their 
political legitimacy will decline markedly. (Schatzberg 2001, 24)
As seen in the refugees’ reactions to the Malian governmental delegations de-
scribed earlier in this chapter, both groups of informants claimed that they are 
not Malians. They considered their experiences of being marginalized within the 
Malian state as their shared history and the reason for redefining themselves as 
collectivities. For example, in Niamey, after listening to some recent stories from 
free-born Tuareg who had recently fled Mali, earlier refugees such as Mossa Ag 
Attaher and Mohamed Ag Irgimit maintained that “this only happened to you 
because you are Tuareg.” In some other cases, the narrator added: “My conclu-
sion was that I am only a Tuareg but not a Malian like the others. Being a Tuareg 
brought me where I am today.” Some others vehemently responded to people who 
called them Tuareg from Mali or Malian: “I am not Malian, I am Tuareg.” Instead 
of Malians, they referred to themselves as coming from tenere, therefore Kel Tenere 
(bush people), or they would refer to themselves as members of the tumast tan Kel 
Tamasheq (the Tuareg people). These answers illustrate that the town refugees to 
whom I spoke articulated their Tuareg identity in response to their experiences of 
marginalization. Similarly, the reconstruction of the Bellah-Iklan’ past in Mali was 
strongly correlated to the construction of a concrete identity: that of the black peo-
ple (peuple noir) as a distinct and homogenous social group. The informants saw 
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themselves as a victimized group, “those abandoned to themselves” or “left behind 
by the state and international donors.” Their interpretations of their situations as 
victims of Tuareg and extra-local actors illustrate that political processes within 
the Malian state over the past decades have become the common reference point 
for the redefinition of Bellah-Iklan history and identity. Taken together, therefore, 
the refugees’ narratives substantiate some scholars’ arguments (Cole 2003; Con-
nerton 1989; Samaddar 1999) that people can turn their experiences of persecution 
into processes of imagining their future societies.
5.4 Concluding remarks
Throughout this chapter, Schatzberg’s notion of the “moral matrix” has proven to 
be a helpful heuristic to understand what “political imageries” informed the nar-
ratives by which different groups of refugees posited themselves as being external 
to the Malian state (Schatzberg 1986; Schatzberg 2001). The refugees’ narratives, 
in turn, depicted the Malian state as “a third party” in the conflicting relations 
between the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg since the colonial era. Due to 
this crucial role, each group of informants pointed to the fact that the colonial and 
postcolonial state institutions have meant that “Mali” has failed to become an in-
clusive political order that grants equal rights to all citizens. As a result, both groups 
of informants conceived themselves as groups outside the Malian  nation-state na-
tional community. While similar narratives have already been  examined for the 
free white Tuareg in other contexts (e.g. Boilley 1999; Claudot-Hawad 1990; Klute 
2013; Lecocq 2010), the accounts from Bellah-Iklan informants about the state pol-
itics provide insights into debates about Tuareg marginalization in northern Mali. 
Their arguments invite careful consideration of how national political processes 
shaped local power relations, particularly the relationships between the free-born 
Tuareg and Bellah-Iklan in recent decades. This implies that when we speak about 
the marginalization of the Tuareg in the north, we would then need to clarify 
which social segment we are dealing with. Earnestly taking local cleavages into 
account provides a good starting point for a complex analysis of the state presence 
in the north over the past decades. Such analysis would include both Bellah-Iklan 
and the free white Tuareg voices, thus complementing a tradition of mono-vocal 
discourses about the marginalization in northern Mali mostly based on the per-
spective of the free white Tuareg (Boilley 1999; Claudot-Hawad 1990; Klute 2013; 
Lecocq 2010).

6.  “The true history of Azawagh”	(tarekhg wan	tidit	n	
Azawagh)
Speaking the Tamasheq language does not make someone a Tuareg.
—Assalim Ehatt, Abala on 01/01/2013.
This chapter focuses on the central themes of the arguments refugees with whom 
I interacted regularly used to define the physical and moral characteristics of the 
two collectivities to which they expressed attachment. In their everyday conver-
sations, refugees in Niamey and Abala maintained that these arguments offered 
“the true history of the desert” (tarekhg wan tidit n Azawagh).1 This “truth” con-
sists of stereotypes by which the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg set them-
selves apart as two separate racial and moral categories. Characteristically, these 
accounts redefine the criteria of who belongs and does not belong to the Tuareg 
group. The accounts involved detailed descriptions of free-born Tuareg and the 
Bellah-Iklan’s physical features, arguments about as the first comers to northern 
Mali, and about the historical processes by which “Islam” spread across the Sahel 
and led to the emergence of a Muslim majority. A guiding concern of the chapter 
is to demonstrate how the Bellah-Iklan in Abala and the free-born Tuareg in Nia-
mey used derogatory terms to reconstruct and imagine themselves as internally 
homogenous and morally opposite social groups. The chapter will also assess how 
talking about each other negatively enables the two groups of informants to re-
define their inferior social status in Tuareg society back home in northern Mali. 
My analysis of refugees’ labeling draws on Brenner’s discussion of how Muslim 
identities are constructed in southern Mali (Brenner 1993), Hall’s insights into ste-
reotyping (Hall 1997), and work on classification by Tambiah (Tambiah 1985).
As I mentioned in chapter 3, scholarly research on the Tuareg society tends to 
frame differences between the free-born Tuareg and the Bellah-Iklan in terms of 
racial features,2 different tasks performed in a hierarchical division of labor, and 
genealogical origins. Scholars have also divided the Tuareg into two major groups, 
depending on their free or unfree status. Many scholars note further differences, 
such as restrictions on the obligatory social conduct for nobles and that Lecocq 
understood under the term “temushagha” (meaning the way of the noble) (Lecocq 
2010). For example, drawing on the free-born Tuareg’s notion of intelligence (tay-
ite in Tamasheq), Gunvor Berge argues that free Tuareg view the mind frames of 
free persons and slaves as naturally given and not as culturally constructed in the 
following terms:
1 They are alternatively called the desert Azawad, or Azawagh. These were used as terms in Niamey 
and Abala to refer to the territory covering the three northern regions of what is currently Mali 
(Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu).
2 The authors conceived the free-born Tuareg as “red” or “white,” and the unfree Bellah-Iklan as 
“black” (Hall 2011a; Hall 2011b; Hall 2005;Klute 1992b; Lecocq 2005; Lecocq 2010).
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[…] Both free persons and slaves have intelligence, but of a different nature 
[…]. Furthermore, a free or noble person knows shame and honour, which 
restrains his or her conduct. Slaves, by contrast, do not know shame or hon-
our and behave, by nature, in an unrestrained way. This becomes apparent 
in a person’s bearing, for example, in the way in which one dances or sits. 
Free persons dance rather stiffly and slowly, while slaves dance unrestrainedly 
with more movements. Slaves, male and female, sit on their heels (a shame-
less posture as it is associated with defecation), whereas free men proudly sit 
upright and cross-legged, and free women lie elegantly on their sides. But 
free persons also believe that slaves are unable to understand religious duties, 
(being by nature thievish and deceitful), lack endurance, and cannot fend for 
themselves. Hence, slaves need to be cared for and protected. (Berge 2000, 
204f. quoted in Lecocq 2005, 55f.)
Lecocq has argued that for many free-born Tuareg hard manual labor is unbefit-
ting and that instead,
a free man should occupy himself only with pastoral affairs, trade, religion, or 
warfare. Depending on region and caste, free women should not work at all or 
engage only in pastoral activities, religion, or the household. (Lecocq 2005, 56)
For Klute, the preferred present-day professions stem from this labor ethic (Klute 
1992a; Klute 1992b). For example, exploring contemporary labor divisions in post-
droughts and rebellious societies among the Tuareg in northern Mali, Lecocq fol-
lowing Klute argues that:
being a car driver or mechanic is seen as a modern equivalent to being in-
volved in pastoral affairs. Commerce, especially transnational smuggling, is 
seen as a logical follow-up to the caravan trade, and the 1990–1996 rebellion 
gave young men ample chance to prove their warrior skills. (Lecocq 2005, 56)
These ways of framing the differences between the free-born Tuareg and the 
 Bellah-Iklan were not only scholarly schemes of classifications of the Tuareg society. 
Instead, they were also local conventionalized ways in which the free-born Tuareg, 
until now, presented their relationship with the Bellah-Iklan.3 In the following, I 
shall show how the arguments of the two groups of refugees in Niger redefined 
these local conventionalized ways in which the relations between the free-born Tu-
areg and the Bellah-Iklan were expressed throughout everyday social interactions. I 
argue that both groups of informants redefined these conventional categorizations 
of the free-born Tuareg and Bellah-Iklan in consideration of their long-standing 
conflicted relationship. While the first part of the chapter discusses the arguments 
of free-born Tuareg in Niamey, the second part explores the perspectives of my Bel-
lah-Iklan interlocutors in Abala. In the concluding part, I will relate the perspectives 
adopted by the two groups of Tuareg refugees towards each other.
3 The Bellah-Iklan informants’s arguments show that there are long-standing inter-Bellah-Iklan 
conversations that contest this social order.
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6.1	 	“The	true	history	of	the	desert”	according	to	the	free-born Tuareg in 
Niamey
On Friday, September 14, 2012, at the very beginning of my research in Niamey, 
Ibrahim Ag Mohamed picked me up so we could visit Mossa Ag Attaher at Pla-
teau. After we had exchanged the common greeting and sat down next to the ket-
tle, Mossa started inquiring about my research: how long was I going to stay in 
Niamey and was I interested only in Tuareg refugees? When I explained to him 
that I was interested in Tuareg refugees who lived in Niamey as well as those stay-
ing at refugee camps on the southern Nigerian/Malian border, Mossa Ag Attaher 
maintained that if I was interested in Tuareg refugees in Niger, then I should stay 
in Niamey. After all, he pointed out, Tuareg refugees were to be found exclusively 
in Niamey and in Tellia, near Tahoua in central Niger.
I found this statement remarkable; clearly, it was not motivated by concerns 
about my personal safety in a context fraught by the presence of transnational 
terrorist networks since the early 2000s (cf. Keenan 2013; Klute 2012; Olivier de 
Sardan 2012; Schulz 2016). Rather, his remark implied that people in the refugee 
camps of Mangaize, Ouallam, and Ayorou were Bellah-Iklan, the “black” (koual, 
amikwal or takawalt) but not “Tamasheq” (read: Tuareg). When I replied that I 
had read newspaper and internet reports about the many Tuareg living in refugee 
camps in Niger, Mossa Ag Attaher candidly explained to me that many people 
mistakenly considered “the black” (takawalt) that is, the Bellah-Iklan, as being 
“Tuareg,” while there were not; for the Tuareg, the Bellah-Iklan are “Gawboro” (an 
alternative term used by free-born Tuareg to refer to the Songhay),4 he insisted. To 
support this view, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed argued that the Bellah-Iklan themselves 
were well aware that they are not Tuareg, adding that during the civil war in the 
early 1990s, when he himself had fled the country, the Bellah-Iklan had joined the 
Malian army and the Songhay vigilante groups to fight against the Tuareg.
I found this conversation noteworthy for several reasons. It upset my under-
standing of Tuareg society as comprising free-born Tuareg and unfree Bellah-Iklan, 
who also counted as Tuareg (see chapter  3). Mossa and Ibrahim restricted the 
label “Tuareg” (Tamasheq) to the former group and argued that although the 
 Bellah-Iklan speak the Tamasheq language, they are not part of Tuareg society (the 
Kel Tamasheq) but are Songhay. The conversation also revealed that the civil war 
in the 1990s, which had forced free-born Tuareg to flee, cast a shadow on Ibrahim’s 
classification of the Bellah-Iklan, prompting him to argue that their support of the 
Songhay vigilante groups proved that they were not Tuareg. In the weeks that fol-
lowed this initial conversation, Mossa, Ibrahim, and other free-born Tuareg in-
formants in Niamey listed various reasons that spoke against the Tuareg identity of 
the Bellah-Iklan. The following discussion takes a closer look at these arguments, 
exploring how they allowed free-born Tuareg in Niamey to depict the Bellah-Iklan 
4 See also Olivier de Sardan (1984).
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as racial “others” as well as “non-Tuareg.” I argue that by labeling the Bellah-Iklan 
in this way, free-born Tuareg imagine themselves as a homogenous social category 
(i.e. deny status differences among themselves), and, accordingly, redefined social 
status hierarchies that exist among “white” Tuareg, that is, between white Tuareg of 
noble and non-noble birth.
6.1.1	 “How	did	the	Bellah	come	to	speak	Tamasheq?”
To further illustrate differences between the Bellah-Iklan and the Tuareg, inform-
ants in Niamey considered skin color and social origins as additional criteria of 
distinction. As Mohamed Ag Irgimit explained:
When the Tuareg and the Arabs came from the Maghreb, there were no Bel-
lah in this the part of the Sahara […]. The Bellah are nothing more than de-
scendants of the Bambara, Fulani, Gourmatché, Songhay, Mossi, and Zarma 
that the Arabs kidnapped […] and sold to Tuareg […]. Those who were 
bought by the Tuareg were transformed into slaves and ended up speaking 
Tamasheq. But they are not Tuareg. They are black.5
This account constructs free-born Tuareg as a social category, whose “white” skin 
color distinguishes them from the Bellah-Iklan. The arrival of the Tuareg and the Ar-
abs in the Sahara is presented as the foundational moment for this social category to 
emerge. According to this account, Bellah-Iklan were not part of the Tuareg initially, 
but came to co-reside with them after they had been kidnapped by the Arabs and 
sold into slavery. Even if the Bellah-Iklan slaves learned to speak the Tamasheq lan-
guage, this did not make them Tuareg. Instead, Mohamed classified the Bellah-Iklan 
as being akin to the Songhay, Mossi, Zarma, Fulani, and Bambara. My informants 
complemented this historical argument about the essential distinctiveness of Tuareg 
on one side, and Bellah-Iklan, Songhay, Mossi, Zarma, Fulani, and Bambara on the 
other, by referring to physiological features as additional criteria of difference.
6.1.2	 “The	Iklan	have	short	necks,	like	the	Songhay”
The free-born Tuareg in Niamey were preoccupied with the Bellah-Iklan’s neck 
shape. According to them, it was easy to tell the difference between the Bel-
lah-Iklan and the Tuareg simply by looking at their neck. As Mossa Ag Attaher 
and Ibrahim put it:
The Iklan have shorter necks like the Gawboro. They have round faces with 
bigger noses and they are not tall. The Iklan’s shorter necks indicate that one 
can trust them. Although, this is never the case. Their necks actually indicate 
5 Conversation with Mohamed Ag Irgimit on 14/10/2012 in Niamey.
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how hypocritical they are towards other people. They act as if they are ready 
to help you out, but you should never trust them.6
This physiological−racial account of fundamental differences between Tuareg 
and Bellah-Iklan clearly reaches beyond the earlier historical argument regard-
ing the Bellah-Iklan’s origins and the reasons why they began to speak Tamasheq. 
The contours of the face, nose, and neck are considered key criteria in identify-
ing similarities with the Songhay and thus mark all those who bear these features 
as belonging to the same social group. Furthermore, this account also associates 
physiognomic features with certain social and moral qualities: the “shorter neck” 
of a Bellah-Iklan indicates a hypocritical disposition.
In other conversations, Mossa and Ibrahim equated hypocrisy with betrayal. 
They illustrated their claims by recalling specific historical events, such as when, 
in 1994, free-born Tuareg could no longer visit local markets in northern Mali 
for fear of attacks by the Malian army as well as the Ganda Koy Songhay vigilant 
group. In this situation, many free-born Tuareg asked their former Bellah-Iklan 
slaves to go and purchase tea and sugar for them. In other cases, the Bellah-Iklan 
themselves offered their services to their former masters. However, according to 
Mossa and Ibrahim, most often the Bellah-Iklan went to the market, looked out 
for soldiers from the Malian army or the Songhay, and relayed information to the 
free-born Tuareg hiding in the bush. Therefore, rather than coming to the rescue 
of free-born, white Tuareg who fended for their lives, the Bellah-Iklan instigated 
their murder. Ibrahim recollected his personal experience in the following terms:
At that time, we saw the army and the Ganda Koy movement arresting Tuareg 
on a daily basis. They slaughtered many of them. The soldiers also put several 
Tuareg into the wells or other instances into the bags containing heavy stones, 
and proceeded to throw them into the river while they were still alive. Worse, 
no Tuareg could travel in northern Mali any longer. In 1994, I left for Niamey, 
together with my mother and Tanti, my sister. We went to Gossi where we 
knew someone, an akli [sing. Iklan]. Upon our arrival, he slaughtered a goat 
for us, but then he suddenly disappeared. […]. He went out to look for the 
Ganda Koy people or the army, in order to inform them that we were at his 
home [Ibrahim paused and looked down]. Meanwhile, his wife, who under-
stood what was going on, came and told us to leave because soon the Ganda 
Koy were going to arrive. She told us to go to the military barracks before they 
come […] because, once we reached there, they would not be able to attack 
us. We took our bags to move away with our donkeys. Soon after our arrival 
at the military barracks, a Ganda Koy car stopped near us. But the opportu-
nity had already passed, as we had already arrived at the security forces base, 
and they could not do anything else—at least publically. This situation frus-
trated some of them because they missed the opportunity to kill us. We did 
not trust the soldiers and were afraid of spending the night at their place be-
cause we feared that they would hand us over to the Bellah-Iklan and Ganda 
6 Selected from conversations with Mossa Ag Attaher on 07/08/2014 in Niamey.
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Koy […]. We could see that they were making plans. We therefore chose to 
continue with our journey to Gao on that same day […].7
For Ibrahim, the hypocritical character of the Bellah-Iklan man showed in the ak-
li’s dishonest welcome gesture to Ibrahim and his family, followed by his treach-
erous betrayal of his visitors to the Songhay vigilante group. Regarding Ibrahim’s 
account, it is important to note that he does not give any consideration to the fact 
that they had also been saved because of the intervention of another Bellah-Iklan, 
their host’s wife. This strategic focus on one Bellah-Iklan’s reason is characteris-
tic of the labelling account used by my free-born Tuareg interlocutors in Nia-
mey. That is, similar to the narratives of Hutu refugees in Mishamo, Tanzania as 
Malkki discusses, the accounts of my free-born Tuareg informants focused on the 
faulty character and reprehensible behavior of the other group that allowed them 
to depict members of this group in purely negative and condescending terms 
(Malkki 1995b). As Malkki argues, such association of the rival social group with 
negative terms posited a hierarchy between “good” Hutu, who occupy the top of 
the social hierarchy, and “bad” Tutsi (Malkki 1989, chapter 2). Along similar lines, 
according to my free-born Tuareg interlocutors, their honest attitude makes them 
“good” persons who are thus morally and socially superior to their hypocritical 
former slaves.
Mossa Ag Attaher recounted a similar anecdote that also took place in around 
Gossi in the 1990s: A free-born Tuareg chief had fled the village and hid in the 
mountains, behind a big stone. Only his Bellah-Iklan slave (akli) knew his where-
abouts because he brought him food and water. According to Mossa Ag Attaher, 
this akli informed the Malian soldiers about the chief ’s hiding place and was thus 
instrumental in his killing, and the slave therefore had betrayed his master, in 
spite of his family’s long-standing relationship with the chief. This provided proof 
of the essentially treacherous nature of the Bellah-Iklan. Mossa’s and Ibrahim’s 
accounts not only invoke a moral hierarchy between honest free-born Tuareg and 
dishonest, hypocritical Bellah-Iklan. The accounts also relate these discrepan-
cies in moral disposition and social conduct to physiognomic and physiological 
differences.
6.1.3	 “We	Tuareg	are	honest,	elegant,	and	tall”
Ibrahim and Mossa’s narrative constructions of the Bellah-Iklan as one homog-
enous social category defined by common physical features imply a parallel con-
struction of free-born Tuareg as a homogenous group similarly characterized by 
physiological commonalities. As Mossa maintained:
7 Conversation with Ibrahim Ag Mohamed in Niamey on 29/11/2012 in Niamey.
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[…] we Tuareg are thinner with longer noses and faces. We are honest, el-
egant, and straightforward. […] we do not beat women. A great warrior 
should not weigh too much.8
In this portrayal, physiological features, such as a slim body build and long-shaped 
faces and noses, are again taken as indicators of a particular moral and social dis-
position. A slim body physique gives all free-born white Tuareg the potential to 
be “great warriors” and signals self-restraint (refraining from beating a woman) as 
well as honesty.
Mossa and Ibrahim’s assertion that the physical condition of the free-born 
Tuareg show that they are warriors by nature. The account calls into question 
scholarly depictions of Tuareg social status hierarchies. Scholars of Tuareg so-
ciety in northern Mali describe the noble clans, Ifoghas, in the region of Kidal 
and Imushagh in Menaka as warriors and politically ruling groups (cf. Boilley 
1999; Grémont 2010; Hureiki 2003), and argue that the warrior status is inherited 
through descent from particular clans. Such scholarly classifications reiterate local 
discourses about social status differences back home in Mali. For example, a free-
born informant of inferior social status from Kidal whom I met in Bamako in 2016 
explained to me that the difference between Ifoghas and vassal status groups are 
visible in their body shapes. For him, warrior Ifoghas men are taller, about two 
meters tall and strongly constituted. At social events in daily life, they wear pref-
erably white color boubou ensembles and white color turbans eight meters long. In 
contrast, vassal groups’ men are shorter, slimmer. They may wear all color boubou 
ensembles and four meter long green, black, and other color turbans. Whereas this 
interpretation attributes warrior status to specific white, noble groups of Tuareg, 
and expresses significant differences between the two social status groups. Mossa’s 
and Ibrahim’s accounts in Niamey make the warrior status a matter of racial clas-
sification, thereby extending it to vassal clans and other “white” groups, such as 
the Idnan and the Kel Essuk, Taghat Mallat, which are of free birth, who supported 
warriors in circumstances of war but yet have not been primarily classified as 
“warriors” by scholars (Boilley 1999; Grémont 2010). This shows that my free-born 
Tuareg interlocutors not only sought to re-order the Tamasheq society in ways 
that excluded the Bellah-Iklan, but also depicted “white” Tuareg as a homogenous 
group without social status differences between non-noble free-born and noble 
clans. As such, one could, therefore, see the making of a free-born Tuareg’social 
collective in Niamey as a further development of the vassal groups’ long-standing 
contestation of the social status difference between the non-noble free-born and 
the noble Tuareg since the colonial era (see chapter 3). It is precisely (again) this 
long-standing history of conflicted relationship that informs the ongoing opened 
war (since 2012) between the vassal social status groups and the noble clans in the 
area of Kidal and Menaka in northern Mali. However, unlike their counterparts 
engaged in war against the noble clans in northern Mali, the refugee informants in 
8 Conversation with Mossa on 24/10/2012 in Niamey.
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Niamey took their conditions in exile and the free-Tuareg’s longer history of polit-
ical persecution in Mali as a reason to settle the long-standing conflicted relation 
between them and the noble refugees (see chapter 4 of this book). Though the ref-
ugee informants claimed this homogeneity over free-born diversity, one could still 
maintain that their “good will” to settle the inter-noble and non-noble conflicted 
relationship since the colonial era does not undermine their aspirations to become 
equal to the nobles.
6.1.4 “We Tuareg brought Islam to northern Mali”
The historical process by which Islam arrived in northern Mali was another cen-
tral theme through which the free-born Tuareg presented themselves as a racially 
defined social group, in contradistinction to the Bellah-Iklan. Alhabib Ag Sidi 
from the Kidal region made this argument in the following manner:
It is well known that our ancestor, Mohammed El Moktar Aitta, was an Arab 
and a descendant of Fatoumata, the daughter of the Prophet […]. This means 
that we were those who brought Islam to northern Mali.9
This account speaks against arguments (by others such as the Bellah-Iklan) that 
present the free-born Tuareg as people who converted to Islam more recently.10 
Mohammed El Moktar Aiita is considered the ancestor of the Ifoghas, the po-
litically dominant clan of the Kidal of region (cf. Boilley 1999; Klute 2003). But 
Alhabib Ag Sidi portrays him as the ancestor of all free-born Tuareg, including 
his own clan, which conventionally does not form part of the politically dominant 
clans of the Kidal region.
Alhabib Ag Sidi was not the only one to offer this kind of account of what he 
and other informants in Niamey referred to as “the true history of the desert.” 
They all narrated “Tuareg history” from the point of view of their own clan or 
federation. They downplayed or silenced aspects of that history that would have 
hinted at hierarchies or divisions within the clans and federations. In this way, 
my informants told a “true history of the desert” that supported their claims that 
all free-born white Tuareg share the same historical origins, which implies the 
existence of one ancestry11 for all free-born Tuareg. For example, Alhabib’s ac-
count traces the origins of the free-born Tuareg back to the Prophet through his 
daughter Fatoumata, and takes this genealogical link as the basis for the claim that 
  9 Selected from conversation with Alhabib Ag Sidi, Acherif and Mossa Ag Attaher on 11/10/2012 in 
Niamey.
10 As I illustrate below, the Bellah-Iklan in Abala argued that the free-born Tuareg converted to Islam 
after they had met the Songhay, Hausa, and Fulani in northern Mali. This chapter also shows that 
the struggle over the first converted status to Islam implies a struggle over moral hierarchy.
11 The informants chose the name of this common ancestor according to the region they are originally 
from.
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free-born white Tuareg were instrumental to the spread of Islam. Claiming his-
torical roots to the early days of Islam was particularly important to my free-born 
informants in Niamey because it allowed them to assert their difference from, and 
superiority to, other groups.
For example, in several conversations Mohamed Ag Irgimit, together with his 
cousins Abdine and Mossa Ag Attaher, argued that when black fishermen, farm-
ers, and Fulani arrived in the desert, especially in the Bourem area in the Gao re-
gion, they knew nothing about Islam, but believed instead in animate matter, such 
as trees or rivers. It was only when they encountered the Tuareg, who were already 
Muslims that these Songhay, Mossi, and Hausa farmers converted to Islam. As 
Mohamed Ag Irgimit put it,
[i]t was when these black farmers, fishermen, and traders met our ancestors 
that they began to abandon their tree, air, or water spirits and became Mus-
lims. But before that, they did not know about Islam.12
For Mohamed, the black farmers, fishermen, and traders he mentioned in his ac-
count were the ancestors of today’s Bellah-Iklan who had been kidnapped by Ar-
abs and sold to the Tuareg. Mohamed depicted belief in animate nature and being 
Muslim as two stages of “human evolution,” and that black farmers and fishermen 
moved from one stage to the other, while the Tuareg were already at the more 
advanced stage of human evolution. In this way, Mohamed posited a hierarchy in 
terms of civilizational achievement, religious orientation, and forms of livelihood 
between the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg, a hierarchy that justified the 
social as well as political order they had left behind in Mali.
6.1.5	 “We	were	the	first	to	occupy	the	duns”
Mohamed Ag Irgimit used the term “dunes” to refer to northern Mali’s desert area, 
and, in conversations with Mossa Ag Attaher and their cousins (Hamouden and 
Abdine), recounted how northern Mali had been settled:
The Tuareg are a pastoral nomadic people who lived in the desert. They have 
no other country than the Sahara desert where they are the autochthons. Tra-
ditionally, their lifestyle adapted to seasonal changes and pastoral resources 
[…]. When they [read: Tuareg] arrived in the Sahara desert […], there were 
no other people living there. They occupied some dunes for grazing but not 
for farming. Each family occupied some dunes, and no one else could access 
these without their permission. Later on, there were some people who […] 
came mostly from the regions of Bourem and Gao […], and, upon their ar-
rival, they […] obtained permission to settle down in the region from the 
owners of the dunes who were pastoral nomadic people not interested in 
12 Conversation with Mohamed Ag Irgimit on 12/12/2012 in Niamey.
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farming […]. They understood that they [read: Tuareg] would use the land to 
let their animals graze, while the others would use it for agriculture. This was 
how the Songhay and Zarma, mobile merchants who came to sell tobacco to 
nomadic Tuareg or to work as fishermen, ended up settling in this area. Ini-
tially, the exchange of relations between the first comers and the newcomers 
worked as follows: The Songhay and Zarma gave part of their harvest to the 
Tuareg who in return provided them with protection. But over time, they 
came to complement each other so that the farmers exchanged their millet 
against animals. The farmers who arrived later settled down in villages […]. 
But our common memory is that their ancestors came as fishermen and mer-
chants and then, ended up to settling down as farmers. Their children, who 
were born there, became like the real owners of these places where they lived 
and practiced farming for a long time […].
When the Tuareg endured devastating droughts13 that destroyed their an-
imals, they started to farm. Surprisingly, it was at this moment that the prob-
lem started because according to our memory and oral traditions, we are the 
owners of the desert. Meanwhile the descendants of the foreigners whom we 
had allowed to settle also claimed ownership of the land […]. Among them 
were Songhay people […], followed by the Fulani […]. There were also Arabs 
but they were brigands from Morocco, Mauritania, and the western Sahara. 
They engaged in trade across the Sahara and brought all sorts things from the 
Maghreb to sell them in the south. Then, on their way back, they took gold, 
kidnapped children, and then sold them into slavery in the Maghreb. […]. 
It was the Tuareg chiefs who protected other populations from the Arabs.14
This account begins with a straightforward definition of the Tuareg as an occupa-
tional social category who have no other home other than the Sahara desert. This 
historical account again glosses over differences and hierarchies among the vari-
ous Tuareg clans. To appreciate how this depiction of white Tuareg as one uniform 
group silences actual status differences that exist among them, it is necessary to 
keep in mind the social background of Tuareg refugees who live in Niamey.
As I mentioned earlier, the free-born Tuareg refugees in Niamey are mainly 
from the Idnan, Idiaroussouwane, Chamanamas, Kel Essuk, Taghat Mallat, Ifergou-
moussen, Ishadenharen, Kel Amdiliste, Immakalkalen, Iradianaten, and Dawsahak 
groups. According to scholars such as Boilley (Boilley 1999; Grémont 2010; Hureiki 
2003; Klute 2003), historical dissimilarities exist between these groups. One his-
torical difference in particular refers to the notion that some groups are depicted 
as the descendants of Arabs while others are considered to have come from Ber-
bers (Hureiki 2003; Klute 2003). For example, speaking about the Kel Essuk, French 
historian Charles Grémont maintains that “Kel Essuk” is a generic term for vari-
ous people who came to live in the area called Essuk in the Adagh area (region of 
13 The droughts referred to here took place in the pre-colonial era implying that they are different 
than the recent ones that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.
14 This account is extracted from a conversation in Mohamed Ag Irgimit’s courtyard on 10/24/2012 in 
Niamey.
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Kidal) (Grémont 2010, 95f.). They are in charge of religious affairs and are said to 
have descended from an Arab conqueror who arrived in the Adagh region in the 
seventh century. Some Ifoghas groups in Kidal considered themselves as originally 
descended from Arabs. To consolidate their political domination over free-born 
vassals and Bellah, they claim to shorfa, genealogical ties to Arab religious figures 
including the prophet’s family (see Lecocq 2010, iii, also Hall 2011b, chapter  1). 
Whereas the imghad (vassals) are said to have descended from Berbers (Klute 2003). 
These contrasting historical origins imply social status differences between local 
clan hierarchies (2003). It happened to be these historical differences between free 
white Tuareg clans that Mohamed Ag Irgimit and his cousins sought to downplay.
For instance, Mohamed Ag Irgimit did not mention the mythical Tuareg ances-
tor by name; he also did not refer to the hierarchical order that existed between the 
vassal groups and the politically dominant, noble clans of Tuareg society. Implied 
in Mohamed’s account is therefore an emancipatory claim, one that posits vassals 
to be of equal status with the dominant, noble Tuareg groups. The accounts offered 
by Mohamed, Mossa, Abdine, and Hamounden also claim autochthony as well as 
first comership for the Tuareg in Bourem region, and presents them as generous 
hosts who offered newcomers protection in addition to a place to live and thrive. 
Like many other mythical settlement accounts, this one presents that the desert 
had been uninhabited prior to the arrival of the Tuareg (cf. Kopytoff 1987; Lentz 
2006; Lentz 2013; Malkki 1989). The latter point came out clearly in Mohamed Ag 
Irgimit’s references to French colonial records.
6.1.6	 “Even	the	French	recognized	that	we	were	inhabitants	of	this	desert”
According to Mohamed:
At the arrival of the colonial occupants, the Tuareg were the masters of the 
desert. They protected the black sedentary populations from the Arabs. The 
French conquerors had a certain vision for developing the land. […] as they 
did elsewhere, at their arrival, they first asked who […] had come first to 
settle in the area. They were told that the Tuareg were the owners and first 
settlers of the desert. […] The colonial officials wrote their first report based 
on that information […] and sent it to the “national archive”15 in France and 
to the General Governor in Dakar. We could still find and authenticate details 
such as dates and names in these reports.16
Like the statements I cited above, this statement is vague and does not provide 
any precise references to the dates or locations where the French had arrived, and, 
15 Though Mohamed Ag Irgimit used the “national archive,” I still doubt whether earlier reports were 
sent to the General governor—and I doubt this was in Dakar.
16 Quoted from a conversation among men at Mohamed Ag Irgimit’s place on 14/01/2013 in Niamey.
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furthermore, did not identify what specific Tuareg groups they encountered. The 
account lists three social groups that French administrators found in northern 
Mali: first, the sedentary groups that needed protection; second, the free-born Tu-
areg who offered them protection; and third, their common enemies, the so-called 
Arabs. This portrayal of relations between the three groups in the pre-colonial era 
stresses the crucial role of free-born and noble Tuareg in offering the black pop-
ulation security and protection against “Arabs.” The stress on protection served 
to justify the power hierarchy between the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tu-
areg groups. Simultaneously, Mohamed posits non-noble free-born Tuareg groups 
to be of equal standing with the noble warrior clans. As I illustrate below, my 
Bellah-Iklan informants offered a different account of “the true history of the de-
sert” that similarly implied a redefinition of how social hierarchies existed and 
“functioned” in Tuareg society back home in northern Mali.
6.2	 “The	true	history	of	the	desert”	according	to	the	Bellah-Iklan	in	Abala
ACTED staff members first introduced me to Inawélène after I had arrived in the 
Abala refugee camp on Thursday November 8, 2012. When I told Inawélène my 
name and, as part of the formal greeting, asked for his name, he replied: “My name 
is Inawélène Aklinine.” His response startled me because I had assumed that all 
male Tuareg names in northern Mali include “Ag.”17 In his case, I had expected to 
hear “Inawélène Ag Aklinine” which means Inawélène, son of Aklinine. Puzzled 
by his answer, I asked him whether he was Songhay, since “Inawélène Aklinine” 
sounded like a Songhay name to me. His response was that although he spoke 
Tamasheq, he was not a Tuareg but was instead a member of the “black people 
of Azawagh (tumast ta kawalet n Azawagh) who have Songhay ancestors.” He 
maintained that most people in the Abala refugee camp had Songhay ancestors as 
well and should therefore not be considered Tuareg even if they spoke Tamasheq. 
Inawélène concluded by suggesting that I should not look for Tuareg in the refu-
gee camps in southern Niger. He stressed that since the Tuareg had burned “Bel-
lah-Iklan” homes, looted their shops, and raped their daughters and wives, forcing 
them to flee Mali, if I wanted to meet the Tuareg I should have gone to northern 
Mali or stayed in Niamey instead. Noticing my dismay, Inawélène smiled, placed 
his right hand on my shoulder, and then asked me whether what I had just heard 
was new to me. Before I could even answer, he argued, “This is the true history of 
the desert. We are not Tuareg, even if we speak Tamasheq.”
Inawélène’s argument about the peuple noir implies a redefinition of free-born 
Tuareg as the (racially defined) “other” that resembles the accounts by free-born, 
white Tuareg refugees in Niamey insofar as it similarly places himself and other 
17 In contrast to the Tuareg from northern Mali, those from northern Niger used Songhay-Zarma 
naming patterns which require that the father’s name is included as the son’s family name.
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Bellah-Iklan outside of Tuareg society. At the same time, Inawélène’s account of-
fers a nuance to the argument offered by my free-born informants in Niamey. 
While Mossa, Ibrahim, as well as other town free Tuareg informants considered 
the Bellah-Iklan Songhay, Fulani, Bambara, and Mossi tout court, Inawélène de-
picted them as members of the peuple noir. Inawélène argued that the members of 
the peuple noir speak Tamasheq but are not Tuareg. According to him, the people 
of the peuple noir are racially black and are historical descendants of Songhay and 
other sedentary groups in northern Mali and speak Tamasheq. What is crucial to 
understand here is that Inawélène does not claim Songhay origin in order to be 
considered Songhay; instead, the claim to his and the Bellah-Iklan-Songhay ori-
gin allowed him to reconstruct and set the peuple noir as a distinctive group apart 
from the Tuareg and the other social groups in the north including the Songhay as 
well. During the weeks that followed this conversation, Inawélène, Assalim, Ahi-
you, and other Bellah-Iklan men meeting under the hangar took this argument 
further, focusing on the sizes of the free-born Tuareg heads, their weak bodies, 
and female and male infidelity, and the historical status of the Bellah-Iklan as au-
tochthons in the desert in contrast to the free-born Tuareg.
6.2.1	 “The	Tuareg	have	bigger	heads…”
“The Tuareg have bigger heads” was one of the most prominent themes of male Bel-
lah-Iklan conversations in Abala. It was also a formulation that they mostly stated to 
answer humanitarian workers who referred to the Bellah-Iklan as “Tuareg or Tama-
sheq noirs.” From my casual observations, the male refugee informants in Abala always 
replied succinctly: “We are not Tuareg, we are the noirs. The Tuareg are white (and) 
red and have bigger heads.” Also, on many other occasions, longer explanations were 
given and often took the shape of a “formal lecture”; with a narrator providing thick 
descriptive details about the physical traits particular to the free-born Tuareg whom 
they called the Tuareg tout court. For example, Assalim once argued that in general
when one looks at the Kel Talatayt around Menaka, like Bajan, they always 
have large heads which make them talented manipulators in politics and in 
all sorts of acts of trickery. The size of their heads reveals how selfish and 
criminal they are. Killing somebody makes them laugh. Imagine, the blood 
makes them laugh. After the Kel Talatayt come the Dawsahak.The Dawsahak 
are ugly with small eyes like the Chinese. Their hairs are solid like horsehair 
with the color of Brazilian descendants. This makes them fundamentally rac-
ists, brutal, greedy, and warlike.18
Assalim’s depiction focuses on specific physiological traits of the Kel Talatayt, 
and most precisely on Bajan Ag Hamatou, the Ouillimeden federation’s current 
18 Selected from conversations with the male informants under the hangar on 20/12/2012 in Abala.
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political leader, and the Dawsahak. In Assalim’s view, these traits of these specifics 
groups can be extended to all free white Tuareg and manifest significant contrasts 
between them and the Bellah-Iklan.
Similar to the accounts of my free-born interlocutors in Niamey, Assalim, ar-
gued about the homology between physical features and the character and moral 
attitudes of different groups of free-born Tuareg. To substantiate the claim that 
the Tuareg are criminals who laugh when they see blood from another person, 
Assalim told me the following story:
[…] a slave woman in Tidarmène had two children. […] Her husband, a 
black slave, lived far away from his wife and children because he worked for 
another master family. Since their children were small they had to stay with 
their mother. The oldest son was about five years old while the smallest was 
less than two and could not even walk when the scene happened. The head 
of the family where their mother worked had one big dog. This dog only ate 
meat. Every day, he used to bring the dog with him into the desert, far away 
from the tent in search of some non-domesticated animals. On days when 
he didn’t find any animals, he alternatively looked for isolated black people, 
especially women and children. […] One day, he was sick and stayed in his 
tent home. He could not go anywhere to find something for his dog. In the 
afternoon, the children were playing in front of the tent while their mother 
was occupied with preparing the evening meal. Meanwhile, her master called 
her to assert that the dog had not eaten since the morning, […] as she knew 
the habits of her master, she stopped cooking […] to look down at the earth. 
She knew what he wanted to do. She did not say anything. He insistently re-
peated once again that the dog did not eat yet. Still, she kept silent. The third 
time, he just stood up in time to catch one foot of the smallest child and then 
threw him to the dog. The boy did not reach the earth before the dog caught 
him in his mouth and took the boy away from the people […] The dog ate the 
son in front of his helpless mother […].19
Other Bellah-Iklan men who listened to this story attentively followed Assalim’s 
tonal modulation of the events he recounted and his way of highlighting certain 
scenes through gestures and body movements. Their emotionally charged excla-
mations, such as Allahu Akbar (literally, God is great), further underlined Assal-
im’s main argument about the heartless disposition of Tuareg who did not deserve 
to be considered “human beings.” After all, the bystanders argued, a human being 
does not feed a dog with another human being. For these men, the discrepancy 
between the Bellah-Iklan and the free white Tuareg resides in their different hearts 
and morals. Whereas the Bellah-Iklan had a heart with a capacity for compas-
sion (Tahanint),20 the heart of the free-born Tuareg was incapable feeling. For my 
Bellah-Iklan informants, this difference related to distinct religious dispositions: 
19 Assalim’s narration under the hangar on 18/12/2012 in Abala.
20 My informants used the French term: “la pitié.”
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Muslims who fear God have a heart with the capacity for compassion, whereas a 
heart without these feelings shows that someone is not a true God-fearing Muslim.
Substantiating their claims here, Inawélène referred back to the hangar men’s 
emotional reactions to Assalim’s story. For him, these emotional reactions mani-
fested in formulations such as Allahu Akbar illustrate how they as “black people” 
have the capacity to feel compassion (for the woman who lost her son), in contrast 
to the free-born Tuareg who lack these feelings. He explained to me that their 
compassion for the woman as a victim of her master indeed offers some illustra-
tive instances and gestures that reveal them as being Muslims, as for Inawélène, 
only Muslims have feelings for others people. As I understood it, these arguments 
altogether point to the construction of two particular moral identities that come 
together in the social expression of racial differences between the Bellah-Iklan 
and the free white Tuareg. One of these identities deals with the portrayal of Bel-
lah-Iklan themselves as people who have a heart for compassion (la pitié, tahanint) 
and are, therefore, Muslims. The second is concerned with the articulation of free 
white Tuareg as a moral category of people who have no heart for compassion and 
that potentially makes them non-Muslims.
6.2.2	 “The	Tuareg	are	lazy	and	physically	weak	people”
Yet another illustration of the parallels between physical features and character fo-
cused on the division of labor between the black people and the free white Tuareg, 
which positions the Tuareg as lacking a strong work ethic. As I noted earlier in this 
chapter, scholars have taken the division of labor to explain the hierarchical social 
order in Tuareg society, arguing, for instance, that hard manual labor is unbefitting 
for a free person who would normally be engaged in pastoralist activities, trade, re-
ligion, or warfare (Lecocq 2005, 5). In contrast to the preoccupation of these schol-
arly accounts with the free-born Tuareg’s perspective, my Bellah-Iklan informants 
offered a very different account of the conventional division of labor between them 
and their former masters, calling into question their former masters’ talent for cat-
tle raiding and military skills by pointing to their inferior physical constitution.
To illustrate his claim, the informants underscored the fundamental differences 
by showing that while the body constitution of the “black people” predisposes 
them to be morally strength, the free-born Tuareg’s weakness leads them down the 
road of immorality. Inawélène explicitly stated that:
We the noirs [read: black people] are what we are because we sow the earth, 
which is good for us physically and mentally. Physically, we are strong like we 
would be if we were exercising every day. But only God knows that we don’t 
exercise daily. Mentally, work is good for us because we don’t steal and raid 
like the Tuareg do.21
21 This passage is selected from conversations under the hangar on 29/12/2012 in Abala.
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In Inawélène’s view, work is placed as the key element of the physical body and 
the moral rectitude of the Bellah-Iklan. The black people are not only physically 
stronger than the free white Tuareg but also morally superior to their former mas-
ters. As Assalim put it,
because they [i.e. the former masters] are lazy and physically weak people 
who rely on the black people for everything such as herding, milking, and 
everything.They cannot do anything other than stealing, raiding cattle, and 
trafficking drugs. Whenever there were acts of banditry in the desert, it was 
always them. They don’t work.22
In this example, Assalim again links physiology, character features, and a moral 
disposition. The “laziness” of the free white Tuareg is depicted as a direct con-
sequence of their weak bodily constitution, which, in turn, makes them rely on 
others such as their former slaves for herding, milking, and other physical tasks. 
As Assalim’s following statement illustrates, the Bellah-Iklan in Abala ascribed 
“work” a moral meaning, equating it with manual effort such as farming and 
making bricks: “We work the land and have gardens. We don’t steal and are not 
involved in drug trafficking like they are […].” In this way, the capacity to engage 
in menial labor became a marker of difference, one that supported the claim that 
a strong physical disposition goes hand in hand with moral righteousness and an 
identity as a proper Muslim.
This depiction by my male Bellah-Iklan interlocutors substantiates insights 
from scholarship on “work.” Studies conducted by scholars from the University of 
Bayreuth on peasants, herdsmen, artisans, and factory workers, service employees 
in various parts of Africa (e.g. Dougnon 2007; Klute 1992a; Klute 1992b; Spittler 
2012a; Spittler 2012b and see also Spittler 1990; Spittler 2010) dispel understandings 
of “work” formulated by nineteenth-century German social scientists and philos-
ophers.23 Instead, according to Spittler, “work” should be seen as a “practice” the 
performance of which requires physical strength, manual skills, knowledge, per-
severance, and motivation. For Spittler, work conveys satisfaction and frustration, 
and workers can also ascribe an ethical meaning to it, which takes work beyond its 
immediate benefit (2010, 37). This conception is useful for understanding Assal-
im’s and Inawélène’s arguments, particularly in their tendency to place work, and 
the capacity to work, in an ethical framework.
For instance, Assalim argued that the northern territory of the current Mali 
Republic did not witness raiding, pillaging, and adultery before the free-born Tu-
areg arrived. He portrayed this past era as an epoch in which people led a life of 
tranquility, peace, and noble conduct, in line with Islamic prescripts and law. As 
he argued, tranquility was disturbed when the free white Tuareg arrived in the 
22 This passage is selected from conversations under the hangar on 29/12/2012 in Abala.
23 According to Spittler, the nineteenth-century authors considered work as part of technical, ecolog-
ical systems. See Spittler (2010, 37) where he referred to the Marxist conception of work.
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desert to hide themselves from the Arabs. They introduced cattle raiding, stealing, 
and other practices that went against Islamic precepts and norms.24 Assalim also 
maintained that the free white Tuareg disturbed the tranquilly and security of the 
desert because they were unable to work. All of this suggests that my Bellah-Iklan 
informants in Abala were preoccupied with demonstrating the morally inferior 
conduct of white Tuareg as a way to prove their radical difference from and supe-
riority to their former masters.
6.2.3	 “The	infidelity	of	Tuareg	women	and	men”
“Infidelity” figured prominently in the Bellah-Iklan men’s discussions under the 
hangar. References to the alleged infidelity of free-born Tuareg, and various an-
ecdotes about extramarital affairs of both married women and men, helped con-
struct these different individuals as belonging to one homogenous social category. 
For instance, Assalim asserted: “The Tuareg women are always fatter and cannot 
move easily. This explains their laziness. They spend their time gossiping and en-
gaging in extra-marital relations.” Assalim reported an incident, involving a free-
born Tuareg woman from the Menaka area:
I once travelled from Essailal25 to the Tahabanant.26 I did not plan to stay 
overnight there, but I wasn’t able to finish what I was there for before nightfall. 
Therefore, I decided to sleep over and go back the next day. One Idnan27 fam-
ily that I knew a long time ago offered to let me stay with them. They provided 
me with a mattress and blanket. Later on, when we all fell asleep, a woman in 
the family whose husband was absent came to me under the blanket.28
Because Assalim was intent on labeling free-born Tuareg as immoral, he once 
again drew a close link between bodily constitution, moral disposition, and social 
conduct, while drawing on examples of Tuareg women. According to Assalim, 
Tuareg women’s fatness explains their reticence to work and why they gossip and 
engage in extramarital affairs.
Assalim, by reporting on his refusal to have a sexual relationship with his host’s 
wife, places the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg in two contrasting moral 
universes. On another occasion, Assalim underlined his claim that “the Tuareg 
have no morality” by maintaining that free-born Tuareg men cheat on their wives 
and keep their sexual relations with Bellah-Iklan women a secret.
24 This passage is selected from conversations under the hangar on 15/11/2012 in Abala.
25 This is the name for the Tuareg settlement in the Menaka district.
26 This is the name of the Tuareg settlement in Menaka.
27 Idnan is the name of the Tuareg clan.
28 According to Assalim, the husband who talked about traveling to Tamanrasset in Algeria.
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[…] when they enslave women, they send them into the bush with animals. 
Then, later, in the middle of the day, they pretend to go look after the animals. 
This is not true. They just go and sexually abuse the black woman, and she has 
no ability to tell people about it because if she does, she will be killed the next 
day in the bush. When looking at children that come from these interactions, 
it is clear that they are “authentic copies” of their mother’s master.29
In sharp contrasts to free-born Tuareg the unfree-born in Abala proudly said “we 
are soft and honest with normal eyes and heads. Our wives are beautiful women, 
tall, and loyal to us.”
6.2.4 “The Tuareg are originally Christian and therefore not true Muslims”
According to Assalim, the reason the free white Tuareg are “immoral” is that they 
are originally descendants from Christians and are therefore non-Muslims. This 
explanation assumes that being a Christian or a Muslims have fixed character-
istics, and hence, even if Christians converted to Islam, they will still behave in 
a non-Muslim way as it is ingrained in their nature. Assalim’s depiction of what 
makes a proper Muslim does not refer to specific Muslim social practices and 
rituals. Rather, he explains the true Muslim identity of the Bellah-Iklan using a 
historical argument, that is, by arguing that the history of Islam in the area is inti-
mately tied to the history of the Bellah-Iklan.
[…] this was several hundred years before the nomads arrived that we had 
Islam in Timbuktu. Kankou Moussa, Ahmed Baba, and all the holy names of 
the 333 figures in the history of Timbuktu introduced it. At their arrival in the 
desert, the Tuareg [read: former masters] were Christians30. Yet, when one 
looks closely at the cultural objects proper to nomad culture, it goes without 
saying that they were not Muslims. The sword is for them, and it has the form 
of the sign of the cross of Jesus Christ. Also the “wood fork” is for them. It 
is similar to Jesus’s cross, so to say a sign of Christianity. They [read: Tuareg] 
converted to Islam upon their arrival in the desert.31
This argument was important for my unfree-born interlocutors in two respects. 
First, it allowed them to trace the genealogy of all slaves to Kankou Moussa and 
Ahmed Baba, two prominent figures in the early history of Islam in Mali. Born 
in 1280 and died in 1337, Kankou Moussa was an emperor who ruled territory 
including large parts of west Africa. As Abala argued, he had won several holy 
wars. The second figure, Ahmed Baba, known as “Ahmed Baba the Black”, was a 
well-known west African scholar who died in 1627 and after whom the Institut des 
29 Conversation with Assalim on 02/01/2013 in Abala.
30 My informants view Christianity as a vague category of non-Muslims believers.
31 This passage is extracted from hangar conversations on 11/11/2012.
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Hautes Études et de Recherches Islamiques32 in Timbuktu is named. My inform-
ants referred to these two figures to indicate that it was black Muslim erudites who 
brought Islam from the sedentary populations of the south to the northern regions 
of Mali. This account reversed the direction of the spread of Islam as it is usually 
described as a southward movement that started from northern Africa.
The second related aspect of importance for the Bellah-Iklan was to explain the 
Tuareg’s specific social conduct by referring to their “Christian origin.” Hence, he 
elaborated that it was:
When the Tuareg [read: former masters] arrived in the desert to hide them-
selves from the Arabs, they converted to Islam. Also, this era was the age 
of tranquility and nobility. There was no fear of danger. Everybody was in 
line with Islamic law. This tranquility was disturbed with the Tuareg’s arrival 
[read: former masters]. They brought along raiding, pillaging, and adultery.33
The immoral behavior of the free-born Tuareg is described as a Christian behav-
ior. To Assalim, this difference between the racial categories stemmed from the 
historical fact that the Bellah-Iklan are descendants of the first Muslims erudites 
in northern Mali. This implicit assumption was also pervasive in the Bellah-Iklan’ 
accounts of slavery in northern Mali.
6.2.5	 “Under	Islam	there	were	no	slaves	in	northern	Mali”
In his book, A History of Race in Muslim West Africa, 1600–1960, Hall argues that 
free-born Tuareg drew on the Qur’an to justify the institution of slavery in the 
Sahel (Hall 2011a, part 3). In this section, I will discuss the male Bellah-Iklans’ ar-
guments that drew on “Islam” to criticize the institution of slavery in the Sahelian 
region. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to clarify that the Bellah-Iklan’s 
references to the Qur’an remained vague and, furthermore, that they did not point 
to specific passages in order to substantiate their claims. This was evident in the 
following argument by Assalim:
We asked the marabout [Muslim teacher] about slavery in northern Mali. He 
told us that according to the holy Qur’an, there is no slavery in Mali or even in 
Africa as a whole. He said to us that in the Qur’an the notion of “slavery” ap-
plies only to non-believers who were arrested during holy wars. Although, to 
our knowledge there were no holy wars in Africa. The marabout also told us 
that all these wars during which the slaves were arrested took place elsewhere, 
not in Africa. The marabout went on to suggest that these arrests took place 
in Arab countries, and it is in these countries where we could still find slaves 
and former slaves. All slaves captured during the holy wars were Arab; there 
were no Africans among them. The Qur’an says that when the non-believer 
32 The institute is succinctly referred to as the Institut Ahmed Baba.
33 This passage is selected from conversations under the hangar on 15/11/2012 at Abala.
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Arabs were arrested during the holy wars; they were used for some time be-
fore they converted to Islam. But once they converted to Islam, they ceased 
to be treated and referred to as slaves; a Muslim cannot be called slave. What 
happened in northern Mali can only be explained as raiding and kidnapping 
[…] which are well-known acts of banditry, condemned by Islam.34
This account evaluates and condemns the free white Tuareg by redefining them as 
bandits who kidnapped people and enslaved them. Other informants mentioned 
personal experiences of individuals whom they knew. For example, Inawélène ar-
gued that:
In 1985, when there was a drought in northern Mali, many nomads came to 
Niger. Among them there was an old slave woman who came with her mas-
ters red skin Tuareg around Abala here […]. When she saw the earth of the 
farms around Abala, she recognized […] where she had been kidnapped.35
The example of this woman reminds Inawélène of Amingo, an elderly former male 
slave living in the refugee camp, who told us,
I have no idea about my parents. I grew up among the Kel Essuk in Timbuktu. 
But later on, I was transferred to another fraction in the Timétrine where I 
spent 25 years among the imghad […]. They put a rope around my feet and tied 
the other end to a tree, leaving me the ability to move only between the well 
and the tent. Every morning I started my day around 5 am. I started with giving 
water to the animals and later I would continue with pounding the millet. One 
day, I was lucky enough to cut the rope and disappear. Although I did not know 
where I was, I started to walk along the road. After some time, I saw someone 
coming towards me. I was thirsty and needed some water. I stopped walking 
and waited for the person. He was a soldier on his way to Anderboukane. He 
gave me water and took me along. When we reached Anderboukane, I stayed 
with him […] this was how I became free from the imghad.36
In the first place, Amingo’s life story was not important to Inawélène because of 
the ways in which the Kel Essuk in Timbuktou and imghad in Timétrine treated 
him poorly over the years. For him, instead, like the story of the old slave woman 
mentioned above, Amingo’s personal experience reveals a historical truth about 
how those referred to as former Tuareg slaves in northern Mali became enslaved 
in the first place. Implicit in this account is the argument that the Bellah-Iklan are 
essentially not slaves. In contrast to scholarly studies that focus on the relations 
between slaves and their masters (e.g. Hall 2011a; Hall 2011b; Klein 1998; Klute 
1995; Lecocq 2005), Assalim’s account examines how the Bellah-Iklan became 
slaves in the first place, stressing that the deeply violent and criminal nature of this 
historical process. Assalim insisted that the Bellah-Iklan are wrongly referred to 
34 Assalim narrated this quoted passage on 11/11/2012 in Abala.
35 Following up Assalim’s arguments in a discussion, Inawélène Aklinine added this quoted passage. 
36 Extracted from a life-story interview with Amingo on 11/11/2012 in Abala.
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as slaves, a claim that allows him as well as Inawélène to rehabilitate the image of 
Bellah-Iklan as non-servile people. This is further manifested in the Bellah-Iklan’s 
claim to autochthon status and role as warriors past in northern Mali.
6.2.6	 “Our	ancestors	were	the	first	to	occupy	this	desert”
Life is like the march of donkeys. While it sometimes brings you to the forefront, 
ahead of the others, it may leave you behind the others at other times.
—Ahiyou Intagaout Abala, 1/1/2013.
Ahiyou made this observation to begin and end his reflections on the status of Bel-
lah-Iklan as autochthones who arrived in Mali prior to white Tuareg. According 
to him, the march of the donkey is a good illustration of the Bellah-Iklan’s social 
trajectory in northern Mali. Comparing the Bellah-Iklan to donkeys, animals that 
sometimes march alone and other times in a group, he argues that one cannot 
always be ahead of the others, by which he refers to free white Tuareg. As Ahiyou 
implies, initially, the Bellah-Iklan were ahead of the free-born Tuareg, but histori-
cal circumstances took away their power and put them in the hands of the Tuareg 
masters. With this argument, Ahiyou and other Bellah-Iklan emphasized that they 
are not actually what they are taken for (i.e. passive historical actors), but that 
they should be seen as those at the heart of the history of the desert, along with 
the Songhay, Fulani, Mossi, and Hausa, people who lived in northern Mali prior 
to the arrival of the free white Tuareg and from whom they descend. Consider the 
following statement by Assalim:
Once in Menaka we discussed this issue about who first inhabited the desert. 
There were some people who argued that Azawagh was first inhabited by 
the pastoral nomadic people, the Tuareg [read: free-born] and the Fulani. 
During the raining season, they moved to the forest and came back to the 
wells during the dry seasons. Their life was routinized according to seasons. 
For example, when water and grass was available for animals in the area of 
Tahabannante, they all moved there. Similarly, when they heard that there 
was sufficient water and grass in Niger, they all moved there as well. They had 
an animal-like instinct, which made them different from the other sedentary 
populations. They were also Songhay people. After a weeklong discussion, we 
reached the conclusion that the first communities’ founders who first inhab-
ited Azawagh were respectively the Zamburuten, Dawsahak Idoguiriten, and 
[…] Ishadenharen from Tidarmène. Since the Zamburuten are descendants 
of the Songhay this shows that the sedentary groups have inhabited the desert 
several years before it even became a desert. At that time, the stones were not 
yet solid; one could even write on them, or give them any form one wanted 
them to take […].37
37 This conversation took place at the forum in the camp (in Abala) on 11/11/2012.
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To Assalim, the Bellah-Iklan first-comership status can be further proved by 
looking at old cultural objects such as old women ornaments, old kitchen uten-
sils that one could still find in the desert. For the informants, these are not cul-
tural objects of the pastoral nomadic people. Instead, sedentary people like the 
Songhay, Zarma, and Mossi among others used these objects. In addition, the 
informant also maintained that during the raining seasons, it is also possible to 
still find herbs like the savage paddy (or riz sauvage) throughout the Menaka 
area. These savage paddies grew up in the former farms of these sedentary peo-
ple. Second, Assalim drew on the ruins of houses built up with bricks or stones, 
which are found throughout northern Mali, to substantiate his claims. Accord-
ing to him, these ruins illustrate that sedentary farming communities—the 
Bellah-Iklan’s ancestors—had first inhabited northern regions of Mali. Claim-
ing the historical status of autochthons and first comers for the Bellah-Iklan 
is justified by reference to their hospitable culture, a claim that, in turn, is jus-
tified with reference to the long-standing rootedness of hospitality culture in 
Bellah-Iklan history.
6.2.7	 “When	the	Tuareg	arrived,	we	black	were	there	to	protect	them”
My Bellah-Iklan informants depicted their ancestral hospitality using three spe-
cific events: the arrival of Karidena38 in Timbuktu, the battle against the Kel Hog-
gar, and that against French troops in Dodia near Anderboukane.
6.2.7.1 “When Karidena arrived in Timbuktu”
Ahiyou recounted Karidena’s arrival as follows:
When the Tuareg fled northern Africa where they had been persecuted by 
Arabs who were merchants and thieves, our ancestors welcomed them. They 
gave them a place to live, food, and everything else in Bourem, Timbuktu. 
For example, in Timbuktu, my grandfather, Osiwène Irchy, welcomed Kari-
dena, the ancestor of the Kel Talatayt. Karidena arrived from Morocco, ac-
companied by only a woman. They stayed with Osiwène Irchy, a farmer, near 
Timbuktu. Osiwène and Karidena became and remained good friends till 
Karidena died. When he died, Osiwène took his son Firhun, the descendant 
of Karidena who would later become the amenokal of the Ouillimeden, and 
his mother to the Menaka. When they arrived there, this old woman was tired 
and asked Mi nika [meaning literally where are we going]? This is how Osi-
wène kept them there. It was in this way that Menaka is now called Menaka. 
The name stems from the question.39
38 Karidena is the mythical ancestor of the ruling clans of the Ouillimeden federation (see Grémont 
2010).
39 This conversation took place at the hangar in the refugee camp on 11/01/2013 in Abala.
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Ahiyou presented the man he called Osiwène as his grandfather, and by exten-
sion, all Bellah-Iklan.40 The depiction of Karidena’s social trajectory implies a 
certain reconfiguration of power relations between the free white Tuareg and 
the Bellah-Iklan in the Menaka area. It dismantles and pulls apart the strength of 
 Karidena’s descendants conventionally portrayed as warriors (Grémont 2010). At 
the same, the account simultaneously gave social credit to the Bellah-Iklan, result-
ing from their ancestor, Osiwène Irchy, offering a place to stay to Karidena upon 
his arrival in Timbuktu. A similar argument runs through the second account that 
focuses on the battle against the Kel Hoggar.
6.2.7.2 “The Battle against the Kel Hoggar”
According to Assalim, not only had the Bellah-Iklan’s ancestors helped the free-
born Tuareg escape from the Arabs in Menaka, but they had also protected them 
from other Tuareg from southern Algeria. He stated that:
When our ancestors, the “black” felt that the Kel Hoggar were arriving to at-
tack the Tuareg in Menaka, they built a park where they gathered women and 
children. This park had two doors. The black took the control over the main 
door and asked the red Tuareg to take care of the secondary door. When the 
Kel Hoggar arrived, they first tried to enter through the main door guarded 
by the black people. They fought… fought… fought… until they were de-
feated. Then, they left that door and went to the one guarded by the red, the 
Tuareg. It was from there that they penetrated the park. When they entered 
inside the park the black came over to defeat them once again. Since then, the 
Kel Hoggar never tried to attack the Ouillimeden Tuareg again […].41
This account inverts the social status hierarchy between the free white Tuareg and 
Bellah-Iklan. The strength of the Bellah-Iklan that manifested itself in the context 
of the battle against Kel Hoggar as recounted by Assalim recounts the prominent 
role played by the Bellah-Iklan. A role that goes beyond the traditional tasks dis-
cussed in the literature that considered the Bellah-Iklan vulnerable people who 
needed to be taken care of. For example, the account shows that it was the Bel-
lah-Iklan’s ancestors who protected the free white Tuareg. This is taken further in 
the following account.
6.2.7.3 “The battle of Dodia”
According to Ahiyou, the battle of Dodia took place in 1916– 1917. It marked a 
continuation of the resistance launched by Firhun. At times, the political leader 
40 However, Ahiyou’s account does not reveal how one could trace the Bellah-Iklan’ social origin 
from Osiwène to Ahmed Baba (1556–1627) and Kankou (1280–1337) presented in other accounts 
above as the ancestors of the noirs.
41 This conversation took place at the hangar in the refugee camp on 11/01/2013 in Abala.
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of the Ouillimeden Tuareg in the region during the colonial conquest who, as 
 chapter 3 depicts, had opposed the (violent) resistance to the French occupation 
since 1911–1914. French troops arrested and placed Firhun under house arrest in 
Gao. Ahiyou recalled Firhun’s political trajectory as follows:
French administrators have transformed the true version of the history of 
the desert. They have written that Firhun was a hero, a courageous warrior. 
How could he be a hero? What they do not write is that whenever Firhun 
fought, he always helped by blacks allies, whom he never dared call his slaves 
[…]. When he was arrested and brought to Gao, Osiwène helped him. They 
helped him escape and come to Dodia in Anderboukane where only the noirs 
protected him. […]. These people fought against the French troops and their 
allies Kel Adagh and Hoggar in Dodia. They accompanied Firhun from An-
derboukane to an area located not very far from Agadaw where he died and 
was buried by Osiwène Irchy. Nowadays, when I hear that he was hero, I just 
laugh. He was only a boy who feared a lot.42
Ahiyou’s account contradicts the official version of Firhun’s history as docu-
mented by the colonial archive and historians (Boilley 1999; Grémont 2010). It 
shows the tension between the Bellah-Ikan’s version of history and that of histo-
rians stemmed from the fact that scholars focused on the perspective of the free-
born Tuareg. As such, Ahiyou’s account substantiates the insights found in studies 
(Comaroff/Comaroff 1991; Comaroff/Comaroff 1992; Comaroff/Comaroff 1997; 
Hanretta 2009; Olivier de Sardan 1976) that have sought to address the narratives 
on which researchers, as well as colonial and postcolonial administrators, rely are 
not part of an objective historical analysis. Such analysis should, instead, be taken, 
as scholars suggest, as the working memory of a process of domination to the ben-
efit of specific social segments.
To Ahiyou in Abala, the written sources on the Tuareg owe their general form 
to the broad strategies of free white informants who collaborate with most re-
searchers and colonial administrators. Accordingly, he argued that these colonial 
accounts and the scholarship the free-born Tuareg influenced have reinforced a 
certain hierarchical order that maintained the Bellah-Iklan in marginal social, 
economic, and political positions.43 Ahiyou hopes that the Bellah-Iklan voices 
from the refugee camp in Abala that are taken up throughout this publication 
would contribute to redressing the imbalance generated by processes of historical 
knowledge production in northern Mali.
42 This conversation took place at the hangar in the refugee camp on 11/01/2013 in Abala. Speak-
ing other forms of free-born Tuareg’s dependence Assalim also argued that even the grandson of 
Firhun, the current amenokal Bajan Ag Hamatou, still relies heavily on the mystical power of the 
black Kel Essuk family in the Menaka district. For example, wherever, Bajan goes, Assalim insisted, 
the members of this family still always accompany him.
43 Earlier discussions in chapter 2 of this book show that the unfree in Abala see the written textbooks 
on the Tuareg history in northern Mali as being highly informed by the free-born perspective.
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6.3	 How	are	the	accounts	related	to	each	other?
On the one hand, the narratives discussed throughout these two foregoing parts 
describe the order of events, persons, and relationships. On the other hand, the 
accounts also reconstruct in detail how and for what reasons differences between 
groups’ physiological and moral characters exist. These differences are said to 
be fundamental and essential because they are inscribed in the “natural order of 
things” (Malkki 1989). For example, part of the Bellah-Iklan’s accounts focused on 
the free white Tuareg’s bigger heads, weak bodies, and non-Muslim hearts in order 
to shed light on how these body traits imply specific social conducts proper to 
the former masters. As for the free white Tuareg, the physical features, and other 
characteristics, come altogether in the formation of the moral quality and identity 
of the Bellah-Iklan. The narratives on the settlement history and coming of Islam 
in northern Mali further emphasized the differences between the two social cat-
egories. The discussions of these themes enable us to understand crucial values 
the refugees’ narratives associated with their claims of autochthony. One of these 
values comes into light in narratives that establish a relationship between the social 
status of autochthons and the power relations between the weaker and the stronger. 
For example, while depicting their respective groups’ historical status as first in-
habitants in northern Mali, both the free-born Tuareg and Bellah-Iklan conceived 
themselves as good hosts who welcomed and protected the latecomer groups. The 
informants’ competing emphasis on protection that the first comers provided the 
latecomers is revealing. It points at the protection that highlights the strength of the 
first comers as one major component of the refugees’ claims to the social status of 
autochthony. In this regard, on the Bellah-Iklan’s side, the strength is taken as the 
physical capacity that derives from the stronger constitution of the descendants of 
the former slaves in contrast to the weaker free white Tuareg. As for the free-born 
Tuareg in Niamey, their strength results from the Tuareg’s warrior culture. Another 
aspect of the refugees’ claims of autochthony is that the accounts allowed the in-
formants to create a “unitary genealogy” for their group in Niamey and Abala. This 
view takes all free white Tuareg as historical descendants of a single ancestor that 
was chosen according to the initial groups to which the narrators belong. Similarly, 
the Bellah-Iklan who are originally considered as people without genealogy, temet 
in the Tamasheq language (Lecocq 2010, 7f.) have now created a lineage in Abala. 
Osiwène Irchy was this historical figure around which the informants articulated 
their claims of autochthony and the Bellah-Iklan’s common origin.
Furthermore, both groups of informants strongly associated their claims of au-
tochthony with the coming of Islam. For example, while the Bellah-Iklan depicted 
themselves as descendants of Kankou and Ahmed Baba who, for the informants 
in Abala, brought Islam to northern Mali; they portrayed the free white Tuareg 
as Christian believers. According to this view, the former masters converted to 
Islam later on compared to the Bellah-Iklan. For the town interlocutors, their an-
cestors brought Islam along with them. Their version argues that the ancestors 
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of the Bellah-Iklan who were farmers, fishermen, and merchants who worshiped 
the trees, air, and water. Here, trees, air, and water are associated with the primi-
tiveness of the Bellah-Iklan’s ancestors. In both cases, the informants took Islam 
as a higher value as opposed to worshipping the elements for both the inform-
ants in Niamey and Christian culture in Abala. Such interpretations substantiate 
scholarly arguments that people always articulate their claims of autochthony with 
some concrete preoccupations. Peter Geschiere argues that the claims of autoch-
thony, “born from soil”, seek to establish an irrefutable, primordial right to belong 
to the first-comer groups (Geschiere 2009). He also stresses that these claims are 
often used in politically motivated attempts to exclude the outsiders. Lentz notes 
that autochthony became a powerful political slogan, particularly in the 1990s, in 
the competition for posts, but even more so in struggles over access to land (Lentz 
2003).44 For Malkki, the Hutu historical claim for autochthony was essential for 
their desire to be liberated from Tutsi domination with the latters (false) pretense 
of superiority (Malkki 1996).
Similar to Malkki’s argument, by claiming to autochthony social status in 
Niamey and Abala, the refugee informants reconstructed the genesis of the two 
collectivities to historically justify the difference between the free white and the 
Bellah-Iklan. Their narratives involve the redefinition of social status hierarchy 
on two levels: on the one hand, between the free white nobles and non-noble free 
white Tuareg, and, on the other, between the former Tuareg masters and slaves. 
For the first level, I argue that by articulating the moral and physical character-
istics of the free white Tuareg, the town informants blurred differences in power 
relations between the white noble Tuareg and the non-noble free-born Tuareg. 
These arguments place them historically as part of the powerful groups vis-à-vis 
the Bellah-Iklan.45 As for the Bellah-Iklan, the informants in the refugee camp 
redefined themselves as the powerful group in relation to the free white Tuareg. 
This implies a significant inversion of power vectors between the former Tuareg 
masters and the Bellah-Iklan. In my view, the refugees’ arguments redefined the 
existing scholarly debates on the difference between the free white Tuareg and 
the Bellah-Iklan called the black Tuareg. However, while such differentiations are 
not novel, the Bellah-Iklan perspective included here suggests a reversal in the 
argument often discussed in the literature that focused on the free white Tuareg’s 
points of view. Therefore, this perspective provides new insight for scholarship on 
the subject, that, although they may be aware of the differences between the Bel-
lah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg, little time has been spent understanding the 
Bellah-Iklan’s daily lives, social relations, and real life struggles.46
44 See also Lentz (2013).
45 As mentioned above, scholars often argue that the powerful clans protected the others prior to the 
colonial occupation.
46 But see Bouman (2010), who studied the effects of globalization on Iklan marriages in Burkina 
Faso. However, she unfortunately argues that the Iklan have neither a communal past (conscious-
ness) nor a territory to refer to, an argument that this book challenges in all respects.
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My informants fixed the social order through accounts that recall Tambiah’s 
distinction between “cosmology” and “cosmogony”:
Cosmologies […] are the classifications of the most encompassing scope. 
They are frameworks of concepts and relations which treat the universe or 
cosmos as an ordered system, describing it in terms of space, time, animals, 
spirits, demons, and the like. Cosmogonies consist usually of accounts of the 
creation and generation of the existing order of phenomena, explaining their 
character and their place and function in the scheme. (Tambiah 1985, 3f.)
Displacing Tambiah’s distinction between “cosmology” and “cosmogony” from its 
original context into the refugees’ ones in Abala and Niamey is helpful because it 
enables to reflect on stereotyping or labeling account as a “cosmology” and “cos-
mogony” and a “regime of truth” (in the Foucauldian sense) for those who pro-
duced them. Both groups of informants drew some common physiological and 
moral characteristics, which, according to them, are inscribed in the “nature” of 
all members of their respective collectivity share.
Drawing on Brenner (Brenner 1993; Hall 1997; Tambiah 1985), this chapter has 
traced how Bellah-Iklan refugees in Abala and free-born Tuareg residents of Nia-
mey constructed their respective groups as radically distinct and homogenous col-
lectivities by employing racial labeling discourses. The chapter also demonstrates 
that both groups of refugee actors redefined their respective inferior social status 
by describing each other in derogatory terms. The discussion pointed to signifi-
cant redefinitions of the criteria for group membership, and thus of inclusion in as 
well as exclusion from the category of “Tuareg.” Establishing connections between 
bodily features, skin color, moral character, and social conduct, informants from 
both groups called into question the key role that scholars have attributed to the 
Tamasheq language in defining the Tuareg identity (Bourgeot 1990, 131f.; Lecocq 
2010, 4f.). Informants in Abala and in Niamey alike maintained that although Bel-
lah-Iklan speak Tamasheq, this does not make them part of the Tuareg society. To 
be a Tuareg implies having certain social origins, bodily features, and a particular 
character.
The Bellah-Iklan’s accounts of social and moral differences between themselves 
and the free-born and noble Tuareg also provide a counterpoint to scholarly por-
trayals that have exclusively adopted the perspective of the former masters and, 
accordingly, tended to reproduce the negative stereotyping of the Bellah-Iklan 
(e.g. Berge 2000; Klute 1992b). Ahiyou, Assalim, and Inawélène depicted the 
Bellah-Iklan as a group whose stronger bodily constitution makes them both 
physically and morally more resistant than the free-born Tuareg. The three men’s 
stress on the close link between bodily constitution and one’s ethically superior 
disposition as a proper, God-fearing Muslim contrasts starkly with Berge’s posi-
tive portrayal of the white Tuareg and their work ethic. All these claims suggest 
that the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg engage in an ideological struggle 
over legitimacy and the power to define each other as social group (Bazin 1979; 
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Diawara 1990; Olivier de Sardan 1976). The claims of both groups need to be put 
into perspective; that is, they need to be interpreted in consideration of the group’s 




French anthropologist André Bourgeot portrays Tuareg refugees in the Magh-
reb as people disconnected from their social and cultural roots, left behind in 
northern Mali (Bourgeot 1990, 140f.). He distinctively interconnects culture, so-
cial identity, and territory. Therefore the social fact of exile, which always implies 
relocations outside ordinary sites of living, de facto leads to the collapse of culture 
and identity (1990, 141). This chapter will offer a contrasting account to Bourge-
ot’s argument. The first part will examine specific social practices through which 
the free white Tuareg informants assert and maintain their “Tuareg identity” in 
Niamey. Similarly, the second part will present and discuss practices that ena-
bled the Bellah-Iklan informants to stay noirs in the refugee camp in Abala. The 
interpretations both groups of informants drew from these social practices are 
condensed in the Tamasheq expression adinat wi ataf nen atarekh (those who 
hold the culture, history, or tradition1). At one level, the expression reveals how 
the free white  Tuareg set themselves apart as a group from others such as Hausa 
and Zarma in Niamey. In Abala, it shows how the Bellah-Iklan informants distin-
guished themselves from free white Tuareg, Fulani, and Songhay in the refugee 
camp. At another level, the expression also provides a glimpse into ways in which 
the informants demarcated themselves from other members of their own group 
in Niamey and Abala. While they called themselves “those who hold their history 
or culture” (adinat wi ataf nen atarekh), the informants labeled the others (who 
did otherwise) as those who did not hold the culture, history, or the tradition (ad-
inat wi oya nen atarekh). My analysis of these refugees’ everyday social practices 
is informed by Ferguson (Ferguson 1999). He uses the term cultural style to refer 
to practices that signify differences between social categories (1999, 95). Using 
this notion of cultural style as an analytical perspective, my analysis proceeds in 
three steps. First, I discuss the relevance of the specific practices through which 
the informants kept their history or culture to constructions of the Tuareg iden-
tity in Niamey and Bellah-Iklan in Abala. Second, I show that the informants’ 
demarcations from other members of their own groups, whom they considered 
as those who did not hold the culture, emphasized “new” lines of intra-group 
cleavages. These cleavages necessarily challenge the refugees’ classifications and 
reconstructions of themselves as internally homogenous collectivities in Niamey 
and Abala, as seen in chapters 4, 5, and 6. Third, I will assess how these specific 
signifying practices, through which the informants claimed to hold their identity 
1 The expression adinat wi ataf nen atarekh can be translated as those who hold the culture, history, 
or the tradition.
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distinct and intact in exile, were preparations for the return to Mali in an im-
agined near future.
7.1	 Staying	Tuareg	in	Niamey
The town informants depicting themselves as those who did hold the culture was 
closely connected to another notion. That was that of Kel alassal. The term Kel 
Alassal means the “authentic people.” It refers to a specific mode of living (or so-
cial practices) within the framework of their culture or history (atarekh) from 
Niamey. In what follows, I will explore these interrelated notions by focusing on 
the informants’ interpretations of social practices that, in their own view, rendered 
them Kel alassal, and therefore those who hold their culture. These social practices 
range from the regular visits they paid each other to listening to guitar songs sung 
by a free-born Tuareg musical group called Kel Tinariwen, speaking the Tamasheq 
dialect spoken in northern Mali, dressing up in Jalabia and turbans, and discuss-
ing their desire to return and to live in an independent Tuareg country (akal).
7.1.1	 “A	Tuareg	has	to	talk	about	Tuareg	matters”
When I arrived in Niamey in August 2012, one immediate characteristic feature 
of Mossa Ag Attaher’s, Alhabib Ag Sidi’s, Mohamed Ag Irgimit’s, and Ibrahim Ag 
Mohamed’s social lives that piqued my curiosity was the regular visits they paid to 
each other. When someone visited someone’s homestead, the first thing to do was 
to prepare the tea. If present, the youngest son mostly did this, otherwise other 
sons or daughters took over the task. In cases in which all children were absent, 
the wife herself or the husband himself took on the task of first cleaning the tea 
kettle and then preparing the tea for the visitor. During these preparations, the 
visitors and hosts continued to exchange greetings. Their exchanges unfolded as 
follows: after asking about the well-being of the visitor, the host husband or wife 
extended greetings, in the first place, to family members living in Niamey. Later, 
the conversations included relatives left behind in Mali or living as migrants in 
the Maghreb, for example, those in Tamanrranset in southern Algeria or Tripoli 
in Libya. In return, the visitor would follow similar exchanges of greetings, asking 
about the members of the host family. Later, the greetings were extended to those 
who were absent, and finally to relatives living in Mali and in the Maghreb. Very 
often these exchanges extended into conversations about the development of con-
flicts in Mali and other “themes” of communal preoccupations, such as accommo-
dation problems in Niamey (especially for newly arrived refugees) to the issue of 
youth unemployment.
I should note that, in spite of details specifically relevant to the refugees’ contem-
porary context in Niamey, these exchanges did not differ from conventional forms 
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of greeting I observed during earlier stays among the Tuareg in northern Mali. What 
captured my attention was how they gradually moved to the events and processes 
that brought them into exile (cf. chapters 3 and 5). Such moves from greetings to his-
torical narratives were prompted by guitar songs my informants listened to from mo-
bile phones, radios or any other particular news from the battlegrounds in northern 
Mali. Mostly from the Kel Tinariwen musical group, the guitar songs reconstructed, 
or at least attempted to make claims to, practices, events, personal biographies, and 
accounts of eyewitnesses of particular events the Tuareg have experienced over the 
recent decades in Mali (cf. Klute 2013; Lecocq 2002). The ways in which the inform-
ants reconstituted events and processes from listening to guitar songs remind me of 
Das’s account of the Sikh Militant discourse in post-partition Pakistan and India, and 
the Bhopal tragedy era (Das 1995, chapter 4). She argues that:
One of the important characteristics of Sikh oral discourse is its use of de-
tailed local knowledge through which people are recognized, named, and 
their individual misery transformed into misfortunes of the community. In 
every meeting addressed by Bhindranwale there was detailed use of local ex-
amples. For instance, he would say, ‘Ajaib Singh from Village Todda, who is 
present here—the police came one night and dragged his son away and the 
whole night they tortured him with hot iron rods. Is this not a sign of the 
gulami [slavery] of the Sikhs in India.’ (Das 1995, 131)
She goes on to add that:
Sometimes expression is given to the most tabooed subjects, if these relate to 
police excesses. For example, in one meeting Bhinbranwale pointed to an old 
man who has been dragged to the police station in Ferozepur along with his 
daughter and has been forced to have sex with her (…they made the father 
and the daughter have a relation). It would seem from these examples that 
local knowledge of atrocities and their reiteration in narratives of the com-
munity are very important. (Das 1995, 131)
It was the informants’ apt ways to connect sequences of their own life stories to the 
Tuareg past in Mali (cf. chapter 5) that made their conversations similar to Das’s 
observations in India. Such narratives were not only generated through regular 
visits paid to each other’s families but were also ubiquitous among young men 
like Mossa Ag Attaher’s son, Iba, and his friend, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed. The two 
would meet somewhere for tea in a homestead, informing the others through mo-
bile phones. Several times, they stayed overnight in the yard where Ibrahim Ag 
Mohamed, his mother, and unmarried sisters live.
I gradually came to understand that the guiding ethic of these visits was not 
only about social reciprocity, but that a certain obsession to engage in Tuareg his-
tory informed them. For example, in answering my question about why young 
Tuareg did not visit the Hausa and Zarma social gatherings (fada), Mohamed Ag 
Irgimit once argued that:
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Well you should note that there exists a problem of cultural difference. In prin-
ciple it meant here two different cultures in its very fundamental sense. There 
exists a problem of cultural specificity of the Tuareg people vis à vis the Zarma 
and Hausa. Despite the fact that these Zarma-Songhay and Tuareg have very 
long experience of living together for centuries, a real integration never took 
place. For example, it is rare to see a case of marriage between Tuareg and 
Songhay—Zarma and Tuareg. This is even quasi inexistent. The reason why the 
Tuareg young men […] don’t go the fada […] with their Zarma and Hausa fel-
lows is simple one but also fundamental. It is fundamental because they don’t 
have the same concerns and don’t enjoy the same things. When the young 
Tuareg meet among themselves what do they talk about? They talk about rebel-
lions in Mali, tea, and problems encountered here in Niamey. Or they want to 
hear about Firhun, about the desert and their ancestors. The young Zarma and 
Hausa don’t appreciate these. If a young Zarma comes among them [Tuareg], 
he will feel bored because they don’t have a common interest, don’t attach the 
same meanings to things. The difference is so huge […] if you bring a Tuareg 
to Zarma among the Zarma. These will talk about ECOWAS, Mali, and Chad.2 
And, obviously a young Tuareg will not appreciate these themes. If he [Tuareg 
young] goes to Hausa and Zarma fada he will feel bored too.3
This answer condenses the social significance Mohamed drew from the regular 
visits they paid to each other. In the first place, the statement shows that the white 
Tuareg informants demarcated themselves from other urban residents in Niamey 
through themes they were interested in discussing. But a close scrutiny of the ac-
count implicitly reveals that it was not the themes per se that explained the oppo-
sition between them and the Hausa and Zarma. Whereas the Hausa and Zarma 
discussions focus on the joint intervention of soldiers from ECOWAS countries, 
including Niger, against the Islamist factions in northern Mali, the young free 
white Tuareg found interest in talking about rebellions in Mali, tea, and problems 
they faced in Niamey. Or the free-born Tuareg urban residents wanted to hear 
about Firhun, the desert, and their ancestors. At face value, there were not many 
contradictions between the topics discussed by both free Tuareg and Hausa and 
Zarma groups. All topics discussed dealt with northern Mali. However, the dis-
crepancy between the free-born Tuareg and the Hausa-Zarma fada resulted from 
their different perspectives on issues. To Mohamed, and other free-born white 
Tuareg informants, when the Hausa, and Zarma, residents in Niamey talked about 
northern Mali, they supported the ECOWAS’s military intervention in Mali that 
allowed the national army and the Bellah-Iklan−Songhay people to regain some 
control over northern Mali. In Mohamed’s view, the Zarma and Hausa residents 
in Niamey manifested their hostility toward the free-born Tuareg through this 
2 Here, Mohamed is referring to debates about the joined military operation launched in northern 
Mali in January 2013 by countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
and the French, Chad, and UN militaries.
3 Selected from conversations with Mohamed Ag Irgimit on 29/09/2012 in Niamey.
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support to the Malian army, allied with Bellah-Iklan. It was precisely this perspec-
tive that the free-born Tuareg in Niamey did not like.
Mohamed’s answer implicitly also shows that the particular way in which the 
free-born Tuareg approached themes of interest to them during their social en-
counters in Niamey had some constitutive effects on young Tuareg. To him, when 
the young free white Tuareg talked about rebellions in Mali, tea, and problems 
encountered in Niamey, Firhun, about the desert and their ancestors, they learned 
about their history and, therefore, about themselves as Tuareg. In his view, this 
was important particularly for young people who were born and grew up in the 
social context of exile. The statement opens up one theoretical concern of central 
relevance to this chapter, which is an examination of social practices that consti-
tuted and maintained the informants “Tuareg” despite their decades-long experi-
ences of exile in Niamey. Virtanen used the notion of self-reflection to reflect on 
instances in which her informants through particular practices and ways of doing 
social practices defined themselves as the Fulbe subjects in northern Cameroon 
(Virtanen 2003, chapter 2). She demonstrates this through an apt analysis of the 
Pulaaku (understood as Fulani’s moral code) as the central structuring device of 
the Fulbe identity, arguing that it is what one does and the way one does it that con-
sequently expresses, and asserts, therefore validate one’s membership of pastoral 
Fulbe community.4 Virtanen’s interpretation of Fulbe social practices in the light 
of the notion of self-reflection is helpful for understanding the complex meanings 
underlying Mohamed’s claim above. Implicit in his account is to emphasize that 
the ways in which talking about themes related to Tuareg rebellions, tea, and the 
ancestors such as Firhun among themselves were not simply commentaries on or 
representations of the past. Rather, they were also assertive of young free-born 
Tuareg social identity as Tuareg vis-à-vis other ethnic residents in Niamey.
Finally, the social significances Mohamed Ag Irgimit attributed to their regular 
visits to each other shows that these visits did not only signify the difference be-
tween the free-born Tuareg and the Hausa−Zarma residents in Niamey. They also 
generated difference between those free-born Tuareg who did hold the culture, 
the tradition, or history and those who did not. For instance, when I arrived in 
Niamey in the summer of 2014, I asked Mossa Ag Attaher about another free-
born Tuareg renamed here Mohamed Ag Houssey. He is in his early fifties and I 
first met him through Mossa Ag Attaher in 2012. At that time, both men and their 
family members regularly paid visits to each other. But surprisingly, in answering 
my question about Mohamed Ag Houssey, Mossa Ag Attaher stated:
Who? Mohamed Ag Houssey I haven’t seen him since you left Niamey. He 
didn’t come visit me that is why I also didn’t go to him. You see Diallo, many 
Tuareg have abandoned their culture. They even don’t visit us anymore. I see 
them with Zarma people.5
4 For similar arguments on Pulaaku among the Fulbe in Niger (see Oumarou 2012; Schareika 2010).
5 From conversation on 06/08/2014 in Niamey.
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Mossa Ag Attaher’s answer points at the social implications of not visiting fellow 
free-born Tuareg. He interpreted this as manifest of the abandonment of one’s 
Tuareg culture, establishing a contrast between Mossa and Mohamed Ag Houssey. 
While it depicts Mohamed Ag Houssey as a good example of those who aban-
doned their culture, it also reflexively portrays Mossa Ag Attaher as an illustration 
of those who did not do so. Not doing social practices Tuareg are expected to do, 
can affect the ways in which one is perceived. To put this in another way, Mossa’s 
comments on Mohamed Ag Houssey by implication show that the ways in which 
one is perceived by others, through the lens of social practices, concerns the “val-
idation” of whether one is a member of the Tuareg group or not. The comments 
show that the criteria of being member of the Tuareg group do not necessarily 
mean that one is Tuareg forever. As will be shown below, Ibrahim’s interpretations 
of the social implications of going or not going to the studio of Tuareg culture on 
Sundays further substantiate this argument.
7.1.2 “The hangar of our culture”
Between 2012 and 2013 I followed Ibrahim Ag Mohamed, Iba, and several of their 
friends to the studio, where many young free-born Tuareg met up to discuss and 
learn about Tuareg culture. The studio is situated in the quartier of Koira kano in 
the center of Niamey. A free Tuareg artist called Rhissa Ag Issa, originally from the 
area of Menaka, has established it. What is referred to here as a studio is actually a 
hangar in the middle of Rhissa Ag Issa’s homestead.
They normally gather at Rhissa’s place on Sundays. They put money together in 
order to purchase tea, sugar, meat, and rice. There, they learn Tuareg songs, and 
stories about the Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali. Those who arrive enthusi-
astically greet those who arrived earlier, who in response ask them: Matikknam 
et tumast (what did you do for the “people”)? The latecomers often reply tumast 
tile: (the “people’’ or the “nation’’ is present), emphasizing that one feels part of the 
Tuareg collectivity. It refers to what people do in their daily lives in terms of social 
practices that assert their social belonging to the Tuareg group.
However, in 2014, I noticed that many young men did not come to visit the old 
artist any longer. I asked Ibrahim who explained that:
You know, it is not easy. You can tell that we were many here last year. People 
sat everywhere here under this hangar. But today, we are only few who come 
here now. We want to keep our culture, we are Tuareg and this is our hangar, 
our place to be. I want to follow my ancestors. When you look at people like 
Hama, they have become Zarma. They are not Tuareg anymore. They only go 
to fada. They are the ones who are lost [ceux qui sont perdus]. They are influ-
enced by the life of the town.6
6 Selected from conversation on 18/08/2014 in Niamey.
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Ibrahim’s account establishes a contrast between the hangar at Rhissa Ag Issa’s 
place and visiting the Hausa or Zarma fada. It equates the social practice of going 
to the studio with holding the Tuareg culture. The social importance he attributed 
to going to the studio was linked to what they talked about. For example, they 
learned about their past. He interpreted learning the past as an exercise in learning 
to become Tuareg. Thus, the account equates not going to Rhissa Ag Issa’s place 
with being those who did not hold their culture (adinat wi oya nen atarekh). Ac-
cording to Ibrahim, being part of those who did not hold their culture implies that 
one is in a process to lose ties to one’s social and cultural roots. Those, like Hama, 
who spent time with the Hausa and Zarma, are influenced by the life of town, 
which implies reflexive construction of himself as the opposite. He considered 
himself as part of white Tuareg refugees who remained tied to their rural ori-
gins in northern Mali. Seen in this perspective, Ibrahim’s interpretations illustrate 
James Ferguson’s discussion of cultural dualism (cf. Ferguson 1999, chapter 3). He 
introduced the notion of cultural dualism as (an alternative) theoretical approach 
to explore urban culture in Africa via an elaboration of what he terms “cultural 
styles”: localist and cosmopolitan. Examining his material from the Copperbelt in 
Zambia, he remarked that:
The extremes of these two contrasting modes were immediately visible and 
obvious. On the one hand were the cosmopolitan workers, relaxing in bars 
and clubs, drinking bottled beer or liquor, listening to Western or “inter-
national” music, speaking English and mixing languages with ease, dress-
ing smartly (and even ostentatiously), and adopting an air of easy familiarity 
with whites like me. On the other hand were the localists, drinking in private 
homes or taverns, preferring “African” or home-brewed beer, speaking the 
local languages of their home region, dressing in drab or even ragged clothes, 
listening to “local” music, and presenting to a white foreigner like me an 
impression of intimidation and sometimes even servility. Localist stylistic 
markers seemed to distinguish those who had a strong sense of continuing 
allegiance to a rural “home” community—those who visited often, adhered 
to “custom”, and displayed a strong ethnic or regional identity. Cosmopoli-
tan style, on the other hand, marked the distance a worker maintained from 
“home”; it signified a shrugging off of localist cultural traits, and often a re-
jection of rural ties, along with an embracing of Western dominated transna-
tional mass culture. (Ferguson 1999, 91f.)
According to Ferguson, since the notion of style points to practices that signify 
differences between social categories, localism and cosmopolitanism should be 
viewed as signifying practices (Ferguson 1999, 94). He further wrote that:
Localism is in this sense a stylistic package, in which some elements function 
as signs for others. Localist gestures are thus at once a repudiation of cosmo-
politanism and an affirmation of loyalty to rural allies. The rural relatives’ 
interest is not immediately in the gesture itself but in the alliance for which 
it stands. But the gesture itself helps to cement that alliance, as well as to 
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signal it, by disqualifying and devaluing the worker in more cosmopolitan 
contexts. Just as committed “punks” who dye their hair purple or cover their 
skins with tattoos not only signal their repudiation of the corporate ladder 
but also effectively bar themselves from it, so localist gestures not only signal 
rejection of urban futures, they also help to make them impossible. (Ferguson 
1999, 112)
In Ferguson’s sense, Ibrahim’s account referred to Hama, and other free white Tu-
areg, as cosmopolitans. In Ibrahim’s view, going to the Hausa and Zarma fada 
implies talking about other topics and listening to music by people disconnected 
from their rural cultural ties.
7.1.3  “We Tuareg listen to al-guitara	songs,	the	Hausa	and	Zarma	listen	to	Mali Yaro”
Like visiting other fellow free white Tuareg from Mali, and going to Rhissa Ag Is-
sa’s place, the informants considered listening to al-guitara songs as social expres-
sions of their Tuareg identity in Niamey. The al-guitara musical genre has gained 
significant importance in studies of the Tuareg in northern Mali. Most studies 
focus either on its role in the 1990s rebellions in Mali and in Niger (Belalimat 
2003, 2008; Klute 2013; Lecocq 2010; Rasmussen 2006) or on its nature, specifically 
assessing whether it can be viewed as traditional or a global musical style (Borel 
2006; Fischer/Kohl 2010; Schmidt 2009). Probing whether the al-guitara musical 
genre is traditional or modern, most conclude that it is not traditional at all. This 
is because of electric acoustic material used by performers made it “inauthentic” 
(Borel 2006). Many authors argue that most performers are men, which makes 
contemporary al-guitara different from other authentic or Tuareg traditional mu-
sical genres: anzad or tahardent and tende examined by Brandes (1989) and Card 
(1982). Rasmussen examines how the popularization of a musical genre previously 
associated with political protest and resistance resonates with cultural memory 
once the rebellion is over (Rasmussen 2006). Her study suggests that:
Memories of rebel composers and performers of earlier Tuareg ichumar mu-
sic articulate with popular memories of many performers and listeners today, 
who are keenly aware of the origins of this musical genre and continue to 
identify it with heroic elements in their culture. (Rasmussen 2006, 634)
The free white Tuareg informants in Niamey also identified al-guitara with their 
culture. Explaining why the Tuareg should only visit Tuareg in urban Niamey 
due to matters they have in common to discuss, Mohamed Ag Irgimit extended 
his argument to the al-guitara genre. When young Tuareg meet, they listen to al- 
guitara songs sung by Kel Tinariwen, a musical group created in the 1980s by Kel 
Adagh Tuareg in exile in the Maghreb (Belalimat 2003; Belalimat 2008; Klute 2013; 
 Lecocq 2010). The songs focus on the free-born Tuareg experiences of marginali-
zation, forced migration, and longing for home which they called tenere (literally 
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the bush). For Mohamed, whereas the Tuareg are interested in this genre, the 
Zarma and Hausa do not listen with the same attention. Instead, when they meet 
in their fada, they prefer to listen to American rap music and Mali yaro (a famous 
musician in Niger). The distinction Mohamed tended to draw here, between the 
al-guitara songs and Mali yaro and American rap music, illustrates the relevance 
of music to the construction and expression of free-born Tuareg social differences 
to other ethnic groups in Niamey. He even further argued:
When one says al-guitara, one just says Tuareg. Because, the aesthetics of this 
music and its lyrics of the songs make that it is just for us the Tuareg. When 
young Tuareg listen to it, they learn and get inspiration for their future there. 
Mali yaro and American rap music are for the others but not us.7
Mohamed considered al-guitara songs as a medium of knowledge communica-
tion and dissemination among free white Tuareg. He argued young Tuareg learned 
about their past and inspiration for their future from listening to these particu-
lar songs. He also points to the generative power that the aesthetics and lyrics 
of al-guitara convey. Al-guitara generates social difference between the free-born 
Tuareg and the Zarma and Hausa in Niamey.
Alhabib Ag Sidi, to whom I paid regular visits in the quartier called Ryad, held 
similar points of view. Whenever I visited, al-guitara songs accompanied our 
conversations around the tea kettle either in his living room or in the courtyard, 
played from either his mobile phone or tapes. He has two memory sticks on which 
he stores his collections of songs. I once asked him why the al-guitara music was 
so common. He answered:
As a Tuareg I can only listen to al-guitara songs. One reason is that al-guitara 
is our music, something now cultural among us the Tuareg. Even if you [read: 
Souleymane] go to a Tuareg family and only observe small children playing 
among themselves. After few minutes, you will hear them singing a guitar 
song. They do this even if they don’t have guitar. They will use a wood or any 
other thing at their disposals and use these to imitate the al-guitara. It is nat-
ural for them to like and play al-guitara in opposition to others as they only 
hear al-guitara at home and notice that it is about their history.8
The identification of al-guitara with Tuareg culture is straightforward in this ac-
count. According to Alhabib Ag Sidi, children identify themselves with this genre 
from their early childhood. Alhabib emphasizes that as a Tuareg, he could only 
listen to al-guitara, implicitly referring to the consequences for free-born Tuareg 
who listened to other musical genres. For example, on several occasions, he crit-
icized his daughter (student at the University of Niamey) listening to other songs 
sung by non-Tuareg musicians, especially when she used these songs as ring tones 
7 From conversation on 22/09/2012 in Niamey.
8 From conversation with Alhabib Ag Sidi on 07/12/2012 in Niamey.
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on her mobile phone. Her father would criticize practices that take her away from 
the legacy of the ancestors, referring to the Tuareg proverb: tanfust tarha alghak 
net (literally everything needs its heritage/own value).9
Alhabib’s referral to this proverb condenses and, at the same time expresses, 
his feeling of frustration. Alhabib tended to stress that listening to other musical 
genres than al-guitara distanced his daughter from her cultural roots. The proverb 
also identifies listening to al-guitara with following the footsteps of the ancestors. 
Ultimately, Alhabib’s criticism of his daughter reveals that listening to al-guitara 
or not has become an axis for the assertion and contestation of Tuareg identity 
in Niamey. It expresses the difference between free-born Tuareg, who followed 
their culture, and those who did not. Gonzales reached similar conclusions when 
speaking about the social significance of al-guitara music for the free white refu-
gees Tuareg in Ouagadougou and Sag-Nioniogo (Burkina Faso) (Gonzales 2015). 
She wrote that:
Every informant recognised Tuareg music to be an important symbol of their 
culture. It is also an instrument for recollection and connection their home. 
Listening to music is for many a necessary practice. With its power, music 
heals the pain of being displaced. […] Children and adolescents learn how to 
play guitar music on self-made instruments […]. (Gonzales 2015, 93)
Like the al-guitara musical genre, the urban free white Tuareg informants also 
tended to signify their allegiances to their ancestral culture vis-à-vis other ethnic 
groups in Niamey through speaking their Tamasheq dialects from northern Mali 
at home.
7.1.4	 “I	never	let	my	family	members	speak	Zarma	at	home”
Mohamed Ag Irgimit and Mossa Ag Attaher used this sentence to explain me how 
they tried to protect their domestic realms from the influence of Zarma culture. 
Both informants took Zarma language as the main channel through which a for-
eign culture could enter into their families. For example, Mohamed Ag Irgimit 
explained:
Though all my children are born and go to school here in Niamey, I prevent 
them using other languages than Tamasheq once home. I even told them do 
not bring any friends who are Zarma and Hausa into this house. My reasons 
are the following. My duty as a father is to orient these children born here in 
Niamey towards their land of origin. They are Tuareg above all. They have to 
speak their ancestral language. It is in this language that I explain to them 
several things of the past. Also, they listen to al-guitara songs and sometime 
9 Some informants also framed the same proverb saying: tanfust tarha etari: everything needs its 
heritage.
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ask me about things they hear. This is how they grow in their understanding 
of themselves as Tuareg.10
This illustrates the relevance of the Tamasheq language to the construction of 
free Tuareg identity. He feared that by bringing their Zarma and Hausa school-
mates home, his children might end up mastering other languages. Forbidding 
his children from speaking other languages was a strategy that enabled him to 
establish ties between his family members and their home country (akal). Doing 
so, he maintained, will contribute to consolidate his children self-understanding 
as Tuareg.
Mossa Ag Attaher attributed a similar role to speaking Tamasheq in his family. 
He argued that:
Since you come here you always saw me speaking my Tamasheq language. I 
don’t allow any of my children to speak Zarma or Hausa at home. I am not 
like Hamza,11 my cousin whose children speak other languages at home.12
While Mossa regarded himself as someone whose family members spoke Tama-
sheq, and therefore stayed Tuareg, he viewed his cousin Hamza as someone who 
had been incapable of keeping his family members Tuareg, because began to speak 
other languages.
The insistence on language went beyond domestic realms. During my stays in 
Niamey, I used to visit an adult refugee man (already introduced in chapter 5 as 
Mohamed Ag Zeyd) at the Grand marché of Niamey. Mohamed Ag Zeyd arrived 
in the early 1990s. Although he did not have his own shop at the Grand marché, he 
always went there to spend time with other free white Tuareg from Mali. People 
often came to ask about shops or looking for someone in the surroundings. When 
they spoke Zarma or Hausa, Mohamed refused to reply, or spoke Tamasheq to 
them. Mohamed explained why
I lived in Niamey more than fifteen years now. I do speak the language. But 
these Zarma people think that everybody should speak their language and 
becomes Zarma. No, we [read: Tuareg] want to show them that we exist too. 
I always do this in order to show them that I am proud of what I am […]. 
Through these reactions, I show to them we are not all Hausa and Zarma.13
The reasons why Mohamed did not reply to those who sought information from 
him in the Grand marché are similar to Mossa Ag Attaher’s and Mohamed Ag 
Irgimit’s arguments discussed above. All three informants tended to construct 
themselves as Tuareg through rejecting Hausa and Zarma languages.
10 Selected from conversation with Mohamed Ag Irgimit on 28/11/2012 in Niamey.
11 Hamza is Mossa’s cousin introduced in chapter 4.
12 From conversation with Mohamed Ag Irgimit on 28/11/2012 in Niamey.
13 From conversation on 24/09/2012 in Niamey.
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7.1.5 “I can never abandon the turban and the jalabia”
Like the language, clothing was another way to express one’s Tuareg identity. 
When I first met Mohamed Ag Irgimit in September 2012, he began by asking 
me who else among the free-born Tuareg from Mali I had been in contact with. I 
informed him that I had been spending most of my time with Mossa Ag Attaher. 
Mohamed responded
Souleymane, you don’t need to talk to other people anymore. Mossa is and 
remains the most prototype of authentic Tuareg I have ever seen. Just spend 
your time with him, you will know all about our culture and us. Even though 
he lived several decades now, but he still stayed Tuareg in all aspects of his life. 
He wears always the jalabia and never goes outdoors without a turban. He 
is really different from many other Tuareg who abandon their culture. They 
wear jeans, T-shirts everywhere, even in the Grand marché.14
When I pleasantly reported this conversation with Mohamed to Mossa Ag Attaher 
the next day he put forward that:
You see Diallo since I am in Niamey I never wore anything else than my jal-
abia though I worked for France for long time. For example, I remembered 
long time ago, our patrons at the IRD [a French institute for development 
research] instructed us [the guards] to wear the uniform they had given us. 
This was a way to tell me that I should abandon my turban and my jalabia. 
I clearly told them that I preferred to lose my job than changing the way in 
which I dress, that is, the Tuareg way. I want to keep my culture and what I 
am: a Tuareg. I can never abandon the jalabia and the turban.15
Both Mohamed and Mossa point to wearing jalabia and turban as a non-verbal 
form of social practice through which authentic Tuareg identity is embodied and 
asserted in everyday life. The jalabia ensemble, called nowadays deux pièces, is com-
posed of short trousers and a boubou (cf. photograph below).16 Mossa described 
this as a manifest signal of his allegiance to Tuareg dressing customs. He stressed 
that over the past centuries, all Tuareg men wore the jalabia ensemble in their every-
day life. He explained to me that in the past, youths would meet socially around 
the musical genre called tende (see also Ag Doho 2011). The regular performance 
of tende took place, mostly in winter. When it rained, the youths frequently met 
at the ahal (evening youth gathering) around the tende, and performed Iswat, the 
traditional dance steps of youths surrounding the girls singing. On these occasions 
the young women appreciated and selected their male partners not only according 
14 Selected from conversation on 24/09/2012 in Niamey.
15 Selected from conversation with Mossa Ag Attaher on 24/08/2014 in Niamey.
16 The jalabia can be of varying qualities. But most highily appreciated quality is made out of Bazin 
riche.
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to their dance and camel racing skills, but also their jalabia ensemble. Dressed in 
the jalabia and the turban, the youths smoothly moved with their camels toward 
the girls gathered around the tende. Men targeted the girl singing surrounded by 
several others applauding. The goal of the men was to profit from the inattention 
of the others in order to steal the headscarf of the girl singing, called the tamazagh 
(or tamawayt). The one who succeeded in stealing this headscarf, called the alacho, 
was followed by other competitors. Succeeding and not succeeding in collecting 
back this alacho had equal symbolic value. They all contributed to creating a sense 
of honor as a true man (ahalis wan tidit) among peers. This distinction could in-
crease one’s social charm in peoples’ eyes. The jalabia and the turban illustrated 
Mohamed’s and Mossa’s interpretations of what makes up an “authentic Tuareg”: 
the capacity to embody past dressing habits in the present. This marks a difference 
between Mossa and other free-born Tuareg, who wear jeans and T-shirts.
This leads to another important aspect, crucial in understanding the social sig-
nificance of the jalabia and turban. The Grand marché symbolizes an immense sea 
of people where it should be shameful for “a Tuareg” to appear there without the 
jalabia, and more importantly the turban, the symbol of social distance among 
the Tuareg (cf. Murphy 1964). This interpretation makes the difference between 
Mossa and other free-born Tuareg going to the Grand marché in T-shirts. This 
shows that the notion of shame, here related to dress, is another central and form 
of expression of “authentic Tuaregness” (cf. chapter 4 of this book).
Figure 6:	A Tuareg wearing a jalabia ensemble and the turban in Niamey on 18/09/2014. Photo-
graph S. Diallo.
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Mohamed Ag Irgimit sometimes stressed similar social significances of the veil 
for female Tuareg. He stated that:
Nothing else than entering my homestead you [read: Souleymane] notice that 
you are among the Tuareg. You saw my daughter sitting with her veil even 
though she is born and went to university here. She even graduated recently 
in Sociology. But you could not know all these information if I did not tell 
them to you. You are used to Tuareg now, since you saw her sitting you im-
mediately recognized her as a Tuareg. She wears her veil and did not tell 
anything since you entered this house.17
To understand Mohamed’s argument here, let me describe the context of the con-
versation. That day, when I entered Mohamed Ag Irgimit’s yard, he was sitting on 
the left side, together with his wife, two sons of nine and two years old, and his 
daughter in her mid-twenties. His daughter wore a white-and-red veil. When she 
saw me entering their home, she quickly expanded her veil to cover her head and 
moved closer to her mother. Her mother also slightly adjusted her veil. Mohamed 
Ag Irgimit himself did not have a turban. However, focusing on his daughter’s 
appearance, Mohamed’s statement reveals how the body postures (way of sitting) 
and the veil of his daughter came together in the expression of her Tuareg identity. 
As an ideal Tuareg woman, in Mohamed’s sense, she wore a veil and did not talk 
to her father or me during the hours I spent with them. Mossa’s and Mohamed’s 
accounts reveal the relationships between body, jalabia, turban, female veil, and 
assertions of authentic Tuareg identity. Ultimately, the accounts invite us to ap-
proach these traits as both symbolic and material processes that come together in 
dress as embodied practice (Hansen 2004; Schulz 2007a).
7.1.6	 “A	Tuareg	man	should	have	a	sword”
Mossa Ag Attaher also interpreted his possession of a sword as related to his Tuareg 
identity. One day he invited me to share a meal with his family in Niamey Plateau. 
He had slaughtered his last goat to welcome me. Sitting next to him around the 
tea kettle, I highly appreciated his hospitality and started a conversation about the 
changes in his life situation since leaving Niger in February 2013. He first smiled, 
then stood up and went to his room to bring a sword. Upon his return from his 
room he put the sword aside me and stated that:
I can tell you that I have become now un Touareg complet [literally full Tu-
areg]. I have gotten a sword. This was what I lacked until now. I saved money 
little by little until I could get this sword with which I protect my family. I 
bought it for 80,000 CFA.18 You know that there are many bandits in Niamey 
17 From conversation with Mohamed Ag Irgimit on 28/11/2012 in Niamey.
18 About €123 in 2016.
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who regularly attack people during nights. Before I got this sword, I did not 
have anything to protect my family members with. This is what makes me a 
man (the narrator showing the sword).19
This account exhibits various social significances attributed to owning a sword. 
Owning a sword makes him feel a Tuareg man. The sword enables him to provide 
his family members with security. Providing his family with security stands out 
here as a performative practice of Tuareg masculinity. It is precisely Mossa’s ca-
pacity as head of the family to provide his family with security that explains his 
sensation of pride for having become a Touareg complet (full Tuareg), as the smile 
indicated. Being fully Tuareg can, therefore, be interpreted here as social achieve-
ment resulting from Mossa’s capacity to provide security to his family. The crucial 
role that the sword plays in this process reveals its power to mediate Mossa’s rela-
tionship to his culture and Tuareg social identity.
7.1.7	 “A	Tuareg	has	to	marry	another	Tuareg”
Another key aspect of Mossa Ag Attaher’s explanation of what makes him an “au-
thentic Tuareg” focused on marriage. He took marriage as a social form of asser-
tion of one’s identity. He argued that:
19 Conversation with Mossa Ag Attaher on 18/08/2014 in Niamey.
Figure 7:	Mossa’s sword on 24/08/2014. Photograph S. Diallo.
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You see people like Didjenne. He married his daughter to a rich Zarma man. 
He made the man pay one villa in Niamey, one motorbike, a car, and lot of 
money. You see this Souleymane. He is only interested in money but not our 
tradition, our culture. This is not how a Tuareg behaves. I will never let my 
daughter marry with someone who is not a Tuareg. A Tuareg has to marry 
a Tuareg. You see, Alassane, Alhabib, Mohamed Ag Irgimit we all married 
women from home. We all came here in Niamey since our childhood as ref-
ugees. We lived in Lazaré before and later on, we came to Niamey. But we all 
married women from home. If I married with a Hausa and Zarma woman, 
you, Souleymane would not ask me since I would have changed and will no 
longer be a Tuareg.20
Mossa establishes a contrast between two categories of free white Tuareg. One 
consists of those like himself, Mohamed Ag Irgimit, and Alhabib Ag Sidi, who 
claim their culture is manifested in their choices of marital partners. Though 
they left northern Mali a long time ago, they still demonstrated their allegiance 
to home through marrying free-born Tuareg women. Mossa’s argument points to 
how marrying women from the Hausa and Zarma ethnic groups would have led 
to changes in his self-perception. The man called Dedienne is the illustrative ex-
ample of a second category of Tuareg, whose choices of marital partners demon-
strated that they have abandoned their culture. People of this second category do 
not care about the implications of marrying non-Tuareg partners, instead caring 
about material benefits such as having a motorbike, a villa in Niamey, and a lot 
of money.
Mossa’s criticism of Dedienne was also pragmatic. By opting for lot of money, 
a villa, and motorbike as bridewealth, Dedienne made it impossible for young 
free Tuareg with a refugee background to marry his daughter even if these wished 
to have her. Mossa interpreted this as preferring the money to fellow Tuareg. 
In contrast, Mossa said: “I feel better when donating my daughter to one of us 
rather than accepting the big money (grande somme d’argent) from the others.” 
This contrast is fundamental. While the former gives some satisfaction to help 
other fellow Tuareg, the latter is just a material benefit for personal interest. He 
attributed more value to donating than having money. One could conclude from 
the above comments that what makes marriage a decisive social practice condu-
cive to authentic Tuaregness in Mossa’s view is not marriage itself. Rather, it is 
both the choice of the marital partner and the preference a father gives either to 
material benefit in his own personal/family interest or to donating one’s daughter 
to a fellow Tuareg, even if they do not have enough spending power. Mossa’s in-
terpretation of donation seems similar to Alhabib and Ibrahim’s arguments about 
solidarity that I now discuss below.
20 Selected from conversation on 07/10/2012 in Niamey.
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7.1.8 “The Tuareg have to help each other”
Inter-refugee solidarity was one central aspect through which informants assessed 
whether one stayed Tuareg or not in Niamey. The term used for solidarity initially 
called (anmataf, an milil, tasaght) in Mali was an marh (to love each other). It 
covers and expresses itself through a range of social practices, such as regularly 
visiting fellow free-born Tuareg, sharing what one has with others, and, more im-
portantly, supporting each other with financial means. For example, after spend-
ing a morning transporting rice his fellows got at the distribution center, Alhabib 
Ag Sidi put to me that although
I spent several hours this morning at the consulate for the distribution. It was 
not for myself that I was there. It was by solidarity. Thank God that I have 
my retirement monthly payment, house, and car. My son is now working at 
custom services and is now the one taking care of the family. He does support 
the family with everything these days. I go there because I think my place is 
there to care for other people. When people see us there, they just think that 
we are begging for food. We are those committed to the common interest. 
Thanks God, this is not what we are there for. I fueled my car to help people, 
especially old women living here without means. Even if they get food, they 
cannot take it home. I helped those. If a Tuareg does not help out the other 
Tuareg, no one else will do so. I helped them because I am Tuareg like them. 
We have all suffered through time and should hold together.21
To understand Alhabib’s solidarity toward other free-born Tuareg, let us first 
outline the social context within which it took place. As explained earlier (cf. 
chapter 4), the authorities in Niger refused to create a refugee camp in the neigh-
borhood of Niamey in 2012.22 Consequently, as is the case with urban refugees 
across East Africa (Malkki 1989; Peterson/Hovil 2003; Sommers 2001), UNHCR 
did not establish a clear strategy of support for the refugees living in Niamey town. 
This situation brought the Songhay and free-born Tuareg refugees to create, on 
their own initiative, a structure known as the commission de crise in French. The 
committee worked in the following manner throughout 2012 and 2013: the free-
born Tuareg members of the committee were in charge of identifying and record-
ing their fellow free-born Tuareg in Niamey. In their part, the Songhay members 
of the committee dealt with Songhay, Bellah-Iklan slaves, and Fulani. Since its 
creation the main task of this committee was to persuade NGOs that existed there 
an urgent need for humanitarian assistance for several displaced groups in urban 
settings. Whenever the committee received donations its members immediately 
set the days for distributions.23 The distributions took place in the courtyard of 
the former Mali consulate in the quartier of Koira Kano. It was during one of 
21 Selected from conversation with Alhabib Ag Sidi on 17/01/2013 in Niamey.
22 Instead, the refugee settlements camps were located in Abala, Mangaizé, Ayorou, and Tilia.
23 The main donors were countries such as Qatar, Turkey, and South Africa.
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these distributions that Alhabib transported the rice and oil received by other 
free Tuareg, who did not have means to bring what they received home. As Al-
habid Ag Sidi says in his account, many people suspected that he was primarily 
concerned with his own benefit from the support the NGOs gave for refugees in 
Niamey town.
Against this view, Alhabib took the notion of an marh (to love each other, 
now understood as solidarity) to describe his action. He paid for the fuel from 
his own pocket. He later argued that he did not target close relatives. He consid-
ered all free white Tuareg the same and equal. This made his actions differ from 
the other free-born Tuareg, who visited and materially supported with food and 
money just their close relatives. He called those who did so the “greedy people” 
(imiwila or imarhan in tissatenasen) because, to him, the exclusive help of these 
toward specific relatives simultaneously excluded other free-born white Tuareg. 
The discrepancy Alhabib established between himself and the imiwila helps us to 
understand to what extent the former’s conception of inter-free Tuareg solidarity 
(an marh) was informed by aspirations for unity among free-born Tuareg from 
northern Mali in Niamey.
Ibrahim’s understanding was similar to Alhabib’s. Ibrahim once reported that 
he and his age mates had established a mechanism of support to their parents over 
the past years in Niamey. This mechanism consisted of putting together 500 CFA24 
per week per person for a certain period. They did so since they knew that their 
parents had serious problems to make ends meet. After they had gathered enough 
money they began to purchase millet, sugar, rice, milk, and tea, informing their 
mothers and fathers that they had established something to support them. Their 
parents could borrow cash or borrow rice, sugar, and tea, and then pay back at 
the end of each month. According to him this functioned well and was much ap-
preciated. Ibrahim interpreted the support for their parents as a material form of 
expressing solidarity, their commitment to a free Tuareg communal interest, and 
building up the tumast tan Kel Tamasheq (the Tuareg collectivity). Both Alhabib 
and Ibrahim showed that the social practices of solidarity expressed allegiance to 
the Tuareg culture. This illustrates that they did not only seek to reproduce a cul-
ture that existed in the past but attempted to reshape this past culture according 
to their aspirations for unity emerging in response to their predicament of exile 
in Niamey.
7.1.9 “We want to return and live in our country (akal)”
For the informants in Niamey, the efforts to maintain their culture through e.g. 
language, clothing styles, and Tuareg musical culture, which tied them to northern 
Mali, must ultimately be understood as a desire and hope to return home one day. 
24 Less than €1 in 2016.
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They repeatedly stressed this guiding principle of their everyday life. Mossa Ag 
Attaher once argued that:
the desert is our country [akal]. It is where we lived, and we will live in the 
future. We came from there and we will return there. This is why we can’t 
neglect our culture. Because, if we neglect it now what will we do once we 
return back home?25
This refers not only to past customs but also more importantly to preparation for a 
future life back home. It indicates a cultural repertoire with specific aspirations, re-
garding, for example, Mossa’s usage of the notion akal (country). Etymologically, 
the notion of akal can mean land, settlement, and a country. In the nomad culture 
in northern Mali, akal (land) is always placed under the authority of the amenokal 
(the chief). Hence, Mossa’s use of the term refers to an exclusively “Tuareg imag-
inary” of a future country in current northern Mali placed under the authority of 
an amenokal (Tuareg chief) instead of the Malian state. As hinted at in chapter 4, 
it was through this lens that my informants interpreted the military coup d’état 
and the near collapse of the state institutions in 2012. To them, the political unrest 
in southern Mali indicated that the time for their return to home was near. This 
opinion was an interpretation of the prediction of the old free-born Tuareg man 
who lived around Djebock in the region of Gao. This old man had said that the 
free-born Tuareg exile would end up with the collapse of the Malian state institu-
tions due to internal conflicts between people in southern Mali.
The way in which Mossa’s account situates the future at the center of his con-
ception of everyday day cultural practices in Niamey illustrates a recent claim by 
Appadurai (Appadurai 2013). In his attempt to conceptualize a more productive 
relationship between economics, culture, and development in Mumbai in India, 
Appadurai suggests that anthropologists should change their approaches to cul-
ture, arguing that the future remains a stranger to many anthropological models, 
conceptualizing it as a matter of “pastness.” The key words are habit, custom, herit-
age, and tradition (2013, 180). According to Appadurai, culture is not only about the 
past but also entails a capacity to aspire. This implies seeing culture as a dialogue 
between aspirations and sedimented traditions (2013, 195). Mossa’s account illus-
trates that it precisely through the lens of their aspirations for future life at home 
that the free white Tuareg informants live their contemporary life in Niamey.
The term niameize is taken from the Zarma language to refer to people living 
in Niamey. In ordinary languages or everyday usages, some Hausa and Zarma 
researchers with whom I shared time over lunch, dinner, and coffee, tended to 
use the term niameize in order to interpret the connectedness of people resid-
ing in Niamey with the world beyond, through TV, musical education, life style. 
Refugee informants used the notion as a derogatory term to pejoratively label 
other residents living in Niamey as people cut off from their social and cultural 
25 Selected from conversations on 13/01/2013 in Niamey.
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roots. Mossa viewed free white Tuareg, who tended to resemble the Hausa and 
Zarma through socializing with these at fada, and listening to mali yaro music, as 
people who have become niameized. For Mossa, doing so implies that they have 
no longer any hope or desire to return back home one day. Similar perspectives 
informed ways in which the Bellah-Iklan informants discussed their intra-group 
relations in Abala.
7.2 Staying noirs	in	Abala
In what follows, I examine Assalim’s, Inawélène’s, and Ahiyou’s interpretations 
of themselves as being part of Bellah-Iklan who focused on their history in the 
context of exile in Abala. My analysis will center on social significance of male 
Bellah-Iklan social gatherings and their choice to not listening to al-guitara music 
of free white Tuareg and their desire to return and change the political balance 
between the free white Tuareg and the Bellah-Iklan in the area of Menaka. I ar-
gue that these social practices did not only signify the social difference between 
the Bellah-Iklan and others, such as Fulani, free-born Tuareg, and Songhay, in 
the refugee camp. They also generated a line of social difference between the Bel-
lah-Iklan, who held their history, and others.
7.2.1 “This hangar is where we noirs should come”
On Sunday September 14, 2014, I was invited to stay overnight at Inawélène’s place. 
We stayed in the first quartier where his first wife and her children lived. After 
breakfast, we started to walk toward Ahiyou’s place, exchanging greetings with 
neighbors. One was Mohamed, a son of Ahiyou, who lived with his wife close to 
his father. After exchanging greetings with Mohamed I asked him whether he was 
to join us at his father’s place. Mohamed said: “No I am not coming.” When we 
continued on our way from Mohamed, Inawélène stated:
You see Souleymane, all noirs are not noirs in this camp. Some people are 
noirs by their skin color, but all they do is red [read: free white Tuareg]. This 
hangar is where we noirs should come (Inawélène pointing his index finger to 
Ahiyou’s hangar from few meters away). Since you came here in 2012, you saw 
me, le vieux [read: Ahiyou], Assalim, and many others going to the hangar 
every day. At that time, we met up at the hangar near the office of ACTED. 
After HCR [read UNHCR] had destroyed this hangar, and that le vieux fell 
sick in between we decided to meet up at his place to discuss things for the 
noirs. It is like Tessayt n-azawagh [assessing the history of Awazagh] we had in 
Menaka. People you see there every day are the noirs. They hold our history. 
They did not abandon it for any reason, like others did. People like Mohamed, 
Ousmane, they are not noirs [black]. Not all. They are red instead. Look at 
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Ousmane for example. He worked for Aroudeni, the mayor of Anderboukane 
who is [red]. Mohamed also supports Aroudeni to the detriment of the noirs 
[black people] including his own father. Do you understand this?26
Inawélène’s interpretation of Mohamed’s refusal to join us reveals the social signif-
icances. The account first points to the hangar as a “setting of performance” of men’ 
memberships in the group. Goffman defines a setting of performance as a setting 
that stays put, geographically speaking, so that those who would use a particular 
setting as part of their performance cannot begin their act until they have brought 
themselves to the appropriate place (Goffman 1959, 33). For Inawélène, the hangar 
is such a situated geographic and social context where the male  Bellah-Iklan had 
to go in order to prove and deserve their memberships of the group like Assalim, 
Ahiyou, and many others.
Inawélène’s account also shows the social importance of the hangar. The topics 
focused on Bellah-Iklan history and, through recounting this, participants recon-
structed the history of the desert in northern Mali (cf. chapters 5 and 6). Accord-
ing to the account above, that is what rendered the hangar a continuum of Tessayt 
n-azawagh, the earlier Bellah political propaganda program broadcast on radio 
Adrar in Menaka prior to their forceful migration. It is also why Inawélène inter-
preted attending social gatherings, which became associated with blackness27 due 
to major themes of the discussions, as expressive of how the participants held their 
history in exile. To him, the particular focus on the reconstruction of Bellah-Iklan 
history set those who took part in the discussions apart from those who did not. 
In later conversations, Inawélène and Assalim spoke very critically of those who, 
instead of joining the discussions, ran small jobs made available by humanitarian 
organizations. Both informants treated those who did not join the hangar group as 
traitors, which, by implication, meant people who denied their history and iden-
tity for whatever material interest. Inawélène used the term “imiwila” or “imarhan 
in tissatenasen” (see above) who only care about their own material interest to feed 
their stomachs.
Inawélène and Assalim both worked sometimes as assistants and translators 
for healthcare programs run by NGOs in 2012 and 2013. Their main critique was 
that the Bellah-Iklan men could organize themselves in a way that each of them 
could get a chance to work at least once or twice a week. This could only be done 
if they all met up under the hangar and decided who could work each day accord-
ing to the jobs available. From my own observations this happened sometimes. 
What needs to be understood is that Assalim and Inawélène’s ideas of sharing 
job opportunities were closely informed by their aspirations for inter-Bellah-Iklan 
26 From conversations on 14/09/2014 in Abala.
27 I even also observed several times that many Hausa, Songhay, and Fulani left the hangar because 
they found the topics monotonous in always focusing on the relationships between the Bel-
lah-Iklan and the free-born Tuareg.
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solidarity, which they considered to be a fundamental prerequisite for the success 
of their political project: the creation and consolidation of the peuple noir.
This is why Assalim and Inawélène criticized other male Bellah-Iklan, who 
sought to work every day without leaving any space for others to gain some in-
come in the refugee camp. One example of this was the chief of the third quar-
tier. Inawélène and Assalim criticized him because, as the chief of the quartier, 
he was often asked by NGOs to suggest names for certain tasks. They argued that 
whenever NGOs workers asked him for workers, he immediately chose himself 
or rather his son. For Inawélène and Assalim, since the son of the chief of the 
quartier was not married, it meant that he still lived with his father, so that the 
family would have a double income. This reveals the hangar not only as a space for 
talking and criticizing others, but also as a space where news and opportunities 
for temporary jobs were spread and offered. For the Bellah-Iklan gathered under 
the hangar, their counterparts, who did not join like the chief of the third quar-
tier, remained Tuareg by traits of characters. The former depicted the Tuareg as 
people who do not show any solidarity toward other Tuareg. To substantiate this 
claim, Assalim often stressed that in Menaka, two Tuareg siblings could both eat 
in the presence of the other without inviting him or her to share the meal. For this 
reason, some Bellah-Iklan were considered Tuareg because of their practices of 
not sharing with other noirs. Such interpretations further complicated our under-
standing of the Bellah-Iklan and free Tuareg as two distinctive sets of racial cate-
gories (cf.  chapter 6). For instance, Inawélène argued that people like  Mohamed 
and Ousmane could no longer be considered as noirs. In Inawélène’s view, what 
made Mohamed and Ousmane non-noirs (black) was their refusal to join the con-
versations under the hangar, and their support to the free white Tuareg mayor 
of Anderboukane, the late Aroudeni. In his perspective, working for the mayor 
Aroudeni implicitly implied working against Ahiyou and the peuple noir.28
What one could draw from Inawélène’s account in this regard is that being red 
(shaggaran) or noir (Amikwal or Takawalt) should not be understood as deter-
mined by skin color only. Rather, it is also a result from what one does in every-
day life. Social practices, such as Mohamed and Ousmane’s support to Aroudeni, 
brought some informants to doubt their memberships of the Bellah-Iklan though 
they were in exile in Abala too. The argument that rendered Mohamed and Ous-
mane red (shaggaran) reveals how the skin color and specific social conducts 
come together in the formation and de-formation of racial categories. Since, to 
stay Bellah-Iklan of the peuple noir in Abala was closely connected to the perfor-
mative capacity of certain social conducts, the discussions also suggested that only 
successful Bellah-Iklan could call themselves noirs (blacks). Moreover, Inawélène 
also considered the imiwila as those afraid of being identified as people against the 
28 Inawélène’s critic is that, for example, though Ousmane is the son in law of Ahiyou Intagaout, he 
has accepted Aroudeni’s offer to appoint him general secretary of the commune (municipality) of 
Anderboukane for years.
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free-born Tuareg once they returned to Mali. Therefore, for this reason, they did 
not dare to take part in the discussions criticizing these.
7.2.2 “We noirs	only	listen	to	music	of	history,	not	to	Satan	music”
Assalim, Inawélène, and Ahiyou defined their relationship to the history of the 
Bellah-Iklan through listening to the music of history and not that of Satan.29 
What they referred to as music of history in Abala is characteristically a guitar mu-
sical genre performed by a group founded by Assalim in Mali. The group is called 
atarekh (histoire). Its songs mainly deal with calls for inter-Bellah-Iklan unity. 
During my stays in 2012/2013 and 2014 in Abala, comments typically prompted 
ring tones of Inawélène, Assalim, or participants’ mobile phones. These comments 
often began with the exclamation: allahu akbar (God is Great)! In answering my 
question why he preferred these songs by Assalim’s group, to others sung by free 
white Tuareg’s al-guitara performed by the Kel-Tinariwen group, Inawélène once 
stated that:
What needs to be clarified to you is that our music sings our history. It tells 
other peoples that we are owners of the desert. It also tells us that we noirs 
should be united for our future. If we don’t unite ourselves, it is clear that we 
will disappear forever […]. So, if we don’t listen a music that tells us things 
like these, why will we listen to Satan music? Even though they are both gui-
tars. The Tinariwen people sing hatred songs. They want violence. They want 
to destroy everything. We don’t do this. Our music never invites people to do 
violence, to take up Kalashnikovs for killing other peoples […]. We never do 
this. We are peaceful people.30
Inawélène’s description stresses the constitutive power of the lyrics. He argued that 
participants to the hangar conversations identified themselves with this music of 
history because its content centers attention on the Bellah-Iklan and calls for the 
necessity of their union. The account therefore reflects on listening to the content 
as specific social practices through which the Bellah-Iklan men constitute them-
selves as noirs.
The account establishes a contrast between the music of history and that of 
Satan. What is taken here as Satan music refers to the al-guitara musical genre 
of the free-born Tuareg. To Inawélène that refers to violence, hatred, and armed 
conflict (cf. Klute 2013; Lecocq 2002). He interpreted the Satan as all that is op-
posed to God’s will, maintaining that God, the Almighty, is peaceful, and therefore 
does not like and support violence, which always destroys life. Inawélène tended 
29 They put “We noirs only listen to music of history, not to Satan music” in french sometimes by 
saying: “la musique de l’histoire et la musique du Satan”. 
30 Selected from conversations on 13/09/2014 in Abala.
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to conceive of the Bellah-Iklan as people who do things that God, the Almighty, 
likes. By depicting the Bellah-Iklan as peaceful people, whose musical culture does 
not imply calls for hatred, violence, and armed conflicts, he reflexively considered 
the Bellah-Iklan as people of the God in contrast with those of Satan. Inawélène’s 
comments enrich our knowledge about the diversity of Tuareg guitar musical cul-
ture. He established contrasts between the free-born Tuareg and the Bellah-Iklan 
musical cultures. By showing that there also exists a Bellah-Iklan guitar style that 
competes with that of the former masters, Inawélène’s comments complement the 
extensive literature that focuses on free white Tuareg musical culture (Brandes 
1989; Klute 2013; Lecocq 2010).
7.2.3 “We stay here for our history”
Ahiyou, and several other Bellah-Iklan men, valued staying in the refugee camp 
whereas they could have gone somewhere to live in better conditions. Their state-
ments reveal the crucial significance the social location of Abala has come to ac-
quire in Bellah-Iklan social life. For example, Ahiyou once argued that:
When one looks closely at the social composition of the camp population, 
I can only see my relatives. They are about 80% of the camp population. I 
prefer to suffer with them, even though my health condition is now degraded 
enough due to these winds, nutritional problems […]. But, still I will con-
tinue to stay here. I prefer this suffering here. It is our history that tied us with 
each other. Ah yes, it is for our history that I stay here.31
Ahiyou’s statement illustrates that Abala has become a social site through which 
several Bellah-Iklan men could define and express their relationships to their his-
tory. Ahiyou assessed his own stay in Abala as a manifestation of commitment 
to Bellah-Iklan communal history. To understand Ahiyou’s statement further, we 
need to situate it within its specific context. It was particularly cold in Abala dur-
ing the night from Saturday, 29 to Sunday, 30 December 2012, the temperature 
dropping to 6°C between 2 and 6 am. At that time, the refugees in Abala had not 
begun to build brick houses, still living in plastic tents torn by the wind. Many 
parents got up at night due to children crying. When I arrived in the refugee set-
tlement I went to greet and share morning tea with Ahiyou around 7.30 am. Soon 
after, Inawélène arrived. Ahiyou wore a black pullover under his grey boubou. His 
disturbing state of health was revealed by recurrent coughs that punctuated the 
few sentences he pronounced. Inawélène and I noticed that these recurrent coughs 
affected Ahiyou’s persuasive voice and capacity to dominate the discussions. After 
a while, Inawélène said: “You see Souleymane, le vieux is sick today. But even if you 
tell him now to go to Niamey or Bamako, he will refuse.” Reacting to Inawélene’s 
31 Selected from conversations with Ahiyou and Inawélène and few other men on 09/01/2013 in Abala.
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statement, Ahiyou stressed that “despite I have my sons in Bamako or in Niamey, 
where I could go, I prefer to stay here to show my solidarity towards the others.” In 
many respects, this statement further substantiates Ahiyou’s account above. Both 
arguments illustrate that, to him, staying in Abala expressed his solidarity toward 
other Bellah-Iklan, who did not have means to go anywhere else.
Mohamed Intabagaout, a former headmaster of the public primary school in 
Menaka, once stated that:
I have a monthly salary. But in spite of that, I still stayed in the refugee camp 
because of the others. We are all relatives we are of the black people. I cannot 
go somewhere else to have a better life whereas the others are suffering. We 
will all suffer together here.32
Both Ahiyou and Mohamed Intabagaout attempt to define their relationships to Bel-
lah-Iklan history through staying in Abala, though they had opportunities and means 
to go somewhere else, implied reflexively their depictions of those Bellah-Iklan who 
chose other destinations (such as Bamako and Niamey) as people who have aban-
doned their history. For both informants fleeing to Bamako was somewhat different 
from fleeing to Abala due to conditions evoked earlier in chapter 4.
7.2.4	 “When	we	return	back	home,	nothing	will	be	like	before”
To Inawélène, Assalim, and Ahiyou, to engage Bellah-Iklan history in everyday 
life were preparations for their return to Menaka. Inawélène put this in more ex-
plicit terms as follows:
In all cases, what I can tell is that when we return this time, nothing will 
be like before. We will never fight against each other again. You know be-
fore we came here some of us considered themselves Tuareg. They supported 
ADEMA. But now we came here and they now saw they are not Tuareg. The 
Tuareg are not here. They are those who forced us to leave our home. The les-
son these people who supported ADEMA learned from being here is that we 
are the noirs but not the Tuareg. That we should not fight against each other 
anymore. Inchallah, the UMADD will come to power in Menaka for the better 
of the noirs. This was what Aghamad had told us.33
This account shows that the desire to return and to change the balance of politi-
cal power between the free-born Tuareg and Bellah-Iklan was the interpretative 
framework of the everyday action of male Bellah-Iklan. It also demonstrates that 
32 Selected from conversations with Inawélène, Assalim, and other men under the hangar in Abala 
on 09/01/2013. What is peculiar about the school headmaster is that he was politically supportive 
of the free-born before his exile. But now he shares the views of Inawélène and Assalim against the 
free-born Tuareg in Menaka.
33 Selected from conversations on 18/12/2012 in Abala.
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the Bellah-Iklan informants continued their earlier struggles against the free white 
Tuareg in Abala. To Inawélène their stay in Abala seemed to have a significant role 
in this because it enabled to reshape several Bellah-Iklan notions of themselves 
as noirs and not members of their initial free-born Tuareg clan structures. For 
him, such changes already manifested themselves through ways in which those 
Bellah-Iklan, who supported ADEMA, that is associated (at least in the refugee 
camp in Abala) with the free white Tuareg in Menaka, now decided to join other 
noirs. Inawélène argued that the refugee camp offered a greater opportunity for 
Bellah-Iklan living in Menaka, in the village of Anderboukane who were freed 
from their masters and those who still lived in bush with their masters at the 
time of their forceful migration to meet up, to get know each other, and organize 
themselves politically before their return home. In his view, these changes will 
ultimately imply significant reconfigurations of the balance of political power in 
Menaka. The change will result in significant support that UMADD will gain. This 
significant support will, in turn, allow the Bellah-Iklan to gain political control 
over the three northern regions of Mali in the near future. Yet, the longing for a 
new balance of political power, to which the male Bellah-Iklan aspired to in Abala, 
indicates the future.
7.3	 How	the	two	perspectives	relate	to	each	other?
The previous two sections have consisted of examinations of various areas of social 
practices through which urban free-born Tuareg and the Bellah-Iklan in Abala 
sought to maintain and express their distinctive social identity as Tuareg in Nia-
mey and noirs in Abala respectively. I have shown that authentic Tuareg identity 
(Kel Alassal) is revealed through everyday visits, youth gatherings, language, and 
ideal Tuareg dress pattern, as well as choices of marital partners and the desire to 
return to live in an exclusively Tuareg country. In contrast to the free white Tuareg 
in Niamey, informants associated the sword with “some negative connotations” 
in Abala. From their perspective, the sword is a material object for non-Muslim 
people due to its form that is similar to the cross of Jesus Christ. Assalim and 
Inawélène evoked the sword while referring to the free white Tuareg historical 
connection to “Christian culture.” Also, like the sword, while the Tamasheq lan-
guage was an important aspect of the ways in which my town informants labored 
to distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups in Niamey, the Bellah-Iklan 
informants in Abala did not take it as markers of collective identity and difference. 
They spoke three main and different languages and the Tamasheq did not have any 
particular importance for them. What mattered to them was the everyday partic-
ipation to male conversations, listening to the music of history, and the specific 
aspirations for a better Bellah-Iklan political future in northern Mali.
The social significances both groups of informants gave to domains of their 
social life examined throughout this chapter set the free white Tuareg, who stayed 
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“Tuareg” in Niamey, and the Bellah-Iklan, who stayed noirs in Abala, apart from 
those who did not. I argued that while these areas of social practices could consol-
idate the memberships of either group for some, which might not be the case for 
others. This revealed that the Tuareg and the Bellah-Iklan did not constitute two 
fixed sets of racial categories (chapter 6). Mossa Ag Attaher, Mohamed Ag Irgimit, 
Alhabib Ag Sidi, and Ibrahim referred to other free-born Tuareg as those who be-
came Zarma and Hausa due to fact that they did not visit fellow free-born Tuareg, 
wear the turban, the jalabia ensemble, listen to Kel Tinariwen’s songs. Similarly in 
Abala, Inawélène, and Assalim ironically called Ahiyou’s son Mohamed and his 
in-law Ousmane “the red” (read: free white Tuareg). This was due partly to their 
support to the free-born Tuareg mayor of Anderboukane. The social processes 
explored have also in common the fact that the Bellah-Iklan and the free-born 
Tuareg informants did not conceive culture or history as a set of past customs, 
habits, heritage, and traditions only. Rather, their arguments illustrate that their 
representations of their past histories or cultures were also aspirations for specific 
future they longed for.
Both groups envision their future in northern Mali, but their political projects 
stand against one another. The future of the Bellah-Iklan is conceptualized in the 
shadow of Aghamad’s prophecies referred to in chapter 4. According to Aghamad, 
the Bellah-Iklan, who are the “true inhabitants of the desert” in northern Mali, 
will return and live in peace and prosperity. But their return, peace, and prosperity 
are closely connected to the future of their rival free white Tuareg. As the inform-
ants recalled it, Aghamad has insisted that the free white Tuareg will be expelled 
from northern Mali. Therefore the Bellah-Iklan will return and live in peace and 
prosperity. These aspirations clash with the free white Tuareg project for the fu-
ture. They envisaged a future “Tuareg country” in northern Mali. Their claims did 
not clearly define what would be the relationship between the “Tuareg country” 
and other social groups living in the north. But, the claims implicitly assume that 
the withdrawal of the Malian state will result in the withdrawal of its allied Bel-
lah-Iklan and Songhay as well.34 Therefore, the “Tuareg country” will take place in 
the absence of the other social groups living in northern Mali.
Such selective ways in which groups of informants assert and protect their 
differences from the others in exile, in preparation of the future, correspond to 
processes of Hutu refugee’s purification in the refugee camp of Mishamo in ru-
ral Tanzania. Inspired by Douglas’s classical work: Purity and in Danger (Douglas 
1966), Malkki wrote:
Curiosity, the status of “refugee,” which ordinarily acts to make interstitial or 
liminal —and hence polluting […] in the national order of things, had here 
been transformed through a curious social alchemy into a state of purity. 
34 As discussed in chapter 5, the free white Tuareg informants did not conceptualize the state, the 
Bellah-Iklan, and the Songhay as distinct. To them, all of these three stand against the free white 
Tuareg.
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While they were by definition, as refugees, boundary crossers […], this par-
ticular crossing was actually the beginning of categorical purification in the 
refugees’ own eyes. (Malkki 1995b, 230f.)
Transferring Malkki’s discussion from its original ethnographic context to the 
present one is helpful because it enables us to grasp the social and political im-
plications of the collectivities at once. For example, the free white Tuareg and 
Bellah-Iklan tend to break with any social mixture in exile. They reconstructed 
collectivities that are purely composed of people according to specific physical 
and moral characteristics and social practices. For the Bellah-Iklan in Abala their 
redefinition as “a people” implies breaking with any mixture free white Tuareg. 
Thus, the construction of the peuple noir goes hand in hand with purification of 
the Bellah-Iklan identity. As for the free white Tuareg in Niamey, the argument 
that the Bellah-Iklan are not Tuareg, according to moral and physical character-
istics, entails avoidance of mixture with non-Tuareg groups. For both groups of 
informants, these processes began in Niamey and Abala but will be effective under 
specific political orders in Mali.
7.4 Concluding remark
This chapter began with an argument of the French anthropologist André Bour-
geot, who depicted Tuareg refugees in the Maghreb as people who are discon-
nected from their social and cultural roots linked to the territory and lineages left 
behind them northern Mali and Niger (Bourgeot 1990). His understanding inter-
connected and fixed culture, social identity, and territory in a rigid fashion. There-
fore, the social fact of exile that implies the relocation outside the ordinary sites of 
living consequently leads to the collapse of culture and identity. In contrast to this 
argument, I have attempted to show what has become idioms of constructions and 
expressions of Tuareg identity and noirs for the Bellah-Iklan under social condi-
tions of exile in Niger. Drawing on Ferguson’s notion of cultural style, which refers 
to practices that signify differences between social categories (Ferguson 1999, 95), 
I took the notion of adinat wi ataf nen atarekh (those who did hold the culture, 
history, or tradition) as a key metaphor to trace what the free white Tuareg did in 
order to stay “authentic Tuareg” (Kel Alassal) in Niamey. They did so through vis-
its they paid to fellow free-born Tuareg, choice of marital partner, their Tamasheq 
dialects, spoken in northern Mali, listening to al-guitara culture, wearing the ja-
labia ensemble, and their desire to return and live one day in their country (akal). 
According to their interpretations, these domains of social practices have become 
criteria that could do and undo membership of the Tuareg group. The interpreta-
tions also showed that in contrast to most studies that traced how urban refugees 
sought to hide their identity from their host communities in Dar Es Salam, Tanza-
nia (Malkki 1989; Sommers 2001), the informants labored to keep their difference 
visible from ethnic residents in urban Niamey.
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As for the Bellah-Iklan, I examined male social practices of meeting under the 
hangar between 2012 and 2014, their refusal to listen to music by free-born Tuareg 
Kel Tinariwen, solidarity toward Bellah-Iklan, and the desire to return and rule 
once back home through which Ahiyou, Assalim, and Inawélène reconstructed 
themselves as “a people” who kept their history under social conditions of exile. 
Their interpretations of these domains of social practices revealed that the refugee 
camp becomes an historical location and provides material conditions that me-
diate Ahiyou, Assalim, and Inawélène’s relationships to Bellah-Iklan history and 
identity.
8. Conclusion—a “critical event”
In Critical Events: an Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India, Veena 
Das introduces the notion of “critical events” to point to the extent to which the ri-
ots during the partition of India and Pakistan in 1946– 1947 and the Bhopal tragedy 
in 1984 reshaped Indian societies (Das 1995). Her understanding of what renders 
an event “critical” follows François Furet’s conceptualization of the French Revo-
lution as an event par excellence (Furet 1978). According to Furet, the revolution 
instituted a new modality of historical actions that was not inscribed in the inven-
tory of that situation (Das 1995, 5). Following Furet, Das regards the events in In-
dia as having marked the onset of new modes of actions that redefined traditional 
categories such as the codes of purity and honour, the meaning of martyrdom, and 
that of a heroic life. A variety of “political” entities, such as caste groups, religious 
communities, women’s groups, and the nation as a whole acquired new forms of 
significance (1995, 5f.). For example, speaking about the Sikhs’ discourse in the 
Punjab that came to yield consequent political influence in the India nation-state, 
Das wrote
This discourse was part of the political language being evolved by the militant 
movement, of which the purpose was to create a politically active group and 
forge effective unity among the Sikhs. Thus a “we” group was being created 
out of a heterogeneous community to function as an effective political agency 
within the modern state structures in India. (Das 1995, 118)
Das also argues that this militant discourse represented a continuation of a series 
of historical efforts by Sikhs to preserve their identity. It was thus for the purpose 
of community formation that the Sikh militants established contemporaneity be-
tween non-contemporaneous events (Das 1995, 121). By establishing relationships 
between certain key events in the Sikhs’ history, the militants’ political language 
functions more to produce a particular reality than to represent it (1995, 121). In this 
sense, Das insists that Sikh identity cannot be treated as possessing an unchanging 
essence. Rather, it is an identity being produced anew in every period (1995, 121f.). 
To what extent can the exile of free-born Tuareg and Bellah-Iklan in Niger be read 
as critical events? And if so, to what development did this critical event give rise? 
Because their exile in Niger has not ended yet, we cannot grasp its full implications 
at this stage. Still, Das’s perspective is useful for reflecting on the implications of 
the process of constructing collectivity in Niamey and Abala that I have illumi-
nated throughout this dissertation.
The perspective of the study has been informed by scholarship that analyses 
how concrete social conditions may give rise to a sense of community among peo-
ple of heterogeneous social background (Hansen 1997; Malkki 1990; Malkki 1995b; 
Samaddar 1999; Sommers 2001; Willems 2003). My analysis has focused on differ-
ent “elements” or criteria for claiming a particular community identity in response 
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to their predicaments of exile. Chapter  4 started with the frequent observation 
of male refugees that the conditions of exile had reduced them to “nothings” or 
socially useless persons (adinat n bànan or aytedim). Refugees in Niamey used 
this term adinat n bànan (or aytedim) to express dismay at their loss of family 
authority, bemoaning that they were no longer able to respond to the expectations 
placed on them in their roles of fathers and husbands. With this, a central feature 
of the ideal of adult masculinity was no longer in place, and family members no 
longer paid them due respect and heeded their directives. Along similar lines, my 
Bellah-Iklan informants in Abala argued that the “arrogant attitudes” of humani-
tarian workers toward the refugees made them feel like children again. By describ-
ing their life in the refugee camp as a situation of social childhood, Bellah-Iklan 
men, too, centered on their experience of being degraded in their roles as men and 
family fathers. My informants identified the regulations imposed by the UNHCR 
in the refugee camp in Abala as the main motor of this degradation. Their feelings 
that the regulations subverted conventional gender hierarchies within the family 
and increased their own vulnerability culminated in the claim that, under these 
conditions of exile, “women become men and men become women.”
The chapter, therefore, demonstrated that both groups of exiles took their ex-
periences of degradation and humiliation as a reference point to project them-
selves as communities with shared past and a joint future. My informants’ reliance 
on prophecies, proverbs––and of memories of instances of their marginalization 
within the Malian nation-state allowed them to recognize their new situation in 
exile as a “familiar” one (see the interpretation of Marris 1974). These explanations 
also enabled them to frame their situation as a collective experience, that is, as an 
experience that concerned them as a community.
The ways in which my informants constructed their group identities in exile 
differed significantly from how they are commonly portrayed in the scholarly lit-
erature. Both groups of informants were intent on silencing intra-group cleavages 
stemming from their original clans and federations and were adamant in their 
assertion that former clan distinctions no longer mattered to them. As chapter 5 
detailed, my informants took their historical position vis-à-vis the Malian state 
since 1960 as another reference point to frame themselves as communities with a 
shared past and future. Interlocutors from both groups of refugees recalled their 
personal encounters with the state over the past decades in northern Mali to re-
construct their group identity in oppositional terms, that is, as defined by a double 
opposition: against the Malian state and against each other. Chapter 6 has shown 
that both groups of refugees use racial stereotyping to define their respective com-
munities in moral, social, and physiognomic terms.
Chapter 7 departed from the focus on narratives of chapters 4, 5, and 6 and 
looked at other social practices of community constructions and their social 
significance. The chapter demonstrates the social significance my informants at-
tribute to their daily mutual visits and socializing activities, and also to dress, 
language and choice of al-guitara music. In Niamey, the main rationale for these 
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preferences and practices was that they instilled and reinforced the refugees’ de-
sire to return and live in their country (akal). In Abala, informal gatherings and 
information exchange “under the hangar” created a social space for Bellah-Iklan 
men in which to reflect on their decisions to stay in the refugee camp and a place 
where they all could listen to, and express their preference for, songs sung by 
Bellah-Iklan’s musical group called ataregh (histoire). All these practices and ex-
pressions of sociality allowed refugees to define and claim group membership in 
Niamey and Abala. In contrast to the preceding chapters, which illustrated how 
refugees imagine and construct the group to which they belong as a homoge-
nous community, this chapter discussed idioms that point to cleavages within 
each group. The cleavages are between those who hold to their history and those 
who do not. This demonstrates that the endeavor of refugees to reconstruct inclu-
sive communities in Niamey and Abala has remained partly incomplete because 
they have turned out to be not totally inclusive. By seeking to reconstruct their 
groups’ identities in new ways, the refugees have ended up creating new lines 
of intra-group cleavages and exclusions, thus making the initial intention of the 
collectivity formations difficult to achieve.
Another key finding of the study has been that, as part of their effort to recon-
struct themselves as communities in exile, members of both groups of refugees 
redefined the inferior social status they held in society “back home” in Mali. Re-
viewing the long tradition of scholarship on Tuareg social organization and their 
social and political history in northern Mali, I pointed out that they tended to fo-
cus on and adopt the perspective of free-born and noble Tuareg and, among them, 
on politically dominant groups. These authors emphasize significant regional dif-
ferences between the free born, and trace these differences to their distinct gene-
alogies and histories of settlement in the Sahara desert region that currently forms 
part of Mali. My study complements the perspective of these authors by drawing 
on how the free-born white Tuareg in Niamey dismissed the relevance of these 
regional cleavages and the former social status hierarchy between free born of in-
ferior social status and noble free-born Tuareg clans in exile. Similar to the Sikhs 
who, according to Das, invoked a “we” group which was created out of a hetero-
geneous population, free-born refugees of different social background imagined 
themselves as a homogenous group in Niamey. They did so by constructing argu-
ments about their past experiences that fused them together into one community 
and distinguished them from others living in northern Mali. Another mode of 
invoking a “we” group was to stress their common moral characteristics. Further-
more, my study complements the existing scholarship on Tuareg social organiza-
tion and their social and political history in northern Mali by showing how the 
Bellah-Iklan refugees also dismissed the relevance of inter-Bellah cleavages and 
redefined the former social status hierarchy between themselves and their free-
born “masters.” They did so by also articulating claims about their past experi-
ences that fused them together into one community and distinguished them from 
others living in northern Mali.
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Rather than searching for the truth-value of their historical accounts (Eppel 
2009), I followed Cole’s and Olivier de Sardan’s attention to the form of narrating 
the past (Cole 2003; Olivier de Sardan 1976). This allowed me to understand that 
the narratives of both groups were informed by the desire to disregard their in-
ferior social background and to stress, instead, commonality and sharing among 
the members of each group. Here I followed the argument by Foucault that power 
cannot be monopolized by those in power, but that subordinated groups can also 
appropriate it to question the definitional power of the dominant groups (Foucault 
1980, 40). I argued that the reliance on stereotyping discourses allowed refugees of 
inferior social status to challenge the hierarchy between themselves and the more 
dominant groups. The discussions of the refugees’ steorotyping or labeling dis-
courses also provided insights into scholarly debates on ethnicity discourses and 
as boundary drawing, by showing the key relevance of steorotyping or labeling 
in these discursive practices. In contrast to studies that conceive of identity for-
mations mainly as a matter of discourse on exclusion and inclusion, the refugees’ 
arguments discussed in chapter 6 illustrated that “othering” practices entail the 
positing not only of social difference (e.g. Barth 1969; Epple 2014; Geschiere 2009; 
Kopytoff 1987; Lentz 2006; Lentz 2013; Schlee 2002; Schlee 2008), but of moral 
hierarchies (Brenner 1993; Malkki 1989; Tambiah 1985).
Ultimately, these ways in which the refugees re-ordered the Tuareg society 
present new challenges to nation-state formation in Mali. Scholars who discuss 
the relations between the Tuareg and the central state since colonial times argue 
that the Malian nation-state has failed to become an inclusive political community 
and has been repeatedly challenged by Tuareg secessionists’ movements. These 
scholars have adopted the perspective of the free-born white Tuareg and state re-
lationship, ignoring the resentment of the Bellah-Iklan towards the state and also 
failing to point out that their perspective on free-born Tuareg was eclectic and 
partial. Against this portrayal, my study has made two related arguments: Firstly, 
that these scholarly accounts have always been partial and, secondly, that as a re-
sult of more than five decades of persecution, expulsion, and exile, and particu-
larly in response to the recent upheaval in northern Mali, the Bellah-Iklan now 
consider themselves (and are considered by free-born Tuareg) as a distinct “eth-
nic” group. They may speak Tamasheq but this does not make them belong to the 
Tuareg community as is imagined by free-born Tuareg in exile. In line with this 
view, my Bellah-Iklan informants in Abala stressed their first-comer status in their 
area of origin, and that this status historically endowed them with primary access 
rights to land. The book has also shown that both groups of informants expressed 
the membership of their community and difference from each other through spe-
cific social practices in everyday life in Niger. By thus showing that the refugees’ 
constructions of community in Niamey and Abala were made up of different cri-
teria, my study conveys a much more complex picture of identity formations and 
discourses than that of other authors (who focused only on white Tuareg and took 
their claims and arguments and points of view at face value).
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Retracing the multi-dimensional nature of the identity claims and community 
formations at work in the Tuareg diaspora in Niger, the study has shed light on 
various and complex tensions that exist between the two different segments of 
Tuareg society, all of whom nourish their own grievances against each other and 
against the Malian state. In my view, these claims are not only the result of recent 
events in northern Mali but have also further complicated the inter-social status 
groups conflicts since the colonial era. In 2012, the conflicts first started with vio-
lent confrontations between the Tuareg secessionist movement (MNLA) and the 
Malian army, and has subsequently expanded into a conflict that involves a range 
of actors and organizations, among them, notably, the militant Islamist groups 
the Mujao, AQMI, Ansar-Eddine as well as the secularist-minded free-born white 
Tuareg military structures, that are the CMA created by the noble Tuareg in Kidal, 
and the GATIA created by the vassal social status groups in Menaka and Kidal. 
Any peace-building effort must take into account this complexity; to settle local 
tensions one needs to consider the grievances different groups hold against each 
other and also vis-à-vis the central state in Bamako. The refugees’ comments and 
claims made it abundantly clear that the central state lacks legitimacy in their eyes.
Both groups of informants tended to present their collectivity as an alternative 
framework for political belonging. The free-born white Tuareg in Niamey envi-
sioned a future independent Tuareg nation as one that granted its people secu-
rity, prosperity, and justice, all of which (the informants stressed in Niamey) the 
Malian state had failed to provide since the early days of independence. As for 
the Bellah-Iklan, they envisaged their return to a situation where free-born white 
Tuareg would be absent, where social and political relations would be shaped by 
justice and where the Bellah-Iklan, as the numerical majority, would take over 
political control in Menaka. Peace-building efforts need to take into considera-
tion these discrepant, and partly diametrically opposed visions and aspirations. 
Such a development, to which the multi-dimensional nature of the identity claims 
and community formations at work in the Tuareg diaspora in Niger has given 
rise, provides some answer to my initial question, to wit: can the exile of the two 
different groups of “Tuareg” refugees from Mali be considered a “critical event”? 
In addition, the multi-dimensional nature of the identity claims and community 
formations at work in the Tuareg diaspora in Niger also allows for conceptualizing 
exile not just as particular social contexts and fragments of time disconnected 
from the refugees’ antecedents and the future (Agier 2008; Agier 2011; Bourgeot 
1990), but as a social context in which the refugee actors live simultaneously across 
spaces: their ordinary sites of living before exile, their current social and political 
contexts in exile, and to where they return after exile.

List	of	Acronyms
ADEMA Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali
ACTED Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
ANSAR EDDINE Islamist faction created by Iyad Ag Ghaly
AQMI Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique
ARLA Armée Révolutionaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad
ATT Amadou Toumani Touré
CFA Communauté Financière d’Afrique
CMA Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad
CNE Comité National d’Éligibilité
DEF Diplôme d’Études Approfondies
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EMIA École Militaire Interarmes
FIAA Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad
FNLA Front National de Libération de l’Azawad
FPLA Front Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad
GATIA Groupe autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés
GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat
IBK Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
IRD Institut de Recherche pour le Développement
LASDEL Laboratoire d’Études et de Recherche sur les Dynamiques Sociales 
et le Développement Local
MFUA Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad
MNLA Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad
MPA Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad
MPGK Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy
MPLA Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad
MUJAO Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest
NCA Norwegian Church Aid
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
OCRS Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes
PSP Parti Soudanais Progressiste
RPM Rassemblement pour le Mali
SAP Structural Adjustment Programs
UDPM Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien
UMADD Union Malienne pour la Démocratie et le Développement
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US-RDA Union Soudanaise—Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
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